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Abstract 
 
The existing state-of-the-art in the field of application layer Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
protection is generally designed, and thus effective, only for static web domains. To the best of our 
knowledge, our work is the first that studies the problem of application layer DDoS defense in web 
domains of dynamic content and organization, and for next-generation bot behaviour. In the first part of 
this thesis, we focus on the following research tasks: 1) we identify the main weaknesses of the existing 
application-layer anti-DDoS solutions as proposed in research literature and in the industry, 2) we obtain a 
comprehensive picture of the current-day as well as the next-generation application-layer attack behaviour 
and 3) we propose novel techniques, based on a multidisciplinary approach that combines offline machine 
learning algorithms and statistical analysis, for detection of suspicious web visitors in static web domains. 
Then, in the second part of the thesis, we propose and evaluate a novel anti-DDoS system that detects a 
broad range of application-layer DDoS attacks, both in static and dynamic web domains, through the use 
of advanced techniques of data mining. The key advantage of our system relative to other systems that 
resort to the use of challenge-response tests (such as CAPTCHAs) in combating malicious bots is that our 
system minimizes the number of these tests that are presented to valid human visitors while succeeding in 
preventing most malicious attackers from accessing the web site. The results of the experimental 
evaluation of the proposed system demonstrate effective detection of current and future variants of 
application layer DDoS attacks. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1  Overview of the Problem and Motivation  
 
In an era marked by hyper production and consumption of information, there are many web sites that 
experience very rapid and dynamic change in their structure – both in terms of the number of web pages 
and hyper-link connections among them and the contextual information that each individual page provides. 
Online newspapers, online trading sites and social media sites, are examples of web domains where the 
creation of new pages and changes to their content occur on the time scale of minutes, if not seconds. 
 
The browsing behaviour
1
 of users visiting a web site is very much influenced by the site’s organization 
and content. Consequently, every time the site’s organization and/or content changes (one example of this 
would be the creation of a ‘breaking-news’ page on a news-agency web site), the users’ browsing 
behaviour on that site is also likely to change. Figure 1.1 illustrates the structure of a typical news agency 
web site, at two different instances of time - before and after a number of pages have been added/deleted. 
Figure 1.1 also demonstrates that the typical web session trail of regular human visitors can change from 
times t1 to t2 as the web site’s content evolves (i.e., new breaking news is added to the site). Note that 
                                                     
1
 Browsing behaviour is characterized by the number and sequence of pages visited, viewing time spent on each 
visited page, etc.. 
                                                                                             1 
2 
 
several studies have shown that even in web sites of static structure and content, the browsing behaviour of 
its users may change with each subsequent re-visitation of the site ([1], [2]). 
 
Main Page
Article 6 Article 2 Article 4Article 5
Most likely web 
session request 
sequence Breaking News
Story at t2
Main Page
Article 1 Article 2
Breaking News 
Story at t1
Time t2Time t1 t1 << t2
Article 4Article 3
 
Figure 1.1 – A sample news agency web site with evolving content 
 
Successful operation of any given web site − static or dynamic − is closely tied to its ability to provide 
instantaneous response to its users. Security attacks capable of severely degrading the response-rate and 
quality at which web-based services are offered are known as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) is an amplified, and thus increasingly more potent, version of DoS that involves 
a whole distributed network of attacking machines – also known as a Botnet. Nowadays, the means to 
carry out sophisticated DDoS attacks that can result in immense financial losses are within easy reach of 
anyone with a PC and an Internet connection [3]. Due to their great affordability combined with a 
significant damage potential, DDoS attacks have emerged as the weapon of choice for both financially-
motivated cyber criminals as well as politically motivated hacktivists. 
 
From the technical standpoint, a DDoS attack can be conducted at the network, transport or application 
layer involving a range of different protocols. The leading DDoS solution providers commonly agree that 
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the use of application-layer DDoS attacks is growing at a much higher rate relative to network and 
transport layer DDoS attacks (see [4]). The main reason behind the growing popularity of application-layer 
DDoS is the fact that the conventional anti-DDoS tools have much looser control over application layer 
traffic [5]. That is, application-layer DDoS attacks have to deal with fewer layers of protection/security, 
and thus are more likely to be successful. 
 
Current state-of-the-art in the field of application-layer DDoS protection, refer to Tables 3.3 and 3.4 in 
chapter 3, is generally designed (and thus effective) only for static web domains. The main goal of our 
work is to identify the main weaknesses of the existing application-layer anti-DDoS solutions, and to 
obtain a comprehensive picture of the current-day as well as the future application-layer attack behaviour. 
With this knowledge in mind, we propose a novel anti-DDoS system which, through the use of advanced 
techniques of data-mining, has a potential to defend against a broad range of application-layer DDoS 
attacks, both in static and dynamic web domains. 
1.2 Thesis Contributions 
 
Our body of work has two main contributions: 
 
1. We examine the current state-of-the-art in automated benign and malicious web crawler’s browsing 
behaviour. Specifically, we apply machine learning techniques in combination with traffic pattern 
analysis and syntactic log parsing, on several different sets of real-world web logs, to identify 
similarities/differences in the browsing behaviour of various web visitors. Through this novel 
experimentation, we identify malicious bots that exhibit human-like browsing behaviour as well as 
human visitors that demonstrate malicious bot browsing behaviour and could potentially be malicious 
themselves. Next, we identify several non-contextual web session browsing features that can be used 
to separate these two groups of visitors. Lastly, we demonstrate that two non-parametric statistical 
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tests can be employed to separate suspicious (i.e. malicious) and benign visitors based on the 
difference in the distribution of contextual web session features such as web page popularity rankings 
and web page viewing times. This work is outlined in chapters 4 and 5 and has been published in [6], 
[7], [8], [9], [10]and [11]. 
2. Building on the results of 1, we propose a novel next-generation anti-DDoS system that ensures 
effective detection of current and future (i.e., next-generation) application layer DDoS attacks in both 
static and dynamic web domains. According to our knowledge, this system is the first to tackle the 
problem of detection of application layer DDoS attacks in dynamic web domains. Also, this system is 
the first to combine the deployment of automated unsupervised outlier detection algorithms with the 
deployment of manual challenge-response tests in order to separate legitimate web visitors from 
malicious attackers. The key advantage of our system relative to other systems that resort to the use of 
challenge-response tests (such as CAPTCHAs) in combating malicious bots, is that our system 
ensures that an absolute minimum of these tests is presented to valid human visitors while completely 
succeeding in preventing malicious attackers from accessing the web site. This work is outlined in 
chapter 6, and has been published in [6], [12] and [13]. 
 
Additionally, we focus on the following research problems in the thesis: 
 
 We present the limitations of current research and commercial anti-DDoS solutions. This work is 
outlined in chapter 3. 
 We evaluate the application of both the supervised and the unsupervised machine learning techniques 
for classification of various web site visitors. We demonstrate that supervised machine learning can 
be employed to 1) classify user sessions as belonging to either automated benign web crawlers or 
human visitors, and 2) identify which browsing features are the most useful in identifying various 
visitors groups. Note that this methodology can be applied in sites where there exists a ‘natural 
separation’ of benign vs. malicious behaviour that is possibly known to the system administrator. 
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Secondly, we also show that unsupervised machine learning can be utilized to obtain a better insight 
into the types and distribution of visitors to a public web site based on their link-traversal behaviour, 
as well as to identify suspicious outlier malicious/unknown visitors that exhibit human browsing 
behaviour and suspicious outlier human visitors that mimic malicious browsing behaviour on a web 
site. Note that the unsupervised learning should be used in domains/sites where the differences 
between benign and malicious visitors are far more subtle, and thus difficult to identify or capture. 
This work is outlined in chapters 4 and 5. 
 We identify and rank the quality of the features that are typically employed in research literature for 
the task of detecting web crawlers by employing supervised machine learning. We also introduce two 
novel classification features that are highly ranked by the information gain and gain ratio metrics in 
terms of their purity or value in the classification task. This work is outlined in chapter 4. 
 We propose two novel sophisticated HTTP-based DDoS attacks that were employed to evaluate the 
attack detection performance of our next-generation anti-DDoS system. These attacks are discussed in 
chapter 6. 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
 
To provide the relevant context, the remainder of the thesis is organized as follows:  
 In chapter 2, we introduce the reader to DDoS motivation, techniques and existing defenses as 
proposed in research literature.  
 In chapter 3, we focus our discussion on the application-layer DDoS attacks and outline the 
limitations of previous approaches, both in theory and in industry, on detection and mitigation of such 
attacks.  
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 In chapter 4, we review the state-of-the-art in automated web-crawler browsing behaviour and utilize 
several supervised machine learning and statistical techniques for detecting both benign and malicious 
web crawlers in static web domains. 
 In chapter 5, we study suspicious web visitors, identified in chapter 4, by employing unsupervised 
machine learning and two statistical techniques.  
 In chapter 6, we present our next-generation anti-DDoS system that is intended for dynamic web 
domains facing sophisticated variants of application-layer DDoS attacks. We also present the 
experimental results concerning the detection of synthesized DDoS traffic using our proposed system. 
 Lastly, in chapter 7, we conclude the thesis with a summary of our main contributions and findings, 
and we discuss some possible directions for future work. 
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Chapter 2 Denial of Service - Motivation, 
Methodology and Defenses 
 
DoS attacks have become an increasingly prevalent form of security threat in today’s Internet [4]. The first 
section of this chapter (section 2.1) gives a general overview of DoS motivations, impacts and execution 
mechanisms. section 2.2 looks into the DDoS attacks, as the most common as well as the most challenging 
form of DoS attacks. This section also discusses different DDoS variants. In section 2.3, the DDoS 
malware, as utilized by attackers to launch and manage actual attacks, is described. Lastly, in section 2.4, 
we discuss and evaluate briefly some traditional mechanism for DDoS defences. 
2.1 Denial of Service: Motivations, Impacts, Execution Mechanisms 
 
DoS attack falls into the group of so-called ‘availability attacks’, i.e. attacks whose main goal is to prevent 
legitimate users from accessing information or services. Unlike attacks on data confidentiality and 
integrity, the DoS attacks do not aim to steal, corrupt or modify data directly, nor do they attempt to gain 
unauthorized access into a victim’s machine. DoS attacks are accomplished by either crashing the victim 
system, or simply exhausting the system’s processing and/or bandwidth resources. 
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2.1.1 DoS Motivations 
The most common motivations for DoS attacks are: personal, economic, and political. 
1) DoS Motivated by Personal Goals: The early DoS attacks were merely proofs of concept or simple 
pranks played by hackers. The ultimate goal was to prove that something could be done, such as taking 
a large, popular web site or an online chat forum offline. For instance, most of the attacks on IRC 
(Internet Relay Chat)
2
 networks in the late 1990s were done by sophisticated hackers participating on 
the IRC chat forums [14].  
2) DoS Motivated by Economic Incentives: In recent years, DoS attacks have increasingly become part 
of extortion attempts, as mentioned in [14], [15], [16], [17], [18] and [19]. In these criminal schemes, 
an online business is threatened with a DoS attack that would slow down the business to a crawl, and a 
payment is requested as means of avoiding the attack and its consequences. 
3) DoS Motivated by Political Agendas: Political agendas are another common motive for DoS attacks. 
As described in [15], in 2007, a series of large and sustained DoS attacks were launched against several 
Estonian government web sites immediately after Estonian government decided to relocate a Soviet-era 
war memorial commemorating an unknown Russian who died fighting in the World War II. The 
clashes between Russia and Georgia over the region of South Ossetia in July 2008 have resulted in DoS 
attacks as well [20]. Another politically motivated attack from September of 2012 was believed to be 
orchestrated or sponsored by the Iranian government [21]. In this event, a stream of DDoS attacks were 
launched against several large US banks in protest of YouTube's refusal to take down a trailer of the 
controversial anti-Islam movie. 
 
                                                     
2
 IRC is a form of real-time Internet text messaging protocol running on top of TCP protocol. 
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2.1.2 DoS Impacts 
 
Use of Internet services – both commercial and private – has become an integral part of our lives. 
Examples of daily Internet activities include: conducting business transactions, storing and accessing 
patient records in hospitals, taking online courses, socializing with friends, etc. An attack to the 
availability of Internet services can incur serious damages to both - the sites (i.e., companies) under the 
attack as well as their end-users. In some instances, as will be discussed here, it can even cost human lives. 
Particular examples of damages incurred by DoS attacks are summarized in Table 2.1. 
 Table 2.1 – DDoS Impact on Various Online Services 
 Impact 
E-commerce 
E-commerce companies that offer services to users through online stores can only accumulate 
revenue if the users can access their web sites. A DoS attack on such a web site can reduce the 
company’s revenue not only for the duration of the attack, but even well after the attack has 
been successfully thwarted. Namely, studies like [22] and [23] have shown that unavailability 
of a web site tends to drive users away and limit future investor funding. 
News and Search 
Engines 
Large news sites and search engines are paid by marketers to present their advertisement to 
the public, and the revenue is typically accumulated on ‘per-view’ or ‘per-click’ basis. Hence, 
whenever such a web site undergoes a prolonged DoS attack, the financial gains of all 
companies involved can be significantly reduced 
web 
Conferencing 
web-based video conferencing and web-based file sharing are commonly utilized by multi-
branch companies, to enable effective communication and collaboration between remote 
offices. Clearly, a DDoS attack on the network infrastructure of these companies could have a 
detrimental impact on their operation. 
Internet 
Backbone 
A DoS attack on a DNS server – especially the upper-tier ones – can be very damaging to a 
broad range of companies and users. Namely, by flooding the domain name server of a zone, 
the DNS records of all organizations in the given zone may (will) become unavailable, thus 
preventing the future users from properly accessing the multitude of impacted sites 
Public 
Infrastructure 
The Internet is gaining an increasingly important role in the management of public services 
such as hospitals, police, water, power and sewage systems, etc. Unquestionably, a DoS attack 
on any of these critical services, aimed at interrupting their normal operation, could ultimately 
endanger human lives. Fortunately, there have not been documented real-world cases of 
where an actual human life was lost due to a DoS attack. However, in the future, as these 
services become more increasingly connected to the Internet, this scenario could be possible 
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2.1.3 DoS Execution Mechanisms 
 
The ultimate goal of a DoS attack is to prevent legitimate users of an online service from using that 
service. This goal can be achieved in a number of ways, some of them involving the following: 
1. Consumption of computational resources, such as bandwidth, disk space, memory pool or processor 
time, on the victim system. 
2. Disruption of state information, such as unsolicited resetting of TCP or SIP sessions, on the victim 
system (i.e., end-host). 
3. Disruption of configuration information, such as routing information, on the infrastructure components 
leading towards the victim system. 
 
Of the above, group (1) are the most common type of DoS attacks. Though, in order to magnify their 
power, DoS attacks also frequently utilize a combination of the above enlisted mechanisms. 
 
Now, the DoS attacks of group (1) are successful in consuming resources of the victim system only if they 
involve great network and computational resources. The most straightforward way of ensuring sufficient 
network and computational power are consumed is by employing a multitude of attack machines. Such 
DoS attacks - involving a large number of (often compromised third-party) attack machines - are 
commonly referred to as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.  
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2.2 Distributed Denial of Service 
 
A DDoS attack is a coordinated attack on the availability of services of a given target system or network 
that is launched indirectly through many compromised computing systems. The services under attack are 
those of the “primary victim”, while the compromised systems used to launch the attack are often referred 
to as the “secondary victim”. The owners and users of the secondary victim machines typically have no 
knowledge that their system has been compromised and will be taking part in a DDoS attack. 
 
While the presence of one primary and numerous secondary victims is common to all DDoS attacks, 
individual DDoS attack can vary in a number of features ( [24], [25] and [26]), as given below and 
illustrated in Figure 2.1: architecture, impact, exploited vulnerability, attack rate dynamics, and packet 
content. 
 
DDoS Attack 
Features
Architecture Impact
Exploited 
Vulnerability
Attack Rate
Packet 
Contents
Agent-Handler
Reflector
IRC-based
Disruptive
Degrading
Bandwidth 
Depletion
Resource 
Depletion
Continuous
Variable
Filterable Non-Filterable
Fluctuating Increasing
 
Figure 2.1 – DDoS attack features 
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In the remainder of this section, we will describe each of the above enlisted categories of DDoS attacks in 
more detail. 
2.2.1 Architecture Models of DDoS Attacks 
 
There are three architectural models of DDoS attack infrastructure: agent-handler model, reflector and/or 
amplifier model and IRC-based attack model. 
2.2.1.1 Agent-Handler Model  
This, most common model of DDoS infrastructure, consists of an attacker, handlers, agents, and the target 
network - commonly referred to as command and control server network (or C&C). The collection of 
attack machines involved in a DDoS attack is known as Botnet. Botnets are made up of vast numbers of 
compromised computers that have been infected with malicious code, and can be remotely-controlled 
through commands sent via the Internet. Figure 2.2 illustrates a sample Botnet deployment. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 – A sample Botnet deployment 
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The agents are usually machines with little or no security. For instance, these machines either do not patch 
their operating systems and other installed software on regular basis or do not have running anti-virus 
packages in the background. They are usually not protected by a firewall and their users have easily 
guessed passwords. The software that has not been patched has well-known vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited by the hacker.  
 
In order to avoid detection, an attacker attempts to hide its location by deploying several layers of 
indirection between itself and the agents. Specifically, the attacker utilizes machines, known as handlers or 
masters, to deliver (DDoS-attack) control messages to the agents. The attacker can even login in sequence 
through several machines, before accessing the handler. The machines accessed in sequence are known as 
stepping stones. This strategy complicates the task of tracing back the attacker from the victim’s machine, 
especially if the stepping stones and handlers are located in different countries or continents. IP spoofing, 
i.e. falsification of the actual IP address, is usually employed to obscure the origin of an attack (i.e., to hide 
the attacker’s location and identity). 
2.2.1.2 Reflector & Amplifier Model 
The architecture of this DDoS infrastructure model is very similar to the previous one. However, the 
additional parameter in this scenario, besides the attacker, agents and handlers, is the reflector machine. 
Namely, the difference in this type of attack is that agents are instructed by handlers to send a stream of 
packets with the victim's IP address as the source IP address to other uninfected machines, known as 
reflectors. (A reflector is any host that responds to requests, for example a domain name server (DNS) that 
responds to UDP requests or a web server that responds to TCP SYN requests with a SYN-ACK reply.) 
Reflectors can also be amplifiers if the attacker sends a message to a broadcast IP address which causes all 
systems in the subnet reached by the broadcast address to send a much larger reply back to the victim 
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system [27]. The benefit of this approach is that the attack traffic (and thus the DoS effect) is amplified 
tens or hundreds of times. 
2.2.1.3 IRC-Based Attack Model 
In contrast to the previous two infrastructures, which fall in the category of distributed and push-based 
models, the IRC-based DDoS infrastructure is centralized and pull-based. In this type of infrastructure, 
DDoS control messages are exchanged between the attacker and its agents by means of IRC 
communication channels, instead of by means of handler programs/machines.  
2.2.2 Impact of DDoS Attacks 
 
The impact of the DDoS attack can be either disruptive or degrading, as described below:  
 In a disruptive or high-grade DDoS attack the entire resource, such as bandwidth, CPU, memory or 
connection pool, will be exhausted by the attack, thus disrupting the access to the target from its 
legitimate clients.  
 The degrading or low-and-slow DDoS attack causes only the partial bandwidth consumption. This type 
of attack is sometimes difficult to detect because the traffic experienced by the target may only partially 
exceed the volume of traffic generated by usual/legitimate sources.  
2.2.3 Vulnerabilities Exploited by DDoS Attacks 
 
DDoS attacks can deplete either the bandwidth or the resource of the victim network/machine. 
2.2.3.1 Bandwidth Depletion 
In this class, attacker sends large volumes of malicious or unwanted traffic to the target network, in order 
to saturate the target-system’s network bandwidth. Clearly, for this type of attack to succeed, the flow of 
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traffic towards the victim must be high enough to exceed the system’s bandwidth capacity. Examples of 
bandwidth depletion attacks are HTTP, SSL, DNS, FTP, SMTP, SIP, UDP and ICMP flood attacks. 
2.2.3.2 Resource Depletion (Protocol attacks)  
The resource depletion or vulnerability attacks involve sending one or a few specifically crafted messages 
to the target application, that possesses a specific vulnerability, in order to shut down its service to 
legitimate clients [14]. The vulnerability can be either a software bug in the implementation or the 
exploitable logic vulnerability in the underlying protocol or application. Examples of these attacks include 
TCP SYN, SlowPOST [28], SlowRead [28], XML entity expansion (XEE) [29], ReDoS [30].  
2.2.4 Attack Rates in DDoS Attacks 
 
The attack rates in DDoS attacks can be either continuous or variable, as described below: 
 In the continuous attack, the agent machines generate attack packets with full force without interruption  
in traffic volume. This approach is very effective in producing the DoS effect but it is easily detectable. 
 The attackers that generate variable-rate attacks are more cautious in their engagement, i.e., they 
change the attack rate to avoid detection and response by the target. According to the rate change 
mechanism, there are two types of variable-rate DDoS attacks, increasing and fluctuating. In the 
increasing attack, the attacker employs a gradually increasing rate that slowly exhausts the victim's 
resources. In the fluctuating attack, the attacker adjusts the attack rate based on the victim's behaviour, 
occasionally relieving its effect to avoid detection. 
2.2.5  Content of DDoS Attack Packets 
 
The content of DDoS attack packets can be grouped into filterable and non-filterable: 
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 Filterable attacks are those that use malformed packets or packets for non-critical services of the 
victim's operation. These can thus be filtered by a firewall. Examples of such attacks are a UDP flood 
attack or an ICMP echo flood attack on a web server.  
 Non-filterable attacks use packets that request legitimate services from the victim. Thus, filtering all 
packets that match the attack signature would lead to an immediate denial of the specified service to 
both the attacker as well as the legitimate clients. Examples are a HTTP request flood targeting a web 
server or a DNS request flood targeting a name server. These are also referred to as application layer 
DDoS attacks. 
2.3 DDoS Malware 
 
Over the last decade, attackers have developed various techniques and tools for more effective execution 
of DDoS, including toolkits that facilitate the process of locating/recruiting/managing agent machines as 
well as simplify the actual execution of a DDoS attack. The systematic overview of DDoS malware is 
presented in Appendix A. A more detail overview of malware pertaining to application layer DDoS 
attacks, the focus of this work, will be presented in the following chapter. 
2.4 DDoS Defensive Strategies 
 
A number of factors can make the defence against a DDoS attack a rather challenging task, some of them 
being: 
1) A DDoS attack can involve hundreds of thousands of compromised hosts (i.e., attacking machines), 
possibly scattered all over the world. The defense against such DDoS attacks would require a widely 
distributed and cooperative response action by multitude of network operators. However, cooperation 
between different (especially multi-national) administrative domains is often hard to achieve. 
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2) In some cases, in addition to being located in diverse geographic locations, the compromised hosts are 
‘reprogrammed’ to use spoofed IP addresses. The defense against such Botnets is particularly 
challenging, as the true origins of the attacking traffic are hard, if not impossible, to identify. 
3) In the case of an application layer DDoS attack, malicious traffic tends to look very much like the 
traffic generated by legitimate user and, consequently, can be very difficult to identify (i.e., filter out). 
 
In spite of the numerous (potential) challenges in dealing with DDoS attacks, a plethora of defence 
techniques have been proposed both commercially and in academia. As presented in [31], [25], [32] and 
[33] (also see Figure 2.4), DDoS defence techniques can generally be classified based on deployed activity 
1) DDoS Prevention, 2) DDoS Detection, 3) DDoS Reaction/Mitigation, 4) DDoS Post-Attack Forensics. 
The taxonomy of the DDoS defenses is presented in Table 2.2. 
 
In the following chapter 3, we narrow our focus onto application layer DDoS attacks, specifically HTTP-
based DDoS attacks - the main research topic of this thesis. 
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Table 2.2 – Classification of DDoS Defences 
Type Technique Description Main Disadvantage 
Prevention 
Packet Filtering [32] 
Examines the header and payload of a 
packet in order to detect malicious or 
malformed field values. 
Unless the characterization is 
very accurate, filtering 
mechanisms run the risk of 
accidentally denying service 
to legitimate traffic. 
Disabling Unused 
Services 
Drops/Filters out unnecessary network 
traffic, e.g., UDP packets. 
Cannot prevent malicious 
traffic that utilizes 
legitimate/allowed packets. 
Anti-virus Tools 
(also see Section 3.4.2) 
Signature detection for malware 
infections on a computer host. 
New undiscovered 
vulnerabilities in the operating 
system (the so-called zero-day 
vulnerabilities), for which 
security updates are not yet 
available, can still be 
exploited by attackers to 
recruit new bots. 
Load Balancing 
Distributes the incoming traffic across 
multiple concurrently deployed servers 
or server farms (e.g., content delivery 
networks such as Akamai, CloudFlare, 
Limelight, Amazon's Elastic Cloud and 
Microsoft's Azure. 
Can be impracticable for 
small- to medium-size 
businesses, due to the high 
cost of deploying multiple 
servers and/or redundant 
bandwidth. 
Dedicated Anti-DDoS 
Appliances 
(also see Section 3.4.2) 
Hardware (and software) devices 
specifically designed to prevent and 
stop DDoS attacks. 
Impractical for small- to 
medium-size businesses, due 
to the high cost. 
Cloud-based Solutions 
(also see Section 3.4.2) 
So-called "scrubbing centers" that 
utilize large numbers of servers and 
bandwidth to filter traffic. 
High cost. The four well-
known companies that provide 
this kind of service are: 
Akamai, CloudFlare, Cisco 
and Arbor Networks. 
Detection 
Misuse/Signature 
Detection [34] 
Identifies well-defined patterns of 
known exploits and then looks out for 
the occurrences of such patterns. 
Intrusion patterns can be any packet 
features, conditions, arrangements and 
interrelationships among events that 
lead to a break-in or other misuse. 
Relies on existing (already 
identified) signatures of 
misuse, it can easily fail to 
detect new forms and 
variants of exploits. 
Anomaly Detection 
[35] 
Constructs a model of what is 
considered ‘normal behaviour’; and 
subsequently marks anything that does 
not fit this model as abnormal. 
Main challenge of all 
anomaly-based detection 
techniques is minimizing 
both the number of false-
positives and the 
computational overhead of 
attack detection. 
19 
 
Response/Reaction 
Rate-limiting [36] 
Impose a rate limit on a set of packets 
that have been characterized as 
malicious by the detection mechanism. 
The disadvantage is that rate 
limiting will allow some 
attack traffic through, so 
extremely high-scale attacks 
might still be effective even 
if all traffic streams are rate-
limited. Examples of rate-
limiting mechanisms are 
found in [36], [24] and [37]. 
Network 
Reconfiguration [38] 
Reconfigure the topology of the 
victim’s network or some of the 
intermediate networks, in order to add 
more resources to the victim or to 
isolate the attack machines. 
Only a temporary measure 
as after the reconfiguration, 
the attacker can always 
attack the new target point. 
Post-attack 
Forensics 
Traffic and Event 
Log Analysis 
Identify specific characteristics inside 
the attacking traffic. This data can, 
then, be used to update packet 
filtering, load balancing and throttling 
countermeasures, and thereby 
increase their efficiency and 
protection ability. 
Cannot prevent/detect 
imminent/occurring attacks. 
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Chapter 3 Application Layer DDoS Attacks and 
Related Defenses 
 
 
Application layer attacks are an increasingly prevalent type of DDoS attacks, as indicated in a recent 
survey [4]. These types of attacks are more stealthy than traditional network-layer and transport-layer 
DDoS attacks since the attacker utilizes legitimate looking application layer (typically HTTP-protocol) 
requests to overwhelm the victim server or degrade its performance.  
 
In this chapter, we present an overview of application layer DDoS attacks and their defences with the 
specific focus on HTTP-based DDoS attacks. Firstly, in section 3.1, we categorize and describe various 
types of application layer DDoS attacks. In section 3.2, we overview various types of the most common 
application layer DDoS attacks - HTTP-based DDoS attacks. In section 3.3, we highlight the 
sophistication and limitations of current malware toolkits that are capable of generating HTTP DDoS 
attacks. In section 3.4, we review the techniques for defending against HTTP DDoS attacks as proposed in 
research literature and in industry and discuss their limitations. Lastly, we present the main conclusions in 
section 3.5. 
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3.1 Overview of Various Types of Application Layer Attacks 
 
Application layer DDoS attacks can be executed by exploiting various application layer protocols such as 
HTTP(S), SSL, SIP, DNS, FTP, NTP or SMTP. Examples include: 1) DNS amplification attacks [27], a 
SSL renegotiation DDoS attack [39], a SIP (VoIP) flooding attacks [40], a FTP-based DDoS attacks 
against Windows Servers [41], a NTP amplification attack [42] and a SMTP-based DDoS attacks on mail 
servers [43]. 
 
However, as indicated in 2016 Arbor Networks' Worldwide Infrastructure Security report [4], 2014 
Prolexic's Quarterly report [44] and 2015 Akamai's State of the Internet report [45], the majority of 
application layer attacks are executed by means of the HTTP protocol. The rates of occurrence of various 
attack types at the application layer in 2015 are presented in Figure 3.1. 
 
3.2 Overview of HTTP-based DDoS Attacks 
 
Our work focuses on the most prevalent and potent variant of application-layer DDoS attacks – attacks that 
involve the use of HTTP protocol. HTTP-based attacks are typically concentrated on one particular web 
application on one particular victim server, with the ultimate goal of tying up the server’s resources. 
HTTP-based DDoS attacks are generally more efficient than TCP- or UDP-based attacks, primarily 
because the conventional anti-DDoS tools have much looser control over HTTP traffic [5].  
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Figure 3.1 – Distribution of application layer attacks in 2015 (source: Arbor Networks Inc.) 
 
3.2.1 Categories of Real-world HTTP-based DDoS Attacks 
 
The categories of HTTP-based DDoS attacks, occurring in the real-world, can be categorized as following: 
 Web Server Vulnerability Attacks. As described in [28], in the so-called SlowRead attack, the 
attacker exploits the vulnerability of web server's connection management logic. Specifically, the 
attacker exhausts the number of available HTTP sessions on a web server by sending partial time-
delayed HTTP requests. The SlowPOST attack achieves the same effect as the SlowRead attack but 
this time with an execution of a slow HTTP POST request. Another similar attack is Apache Range 
Header DoS attack on the Apache web server described in [46].  
 Web Application Vulnerability Attacks. In HashDoS attack [47], the attacker exploits vulnerable 
hash functions used in hash table implementations of many programming languages (e.g., PHP, 
ASP.NET, Python, Java) for web applications. XDoS attack [48] targets servers hosting web 
services. There are a number of variations of XDoS attacks such as: 1) a simple XML flooding 
attack on a web service, 2) XML entity expansion (XEE) [29] and 3) External entity reference  
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attack that exploits the XML parser functionality. ReDoS [30] attacks exploit the vulnerability 
specific to the most common implementations of regular expressions (regex). The vulnerability of 
regexes lies in the wide adoption of backtracking algorithms (rather than the traditional 
Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA) contraction) in modern programming languages to 
implement regex matching. As a result, crafting a malicious regex will result in the matcher taking 
exponentially long time (in input size) to process an expression and essentially failing to terminate, 
causing a DoS attack [30]. 
 One-shot HTTP attacks. As described in [49], [50] and [51], an attacker, from a single machine, 
may repeatedly request a single HTML page with a large image file from a web server or submit a 
search query to increase the load on the database server, behind the web server.  
 HTTP GET flooding attack. There are two variations of this type of an attack: a recursive and 
random recursive HTTP GET attack. As described in [51], and [52], in recursive HTTP GET attack, 
a bot is designed to continuously request a pre-defined random sequence of hardcoded list of pages 
from a web site. Random recursive HTTP GET attack, described in [51], is a modified version of 
Recursive GET but designed for forum sites or news sites where pages are indexed numerically, 
usually in a sequential manner. The attacking GET statements will insert a random number within a 
valid range of page reference numbers making each GET statement different than the previous one. 
The most common form of these types of attacks use GET requests but POST requests can be used 
as well. 
3.2.2 Malware Toolkits with HTTP-based DDoS Attack Capability 
 
There are a number of malware toolkits, introduced over the last 10 years, that provide support for 
generating various HTTP-based attacks. The following is the list of known HTTP DDoS toolkits with a 
brief summary of each: 
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 BlackEnergy [53] is a DDoS tool capable of launching several types of TCP, UDP and HTTP flooding 
attacks. The C&C operates as a PHP and MySQL server and can be accessed by its respective bots via 
standard HTTP protocol (i.e. through a URL of the form: http://domain-name/index.php). The bot’s 
malware is known to passively propagate through spam and malicious web sites. BlackEnergy is 
available for purchase through Russian language forums from computer hackers at around US$40. 
 Dirt Jumper [54] (also known as Russkill) is a newer version of BlackEnergy bot. It was introduced in 
January, 2009 with the most recent version 3.0 release in September, 2011. There are also some 
variants of Dirt Jumper bot such as Khan, Armageddon, Ferret, Aldi, Pandora and Di-BoTNet [52]. All 
of these bot variations support similar types of HTTP and TCP/UDP flooding attacks as the original 
BlackEnergy bot. In addition, the Dirt Jumper tool also supports a variable-rate HTTP DDoS attack. 
 Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) [55] is an open source denial of service attack tool that can be easily 
found for download on the Internet. LOIC supports HTTP, TCP and UDP flood attacks. Variants of 
LOIC include the High Orbit Ion Cannon (HOIC) and HULK [55]. 
 R-U-Dead-Yet (RUDY), PyLoris, OWASP DoS HTTP POST and Tor’s Hammer [55] are open source 
attack tools that support HTTP-based DDoS attacks such as SlowPOST and SlowRead. 
3.2.3 Characteristics of Web Browsing Behavior 
 
The successful detection of current and future HTTP-based DDoS attacks will rely on the ability to 
identify the differences in browsing behaviour between actual human visitors and web crawlers, both 
benign and malicious. Therefore, in this section, we examine the similarities and differences in browsing 
behaviour between human web visitors and current as well as future automated web crawlers or bots.  
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3.2.3.1 Browser-like and Non-Browser-like Browsing Behavior 
Human visitors employ a web browser
3
 (such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, etc.) to browse web 
site content. When a human visitor selects a web page to view in a browser, the browser retrieves this 
"primary" content web page (such as an HTML/ASP/JSP page) via a HTTP request packet and then issues 
HTTP requests for all embedded "secondary" content (such as embedded images, videos and script files). 
Note that the requests for primary content pages are explicitly requested by human visitors, as they enter 
the URL in the address bar, click on the hyperlinks or press back/forward buttons in the browser's window 
menu, while the secondary content is requested inline by the browser in order to properly present the entire 
content in the page. The graph in Figure 3.2 illustrates the hierarchical structure of a sample web site 
where the directed full-line edges represent the hyperlinks between primary objects and secondary/inline 
content is linked to the primary content with delimited edges.  
 
The browser's HTTP request for the primary and secondary pages includes the User Agent String (UAS). 
UAS specifies the hardware/software (i.e., browser, search engine crawler, Smartphone, tablet, etc.) used 
by the client to communicate with the server. It is generally assumed that a HTTP request carrying UAS 
corresponding to a well-known browser (e.g., Google Chrome, Internet Explorer, etc.) belongs to a human 
visitor. However, note that this HTTP packet field can be easily spoofed by malicious web visitors. For 
instance, LOIC is one of the tools that supports spoofing of UAS. 
 
Unlike humans, most (benign) web crawlers will typically exhibit non-browser-like browsing behaviour. 
Namely, web crawlers will request exclusively primary web pages (e.g., HTML pages) for indexing 
purposes [56] without requesting any of their embedded content. Some crawlers such as Google image bot 
                                                     
3
 A web browser (or browser) is a software application for retrieving, presenting and traversing information resources 
on the World Wide web. 
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will request exclusively image files (i.e. secondary/embedded content). In general, it is not expected that 
any benign crawler follow the request for a primary web page with requests for all its embedded content.  
3.2.3.2 Characteristics of Human Browsing Behavior 
Human browsing behaviour can be modeled by a number of metrics such as: 1) sequence of web pages 
visited on a particular web site or web domain, 2) time spent viewing/reading each web page, 3) number of 
pages viewed while visiting a particular web site or web domain, 4) number of images versus web pages 
downloaded, number of bytes downloaded from a particular web domain, etc.(these browsing behaviour 
features have been previously utilizing in analyzing differences between human and web crawler browsing 
behaviour in [56]).  
 
A number of surveys (e.g. [57] and [58]) of real-world web sites have shown that a vast majority of human 
visitors request (i.e., are only interested in) a very small set of web pages from a particular web site. 
Namely, we can expect that the majority of human visitors will be interested in the currently most popular 
content on the web site. (For a typical distribution of web page popularities and page viewing times of 
real-world web sites we have examined in our work, see Figures 5.13 and 5.15 in chapter 5, respectively.) 
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Figure 3.2 – The graph of a University course web site with primary and secondary web content 
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In general, on a given web site, the typical human browsing behaviour can be characterized by: 
a) Typical sequential browsing behaviour. 
b) Typical time-wise browsing behaviour. 
a) Typical Sequential Browsing Behavior of Human Visitors 
If we examine the diagram in Figure 1.1, we can expect that the "breaking news" web page would be (one 
of) the most accessed/viewed pages on that site. Also, a sequence of pages linking to the "breaking news" 
web page would be the most popular browsing path among typical human visitors. Moreover, on a 
University's course web page (see Figure 3.2), the newly added course material, in the form of a PDF file, 
will be (very likely) the most download page by students (i.e., typical human web visitors of this web site). 
 
Therefore, the typical sequential browsing behaviour of human visitors can be defined as the collection of 
the most frequent sequences or paths of primary page traversals through a web site by human web visitors.  
b) Typical Time-wise Browsing Behavior of Human Visitors 
In general, the page viewing times will be dependent on: a) the web site’s actual subject matters, b) the 
relevance of those subjects to the site’s visitor population and c) the impact the visual organization of 
information on each web-page has on the amount of time a human visitor needs to absorb the given 
information (before moving to the next page), etc.. For instance, in Figure 1.1 we expect that the "breaking 
news" page would be the page with one of the longest viewing times of all web pages on the web site, 
while in Figure 3.2, we would expect that the PDF file would the longest viewed page on that web site. 
Therefore, the typical time-domain browsing behaviour of human visitors can be defined as the range of 
time that most humans spend viewing/reading the contents of each page.  
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Now, in the context of application-layer DDoS attacks, it is reasonable to expect that it will be quite 
challenging for attackers to engineer their bots to correctly guess the typical sequential and time-wise 
browsing behaviour of human visitors. This is especially true in dynamic web domains where the web 
content is continuously added, updated or deleted and, consequently, where the typical sequential and 
time-wise browsing behaviour of human web visitors continuously changes.  
3.2.4 Categories of Current and Future HTTP-based DDoS Attacks  
 
Depending on the level of their sophistication and the likelihood of their successful detection using 
current-day intrusion detection systems, HTTP-based DDoS attacks can be grouped into the following 
three categories: trivial attacks, as currently supported by real-world malware samples, and future 
intermediate and advanced types of attacks expected to be available and dominant in the future. The 
taxonomy of HTTP-based DDoS attacks is outlined in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1 – Taxonomy of HTTP-based DDoS attacks 
Timeline 
Detection 
Level / Type 
Attack Characteristics 
Current 
(supported 
by existing 
Malware) 
Trivial 
 Each bot issues one or a few unrelated HTTP requests labeled with unknown 
or known-blacklisted UASs 
 Each bot issues one or a few unrelated HTTP requests labeled with spoofed 
UASs of well-known benign crawler (e.g., Googlebot and MSNbot) 
 Each bot issues one or a few unrelated sequence of HTTP requests labeled 
with spoofed UASs of legitimate web-browsers (e.g. Mozilla Firefox) 
 Web Server Vulnerability, Web Application Vulnerability, One-shot and 
HTTP GET/POST attacks 
Future 
(not 
supported 
by existing 
Malware) 
Intermediate 
 Each bot issues a (semi-random) sequence of HTTP requests that appear to be 
generated via a legitimate web-browser (i.e., by a legitimate human visitor) 
Advanced 
 Each bot issues a sequence of HTTP requests that appear to be generated via a 
legitimate web-browser and match a sequence of web-pages (possibly) 
browsed by a legitimate human visitor 
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3.2.4.1 Trivial Attacks 
In trivial attacks, each bot is instructed to send one or a limited number of unrelated HTTP attacks towards 
the target site. In terms of their HTTP-packet implementation, trivial attacks can be grouped into the 
following four sub-categories: 
1. Attacks that employ atypical/unknown or known-blacklisted UAS. In this type of attack, each malicious 
crawler issues HTTP requests containing a UAS that is not known or that has been previously 
identified as malicious by intrusion detection systems.
4
  
2. Attacks that employ spoofed UASs of legitimate web crawlers. In this type of attack, each malicious 
crawler issues HTTP requests labeled with a spoofed UAS of a known benign crawler such as 
Googlebot, MSNbot, etc.. By doing so, the attacker aims to evade an easy detection by the victim’s 
intrusion detection system.  
3. Attacks that employ spoofed UAS of legitimate web-browsers. In this type of attack, each malicious 
crawler issues HTTP requests labeled with a spoofed UAS of a legitimate web-browsers (e.g., the UAS 
of Google Chrome or Internet Explorer). By doing so, the goal is to make the attack packets appear 
indistinguishable from the packets generated by regular human visitors.  
4. Web Server Vulnerability Attack, Web Application Vulnerability Attack, One-shot HTTP Attack and 
HTTP GET/POST Flood Attack. In a Web Server Vulnerability Attack, the attacker breaks HTTP 
GET/POST requests into segments and then sends them to the target with a delay. In the Web 
Application Vulnerability Attack, One-shot HTTP Attack and GET/POST Flood Attack, the attacker 
sends a specially crafted valid but unusual HTTP request to the target. For instance, a specially crafted 
HTTP request could contain a computationally-expensive database query that triggers the web server to 
severely exhaust its computational resources. Any of these attacks may use either a known valid 
                                                     
4
 [64] is a good public repository of all known UAS, which are grouped into benign UASs (e.g., UASs corresponding 
to legitimate crawlers and browsers) and malicious UASs (e.g., UASs corresponding to spam bots such as 
bwh3_user_agent). In one of our earlier studies using real-world web traces, (see [10] and chapter 5), we have 
identified 1000s of distinct web visitors whose web requests are labeled with malicious or unknown UASs. 
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browser-like UAS, a known benign crawler-like UAS, a known malicious crawler-like UAS or an 
unknown UAS. 
3.2.4.2 Intermediate Attacks 
The intermediate attacks are more sophisticated than trivial attacks. In these attacks, bots are designed to 
continuously request a pre-defined random sequence of web pages with all of their embedded content. 
(Note, at the HTTP-packet level, the attacker can still choose to use any of the above mentioned strategies 
of UAS spoofing; though, the strategy of using UASs of legitimate browsers is most likely.) By producing 
longer sequences of requests that appear as being generated through a legitimate web-browser, the goal is 
to make the attack traffic ‘blend in’ with the regular human traffic much better than in the case of trivial 
attacks in group 3).  
3.2.4.3 Advanced Attacks 
It is believed that in the next few years the intermediate attacks will undergo further evolution – instead of 
a random attack sequence, the sequence of HTTP requests will be carefully chosen so as to better mimic 
the browsing behaviour of regular human visitors [59]. Namely, in the case of regular human browsing, a 
request for one web-page is typically followed by a request for another page that is directly linked to it. 
Moreover, the actual choice of the ‘next page’ is often determined by its contextual relevance5 with the 
first page requested. Clearly, to design an attack of this level of sophistication, the attacker will have to put 
a considerable effort into studying the victim’s site (i.e., its particular content and structure), and then 
make some educated guesses about the most likely human behaviour on a site with such characteristics. As 
shown in Figure 3.1, we expect that in an advanced attack, bots will be 'more-likely' to request web pages 
in a popular/typical sequence (unlike in the intermediate attack). 
 
                                                     
5
 For instance, let us suppose a web page contains topics on science fiction books, where each topic is marked as a 
link to another page where that topic is covered in more detail. If a user is interested in science fiction books about 
time travel, he/she will (most likely) follow the link on "science-fiction and time travel" web page. 
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Note that the goal of the attacker responsible for executing the advanced, intermediate and also trivial 
attacks such as Web Application/Server Vulnerability and One-Shot HTTP attacks might not be to 
inundate the server resources, but stealthily bring them down over a prolonged period of time. This is 
especially true in the case of the Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attacks. (For more on EDoS 
see [60], [61], [62] and [63].) However, attacker is free to choose to program their bots to generate 
volumetric/flooding versions of the above attacks as well. (Note that in some literature volumetric HTTP-
based attacks are referred to as Flash-crowd
6
 attacks.) 
 
The similarities and differences in the browsing behaviour of various attack bots (i.e., malicious crawlers), 
benign search engine crawlers (such as Googlebot, Yahoo, etc.) and human visitors are illustrated in 
Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3 – Browsing behaviour of human web visitors and various types of crawlers 
 
                                                     
6
 A legitimate Flash Crowd event is a situation where some popular information emerges on a web site (such as a 
news story or a sports event), and many browsers (i.e., human visitors) attempt to access that information, thus 
creating a large demand/load on the server. An attacker can easily achieve a “Flash Crowd”-looking effect by 
performing an excessive number of seemingly legitimate actions on the target web application 
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3.2.5 Defences Against Trivial, Intermediate and Advanced Attacks 
 
In this section, we outline the strategy for defending against trivial, intermediate and advanced attacks. 
3.2.5.1 Trivial Attack Detection 
The detection of subcategories of trivial attacks 1) to 3) can be accomplished as follows. As shown in [10], 
trivial attacks of group 1) can be detected by matching the UASs of received HTTP requests to UASs 
enlisted on [64] or other publically available UAS-whitelists. A possible way of detecting trivial attacks of 
type 2) is by verifying whether the bot’s IP address really belongs to the domain corresponding to the bot’s 
UAS (e.g., through reverse DNS lookup). Trivial attacks of type 3) can be either detected by verifying 
whether the true browser-like behaviour is exhibited (i.e., a request for a web-page is followed by requests 
for all of its embedded content). Note that, as shown in Figure 3.3, we expect that in a trivial attack 
scenario, bots will exhibit a non-browser-like browsing behaviour. 
 
As pointed earlier, the HTTP-based DDoS attacks from the fourth category of trivial attacks (see Table 
3.1) are only special cases of the first three types of trivial attacks, and consequently can be dealt with 
using the same defensive techniques. 
3.2.5.2 Intermediate Attack Detection 
As shown in Figure 3.3, we expect that in an intermediate attack scenario, bots will mimic a browser-like 
browsing behaviour but still request web pages in an atypical or uncommon web page sequence. We 
believe that the only way to defend against this type of attack will be through the use of sophisticated data 
mining techniques – techniques that can facilitate accurate modeling of sessions that are truly human-
generated (i.e., truly legitimate) and then effectively separate them from sessions that are ‘made up’ to 
look legitimate. Namely, the detection of intermediate attacks could be achieved by comparing the 
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sequences of requests in suspicious/attack sessions (i.e., the sequences of actually requested web-pages) 
with sequences that are typically generated by actual human visitors.  
3.2.5.3 Advanced Attack Detection 
Similarly to the case of intermediate attack detection, the detection of advanced attacks will require the use 
of sophisticated data mining techniques. In the advanced attack scenario, the amount of time that humans 
spend on a page will be very important in separating human visitors from human-mimicking bots as it is 
dependent on the amount of ‘contextual’ information found on that page, which cannot be easily 
faked/forged by automated bots. As shown in Figure 3.3, we expect that in an advanced attack scenario, 
bots will mimic a browser-like browsing behaviour, may or may not request web pages in a typical or 
popular web page sequence, but most like will not view web pages with an average web page viewing 
time. 
 
The detection and defence against the intermediate and advanced attacks will also be particularly 
challenging in dynamic web domains, as it will require the use of intelligent data-mining techniques that 
also operate in a real-time manner while performing adaptive tracking of ever-evolving user behaviour.  
3.3 State-of-the-Art and Limitations of HTTP-based DDoS Toolkits 
 
In Table 3.2, we summarize the current-day sophistication of various DDoS malware introduced in section 
3.2.2 (in the context of attack taxonomy outlined in Table 3.1), and outline their limitations.  
 
We can infer the following two major conclusions: 
1. None of the existing tools are capable of generating either an intermediate or an advanced DDoS attack. 
Namely, the existing tools do not implement the functionality of a browser (i.e., to the best of our 
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knowledge, these tools cannot be instructed to follow each request for a primary page with requests for 
all of page's embedded content). Therefore, they are only capable of executing trivial attacks such as 
Web Application/Server Vulnerability, One-Shot and HTTP GET/POST flood attacks) - see 3.2.4.1 
above.  
2. Also, in general, there is little variation in the capability of the existing tools to generate the HTTP-
based DDoS attacks. Some of these tools are very specialized (e.g., designed to exclusively generate 
SlowRead/SlowPOST attacks).  
 
 
 
Table 3.2 – Current attack capabilities of DDoS malware 
Malware 
HTTP-based Attack 
Sophistication 
Main Disadvantages 
Dirt Jumper [52] 
(some variants of Dirt Jumper bot include 
Khan, Pandora and Di-BoTNet [52]  One-shot 
 Recursive HTTP GET floods  
 Recursive Random HTTP 
GET floods  
 Spoofing UASs of legitimate 
web crawlers 
 Spoofing UAS of legitimate 
web-browsers 
 Do not parse web 
pages and do not 
retrieve embedded 
content 
 No capability to 
execute Web Server 
Vulnerability Attacks, 
intermediate or 
advanced attacks 
BlackEnergy [53] 
Armageddon [65] 
Ferret [66] 
Aldi [67] 
Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC)  
XOIC  
HULK [55] 
R-U-Dead-Yet (RUDY) / PyLoris  
OWASP DoS HTTP POST  
Tor’s Hammer [55] 
 Web Server Vulnerability 
Attacks 
 Spoofing UASs of legitimate 
web crawlers 
 Spoofing UAS of legitimate 
web-browsers 
 No capability to 
execute intermediate 
or advanced attacks 
 
 
35 
 
3.4 Overview of the State-of-the-Art in HTTP-based DDoS Defense 
 
In this section, we overview the techniques as proposed in research literature and in the industry for 
defending against the HTTP-based DDoS attacks and highlight their limitations in handling these types of 
attacks. 
3.4.1 Overview of Countermeasures against HTTP-based DDoS Attacks 
Proposed in Research Literature 
 
Table 3.3 presents the state-of-the-art in HTTP-based DDoS defense techniques as proposed in research 
literature. These techniques can be grouped into the following two main categories: 
1. Techniques that attempt to build the model(s) of regular human-user browsing behaviour from user-
traffic logs, and then match the behaviour of new users against these pre-built models. This approach is 
also known as anomaly detection (recall section 2.4). In these proposals researchers have employed a 
variety of methods to model regular or typical human-user browsing behaviour such as statistical 
modeling (i.e., wavelet analysis, auto-correlation analysis, Zipf's Law analysis, entropy analysis, 
Spearman correlation test), machine learning, Markov chains and traffic pattern modeling (such as 
packet rate flow analysis, browsing sequences and page viewing times analysis). 
2. Techniques that attempt to differentiate between human- and machine-generated HTTP sessions on the 
fly by employing active or passive CAPTCHA tests. 
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Table 3.3 –  State-of-the-art of HTTP-based DDoS defenses in research literature 
Strategy Research Solutions 
HTTP-based Attacks 
Protection 
Main Disadvantages 
Statistical Modeling 
[68], [60], [61], [62], 
[69], [70], [71], [72], 
[73], [74] 
 Recursive HTTP GET 
floods 
 Recursive Random HTTP 
GET floods 
 No protection from 
intermediate attacks in 
dynamic web domains  
 No protection from 
advanced attacks 
 Mostly employ features 
that can be easily emulated 
by attacking malware/bots 
Machine Learning 
[75], [76], [77], [78] 
[79], [80], [81], [82] 
Markov Modeling [83], [84] 
Deterministic Finite 
Automaton 
[85] 
Network Layer or  
Application Layer 
Metrics 
[86], [87], [88], [89], 
[90], [91], [92] [93], 
[94], [95], [96], [97], 
[98] 
[99] 
 Protection from 
intermediate and advanced 
attacks in static web 
domains 
 No protection from 
intermediate/advanced 
attacks in dynamic web 
domains  
Active 
CAPTCHAs 
[63], [100], [101], 
[102]  Provide protection from 
all HTTP-based DDoS 
attacks 
 Presents CAPTCHA to 
every web visitor 
Passive 
CAPTCHAs [103], [104], [105] 
 Attacker can pre-process 
the source file of the page 
to defeat the detection 
 
3.4.1.1 Anomaly Detection 
The techniques in group 1) are almost exclusively optimized to deal with static web domains and assuming 
relatively stable patterns of user browsing behaviour - they are not designed to deal with intermediate or 
advanced attacks against domains with evolving web content. For instance, in all works from group 1), 
except [90], the model(s) are constructed once, from the sample dataset and then evaluated on another 
(test) sample dataset. Note that such a pre-built model will become outdated as the typical browsing 
behaviour (page viewing times and sequences of web page accessed) of web visitors changes over time as 
the web content is updated, added or removed.  
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Also, some of the previous body of research on HTTP-based attacks considers distinguishing packet 
arrival rate differences between regular human visitors and attack crawlers. Note that these application-
layer DDoS mitigation solutions activate once the victim web server is under extreme duress. However, 
the attack traffic in intermediate or advanced attacks may not be volumetric but instead degrading (e.g., 
EDoS attacks discussed in section 3.2.4.3). As such, the packet rate between regular human visitors and 
'human-mimicking' malicious bots is expected to be similar and hence will be ineffective feature in 
capturing these types of bots.  
3.4.1.2 "On-the-fly" Detection (CAPTCHA, decoys and Turing Tests) 
On the other end of the spectrum, in group 2), authors propose employing active or passive CAPTCHA 
tests to differentiate between human and machine generated HTTP sessions on the fly. An active 
CAPTCHA test requires web visitors to solve graphical puzzle that can be easily solved by a human but 
not by a bot, e.g., recognizing numbers and letters on a distorted image. Only users who solve the puzzle 
are granted access to the service. However, although generally effective in accomplishing their task, the 
graphical puzzle tests are, often, irritating to human visitors, and thus must be served infrequently. (In a 
recent Scientific American article “Time to Kill-Off CAPTCHAs” [106], the author eloquently 
summarizes the commonly felt negative sentiment about CAPTCHA technology.) Also, they treat all 
automated crawlers equally – both the benign and malicious ones by completely blocking their access to a 
web site. In addition, the use of CAPTCHA farms - companies that employ thousands of people around the 
world, usually in developing countries, to solve CAPTCHAs and help spread spam [107] - has also been 
reported as an effective way of combating CAPTCHA-based defences. 
 
Passive CAPTCHAs such as scripts that monitor ‘user biometrics’ (mouse movement, page scrolling, etc.) 
[103] or decoy hyperlinks [104] and [105] are less invasive techniques to humans. However, the method in 
[103] has a higher likelihood of false positives — e.g., when users disable JavaScript — and false 
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negatives — because bots can modify their behaviour easily to fit the required patterns. The main 
disadvantage of the techniques described in [104] and [105] is that an attacker can circumvent the 
detection by pre-processing the source file of the web page and locating the decoys.  
3.4.2 Overview of Commercial Countermeasures against HTTP-based DDoS 
Attacks 
 
Given their prevalence and potentially detrimental consequences of application-layer DDoS attacks , there 
are many commercial anti-DDoS solutions designed to prevent and respond to these types of attacks. The 
sophistication and limitations in defending against the trivial, intermediate and advanced HTTP-based 
DDoS attacks of market-leading anti-DDoS solutions is presented in Table 3.4. 
 
Although majority of existing commercial solutions provide protection from trivial attacks, they are too 
generic and unsuitable for dealing with intermediate and advanced attacks with evolving web site content. 
Namely, they can be categorized into solutions that employ one or more of the following: 1) hard  
thresholds such as connection and packet rate limiting per IP address ( [108], [109], [110], [111], [112], 
[79], [113], [114]), 2) HTTP packet header content filtering such as UAS/referrer spoofing ( [115] [112]) 
and 3) aggregate traffic statistics ( [116], [117], [118], [119], [120], [113]). The drawbacks of these 
approaches can be summarized as follows: 
 Techniques that employ hard thresholds and/or well-known and publicized attacks signatures. In 
practice, the traffic characteristics can frequently change due to the evolving nature of the respective 
web domains. By relying on such static and non-adaptable parameters, these systems are clearly 
inadequate when it comes to web domains in which both the legitimate and attack traffic is likely to 
undergo continual and generally unpredictable change. It is, therefore, unreasonable to expect that hard 
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system-thresholds and attack signatures could provide adequate protection for such dynamic web 
domains.  
 Techniques that employ application layer packet header content filtering. The major drawback of 
simple packet content filtering is that attackers can easily circumvent detection by ensuring that their 
attack parameters follow the protocol specifications. 
 Techniques that rely on aggregate traffic statistics. Note that an algorithm that builds its detection 
strategy on ‘aggregate traffic statistics’ (e.g., total number of connections/packets) will likely not be 
able to distinguish (e.g.) between a true Flash Crowd incident (sudden surge of traffic generated by 
humans) and a sudden surge in traffic generated by a web crawler spoofing the UAS of a browser. 
Also, it is unreasonable to expect that these traffic statistics will stay constant in dynamic web domains. 
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Table 3.4 – State-of-the-art of commercial DDoS defenses 
Deployment 
Scenario 
Brand name 
HTTP-based Attacks 
Protection 
Main Disadvantages 
Network Security 
Appliance 
(Firewalls and 
IPS) 
Dell SonicWall [121] 
WatchGuard [122] 
Palo Alto Networks [108] 
Juniper's Junos DDoS 
Secure [115] [112] 
Barracuda [109] 
HP [116] 
McAfee (Stonesoft) [110] 
Sophos [111] 
F5 [114] 
 Recursive HTTP GET 
floods 
 Relies on hard thresholds 
and/or well-known and 
publicized attacks 
signatures and/or 
application packet header 
content filtering and/or 
aggregated traffic statistics 
 No protection from 
intermediate attacks in 
dynamic web domains 
 No protection from 
advanced attacks 
Dedicated 
Anti-DDoS 
Appliance 
Check Point Protector 
[117] 
 Recursive HTTP GET 
floods 
 Recursive Random HTTP 
GET floods   
 Web Server Vulnerability 
Attacks (trivial attacks) 
RioRey's DDoS 
appliances [118]. 
Huawei [119] 
Fortinet's FortiDDoS 
[123] 
 Recursive HTTP GET 
floods  
 Recursive Random HTTP 
GET floods   
 Web Server Vulnerability 
Attacks (trivial attacks) 
 Application Layer 
Filtering of HTTP Request 
packet to detect suspicious 
content such as User 
Agent strings, Cookies, 
Referrer fields 
Cloud-based 
(Scrubbing 
Solutions) 
Prolexic [124] [120] 
 Recursive HTTP GET 
floods 
 Recursive Random HTTP 
GET floods  
 Web Server Vulnerability 
Attacks (trivial attacks) 
Arbor Networks and 
Cisco Clean Pipes 2.0 
[113] 
Akamai SiteShield 
[125] 
3.5 Summary 
 
In the light of the attack taxonomy presented in Table 3.1, the detection of trivial HTTP-based attacks can 
be achieved through a simple packet-by-packet (i.e., request-by-request) inspection, and as such could be 
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easily integrated into many of the existing intrusion detection systems. (Some of the current-day 
commercial intrusion detection systems have such detection mechanisms already in place - see Table 3.4) 
The detection of intermediate and advanced attacks is considerably more complex, and generally requires 
the use of advanced techniques of statistical modeling. While (only) a few of the earlier research works 
have broached the issue of these attacks in the context of static web domains, to the best of our knowledge, 
there has been no previous research study on the detection and defence against the next-generation HTTP-
based application-layer attacks (i.e., intermediate and advanced attacks) in dynamic web domains. Also, it 
is very much evident that once these attacks start emerging, none of the current-day commercial anti-
DDoS solutions will be able to provide adequate defence against them.  
 
In the following chapter 4, we investigate the state-of-the-art in automated web crawler browsing 
behaviour and, in more depth, identify differences between the browsing behaviour of web crawlers and 
humans. Additionally, in chapter 4, we propose novel techniques for detection of various suspicious web 
visitors in stable/static web domains by utilizing various data mining and statistical techniques. Then, in 
chapters 5 and 6, we move onto explaining our methodology for building an anti-DDoS system for both 
static and dynamic web domains. 
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Chapter 4 Detection of Web Crawlers and 
Suspicious Web Visitors in Static Web 
Domains 
 
 
There have been a number of research works ([56], [126], [127], [128], [129], [130], [131], [132], [133], 
[134], [135], [136], [137], [138], [139], [140], [141], [142]), [143], [144], [145], [146], [147] and [148]) 
published over the last decade and a half on the topic of detecting browsing behaviour differences between 
human visitors and benign crawlers. However, very few studies have examined the detection of browsing 
behaviour differences between human visitors and malicious crawlers.  
 
In this chapter, we present our work on detecting malicious/suspicious web visitors with an assumption of 
an underlying static web domain. In section 4.1, we present an overview of the previous works dealing 
with the detection of mostly benign crawlers. Next, in section 4.2, we present our study on utilizing 
various supervised machine learning algorithms to detect malicious crawlers. To the best of our 
knowledge, this work is unique since it represents the first known attempt to separate malicious from 
benign visitors by employing novel features and multiple supervised machine learning algorithms. Lastly, 
in section 4.3, we present our concluding remarks. 
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4.1 Review of Existing Work on the Topic of Web Crawler 
Detection 
 
Defences that attempt to differentiate between human and machine-generated web/HTTP sessions can be 
grouped into the following three categories: 
1. Techniques that attempt to differentiate between humans and web crawlers by applying ‘single-
parameter rule-based analysis’ to the contents of the web server access logs (the so-called syntactic 
log analysis). 
2. Techniques that attempt to differentiate between humans and web crawlers by examining the 
‘multiple-parameter rule-based analysis’ in robot traffic (the so-called traffic pattern analysis). 
3. Techniques that attempt to differentiate between humans and web crawlers by employing supervised 
or unsupervised machine learning. 
4.1.1 Syntactical Log Analysis 
 
Syntactic log processing techniques classify web visitors by analyzing the contents of the web server 
access logs. A web server access log file is a time-ordered sequence of HTTP requests. Each entry (HTTP 
request) in the log includes the information such as the IP address/host name of the site visitor, the page 
requested, the date and time of the request, the size of the data requested and the HTTP method of request, 
UAS and the referrer field which specifies the web page by which the client reached the current requested 
page.  
4.1.1.1 Detection by IP Address 
The previous works that propose to identify web crawlers based on their IP addresses are [126], [127], 
[128]. In these studies, authors match the IP address of the visitor against an IP address database of known 
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web crawlers. The main disadvantage of this technique is the reliability and complexity of managing a 
database of IP addresses for each web crawler as they change over time. 
4.1.1.2 Detection by User Agent String 
The previous works that propose parsing a UAS to identify web visitors are [129] and [130]. The table of 
known user agent strings of browsers and crawlers can be found on web sites such as [149], [150] and 
[151]. As discussed in chapter 3, the main disadvantage of this technique is that malicious crawlers can 
easily spoof the user agent string in order to hide their true identity (e.g. LOIC tool can be used to spoof 
user agent string by modifying the UAS field inside the HTTP request packet). 
4.1.1.3 Detection by Robots.txt file 
Some works, such as [56], [126], [127] and [128], classify web sessions by checking whether the visitor 
has requested robots.txt file to classify web sessions. Namely, web administrators, through the Robots 
Exclusion Protocol, use a special-format file called robots.txt to indicate to visiting robots which parts or 
pages of their sites should not be visited by the robot. Thus, when visiting a web site, say 
http://www.yorku.ca, a robot should first check for http://www.yorku.ca/robots.txt in order to learn about 
possible access limitations. It is unlikely that any human would check this file, since there is no external or 
internal hyperlink linking to this file, nor are (most) users aware of its existence. Therefore, any visitor that 
retrieves robots.txt file is likely a crawler. However, this approach of separating automated crawlers from 
human visitors is not 100% effective in practice since it is known that some well-behaved web crawlers, as 
well as a large number of malicious bots, omit retrieving this file during a visit to a web site [152].  
4.1.2 Traffic Pattern Analysis 
 
Web visitor detection techniques which analyze patterns in robot traffic use a deeper interpretation of the 
entries in the web server access log. More specifically, these techniques consider aggregate attributes of 
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multiple requests such as: the overall amount of traffic they carry, percentage of error requests, etc. The 
idea behind looking at aggregate traffic characteristics is that values of web session features can identify 
whether the visitor is human or an automated agent. For instance, one of the features that is shown to be 
useful in this type of analysis is the percentage of HTTP GET/POST requests. In particular, most web 
crawlers, in order to reduce the amount of data requested from a site, employ the HEAD method when 
requesting a web page. Yet, requests coming from a human user browsing a web site via browsers are, by 
default, of type GET or POST. Another feature that is used to distinguish between human and crawlers 
visitors is the percentage of error requests. Namely, web crawlers typically have higher rate of erroneous 
requests than human visitors since they have higher chance of requesting outdated or deleted pages. Web-
page popularity index can also help distinguish between the visitors because, typically, human visitors tend 
to request more popular pages in a single session and therefore end up with a higher page popularity index 
score. On the other hand, web robots generally request both popular and unpopular pages which results in 
a lower page popularity index score for their respective sessions. Previous studies that have employed one 
or more of these attributes to classify web visitors include [56], [126], [127], [131], [132], [133], [134] and 
[135]. In [56], authors identify 25 classification features that can be used to classify web site visitors. 
 
Note that all of the features mentioned above are modelled to detect differences between the browsing 
behaviour of humans and benign web crawlers. However, as in the case of techniques from section 4.1.1, 
these features are not very effective in capturing of malicious crawlers, as malicious crawlers can be 
engineered to mimic all or most of the traffic characteristics of either humans or regular/benign web 
crawlers and thus evade detection.  
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4.1.3 Detection by Machine Learning 
 
Many of the early systems for classification of web site visitors, such as the ones described in previous two 
sections, were based on simple rule-based logic. Clearly, the performance of such systems was greatly 
dependant on the accuracy of the established classification rules and visitor groups.  
 
The classification accuracy can be improved with either supervised or unsupervised machine learning. The 
supervised machine learning refers to a group of algorithms that attempt to create a classification model 
from a pre-labelled (training) data samples, and then subsequently allow the use of this model for 
classification of new previously unseen data. On the other hand, in the unsupervised machine learning, 
sessions are classified without previous a priori knowledge (i.e. without a pre-labelled training dataset). In 
this method, data samples are clustered together based on the similarity of their corresponding feature 
values. Therefore, the advantage of employing unsupervised over supervised machine learning is the 
ability to obtain an unbiased look and understanding of the underlying data set and to generate results 
without human intervention. 
 
Additionally, we can argue that machine learning models are more powerful than traffic/syntactic pattern 
analysis as they are able to consider the relationships among the implicit features that are considered 
separately in traffic/syntactic pattern analysis (see more in [152]). As a result, it may be more difficult for 
robot authors to circumvent detection by analytical techniques.  
 
The main drawback of supervised learning is that it relies on accurately labelled training data to accurately 
classify new data. Note that the unsupervised learning does not employ labelled training data in its 
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learning process. However, it does require accurate post-learning data labelling to facilitate our 
understanding and validation of the results that are obtained by the actual learning process. 
 
So far, several research studies have looked at the use of supervised machine learning for the purposes of 
data-mining and/or clustering of web sessions. Examples of supervised machine learning algorithms 
include decision tree mining [153], [148], [154], Bayesian classification [155], [136], and support vector 
machines [155], [79]. 
 
Several studies have looked at the use of unsupervised machine learning for the purpose of more general 
web log analysis. Examples of unsupervised machine learning algorithms include neural network 
algorithms such as Self-Organizing Map (SOM) ([137], [138], [139], [140], [141]), Growing Neural Gas 
(GNG) ([142], [156]), and Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) ([143], [144], [145]).  
 
In the following section, we outline the novelty aspects of our work.  
4.1.4 Novel Aspects of Our Work 
 
Table 4.1 presents taxonomy of the proposed detection methodologies for detecting browsing behaviour 
differences between human (benign) and machine web visitors - as found in research literature. The table 
also lists the main disadvantages (i.e., challenges) of each strategy in terms of its ability to detect malicious 
web visitors. 
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Table 4.1 – Main challenges of web visitor detection techniques 
Strategy Main Challenges 
Syntactical Log Analysis 
 Unreliable as malicious bots can spoof/emulate behaviour of  
human visitors 
Traffic Pattern Analysis 
 Unreliable as malicious bots can emulate syntactic/traffic 
patterns of  human visitors 
Supervised Machine Learning  Biased learning – requires accurate labeling of a training dataset 
Unsupervised Machine Learning  Requires accurate labeling of a dataset for post-learning analysis 
Turing Test  (Section 3.4.1.2) 
(Active and Passive CAPTCHAs) 
 Generally effective but of limited practical use 
 
From the overview of the previous works above we can conclude the following. Firstly, previous 
researchers have never attempted to pursue detection of malicious web visitors to a web site by employing 
a combination of detection techniques that have shown promise in the past, e.g. machine learning 
techniques in combination with traffic pattern analysis and syntactic log parsing. We believe that such a 
‘holistic’ (multi-technique) approach is the first and necessary step in the design of effective systems that 
would guard against HTTP-based DDoS attacks. Secondly, we believe that among various machine 
learning approaches, unsupervised learning is best suited for detection of malicious web visitors due to its 
ability to provide an unbiased look at the browsing behaviour of various web site visitors. In other words, 
the performance of unsupervised learning is least likely to suffer due to incomplete a-priori information 
and sporadic attempts of malicious visitors to disguise their behaviour. 
 
In order to address the shortcomings of previous research on differentiation between malicious and benign 
web crawlers, we have conducted two studies: one employing supervised machine learning and another 
employing unsupervised machine learning. Both of these experiments are novel in the sense that we have 
combined well-known machine learning algorithms with traffic pattern analysis and syntactic log parsing 
to detect malicious/unknown crawlers.  
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4.2 Detecting Differences in Browsing Behavior of Web Visitors 
with Supervised Data Mining Classifiers 
 
In the first stage of our study, two separate sets of experiments for detection of malicious and non-
malicious web site visitors using supervised learning are undertaken. (The results of this study were 
initially published in [7] and [8]). The goal of the first set of experiments is to: 1) examine the 
effectiveness of seven supervised algorithms in distinguishing between two basic and most common 
groups of visitors to a web site: known well-behaved web crawlers and human visitors, and 2) evaluate the 
potential of our two newly proposed web-session features to improve the classification accuracy of the 
examined algorithms. The goal of the second experiment is to: 1) examine the effectiveness of seven 
supervised algorithms in distinguishing between four different and potential visitor groups to a web site: 
malicious web crawlers, well-behaved web crawlers, human visitors and unknown visitors, and 2) evaluate 
the potential of two newly proposed web-session features to improve the classification accuracy of the 
examined algorithms in this particular case.  
4.2.1 Dataset Preparation 
 
In this section we give a brief overview of our web access log analyser that has been used to generate a 
workable dataset - comprising both training and testing data samples - from any given web-log file. The 
operation of the log analyser is carried out in three stages: 1) session identification, 2) feature extraction 
for each identified session, and 3) session labelling (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1 – Web server access log pre-processing 
 
4.2.1.1 Session Identification 
Session identification is the task of dividing a server access log into individual web sessions. According to 
[146], a web session is a group of activities performed by one individual user from the moment he enters a 
web site to the moment he leaves it. Session identification is typically performed first by grouping all 
HTTP requests that originate from the same IP address and the same user-agent, and second by applying a 
timeout approach to break this grouping into different sub-groups, so that the time-lapse between two 
consecutive sub-groups is longer than a pre-defined threshold. The key challenge of this method is to 
determine proper threshold-value, as different web users exhibit different navigation behaviours. In the 
majority of web-related literature, 30-min period has been used as the most appropriate maximum session 
length (see [56] and [136]). Typically, the web session definition also includes the condition that a user 
does not revisit the same page in the session. This is required in order to limit the length of a session as we 
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can imagine a web visitor (a malicious bot) to continuously request web pages and therefore never end a 
web session. 
4.2.1.2 Feature Extraction 
From previous web crawler classification studies, namely [56], [154], [136] and [147] we have adopted 
eight common features that are shown to be useful in distinguishing between browsing patterns of web 
robots and humans. These features are:  
1) Click number – a numerical attribute calculated as the number of HTTP requests sent by a user in a 
single session. The click number metric appears to be useful in detecting the presence of the web 
crawlers because higher click number can only be achieved by an automated script (such as a web 
robot) and is usually very low for a human visitor. 
2) HTML-to-Image Ratio – a numerical attribute calculated as the number of HTML page requests over 
the number of image file (JPEG and PNG) requests sent in a single session. web crawlers generally 
request mostly HTML pages and have the ability to ignore (i.e., not request) images on the site, which 
implies that HTML-to-Image ratio would be higher for web crawlers than for human users. 
3) Percentage of PDF/PS file requests – a numerical attribute calculated as the percentage of PDF/PS file 
requests sent in a single session. In contrast to image requests, some crawlers, tend to have a higher 
percentage of PDF/PS requests than human visitors. E.g., a crawler traversing through a site would 
typically attempt to retrieve all encountered PDF/PS files, while a human visitor would be much more 
selective about what he chooses to retrieve. 
4) Percentage of 4XX error responses – a numerical attribute calculated as the percentage of erroneous 
HTTP requests sent in a single session. Crawlers typically would have higher rate of erroneous request 
since they have higher chance of requesting outdated or deleted pages. 
5) Percentage of HTTP requests of type HEAD – a numerical attribute calculated as percentage of 
requests of HTTP type HEAD sent in a single session. (In the case of an HTTP HEAD request, the 
52 
 
server returns the response header only, and not the actual source, i.e. file.) Many web crawlers, in 
order to reduce the amount of data requested from a site, employ the HEAD method when requesting a 
web page. On the other hand, requests coming from a human user browsing a web site via browsers 
are, by default, of type GET. 
6) Percentage of requests with unassigned referrers – a numerical attribute calculated as the percentage 
of blank or unassigned referrer fields set by a user in a single session. Most web crawlers initiate 
HTTP requests with unassigned referrer field, while most browsers provide referrer information by 
default. 
7) Number of bytes requested from the server – a numerical attribute calculated as the amount of data, in 
bytes, that was requested from the server in a single session. Typically, sessions belonging to web 
robots should request greater amounts of data from the server in a single session than sessions initiated 
by human visitors.  
8) Page Popularity Index – a numerical attribute, calculated as the average value of Page Popularity 
Index (PPI) for all N pages (Page(i), i=1,..,N) retrieved during one observed session j – 
PPI_Session(j). The expression for PPI_Session(j) is given in (4.1):    
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
                             
                        
                                        
                               (4.1)  
 
The expression for the Page Popularity Index for a page i - PPI(i) in the above expression - is shown in 
(4.2). 
 
                                                
                         
                          
                                          (4.2)             
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Note that in (4.1) only requests for one particular session are considered. In (4.2), the total number of 
requests is considered – cumulatively, from all sessions (i.e., all users). It should be obvious from (4.1) 
and (4.2) that in order to calculate PPI_Session(j), first PPI(i) for all pages appearing in the log file 
needs to be calculated. Also, note that the max(PPI) is the maximum PPI out of all pages. This metric 
considers all primary files requested from the server (i.e., the requests for the secondary files such as 
images and scripts are excluded from the calculations above). The more detail discussion of the page 
popularity index and its calculation can be found in [157].  
In the remainder of this chapter we will refer to these features based on their numeric ID shown above. In 
addition to these eight features and based on the recommendations of a recent study [152], we have 
derived and incorporated two additional novel features in our web robot classification: 
9) Standard deviation of requested page’s depth – a numerical attribute calculated as the standard 
deviation of page depth across all requests sent in a single session. For instance, we assign a depth of 
three to a web page ‘/cshome/courses/index.html’ and a depth of two to a web page 
‘/cshome/calendar.html’.  
10) Percentage of consecutive sequential HTTP requests – a numerical attribute calculated as the 
percentage of sequential requests for pages belonging to the same web directory and generated during 
a single user session. For instance, a series of requests for web pages matching pattern 
‘/cshome/course/*.* will be marked as consecutive sequential HTTP requests. However, a request to 
web page ‘/cshome/index.html’ followed by a request to a web page ‘cshome/courses/index.html’ will 
not be marked as consecutive sequential requests. 
 
In [152], the authors argue that analytical robot detection techniques must be based on fundamental 
distinctions between the robot and human traffic across server domains and in the face of evolving robot 
traffic. We argue that the features 9 and 10 -  which to the best of our knowledge have not been used in 
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any previous research on web robot detection - have an excellent chance in separating human and robotic 
users in server access log sessions. Namely, the importance of features 9 and 10 can be explained as 
follows. In a typical web-browsing session, humans are set to find information of interest by following a 
series of thematically correlated and progressively more specific links. In contrast, robots are neither 
expected to have such complex navigational patterns, nor would they be restricted by the link structure of 
the web site. For instance, web crawlers like Google browse systematically through an entire web domain, 
i.e., they access files at various depths in the file hierarchy. Therefore, the cumulative standard deviation 
of their sessions should be large. On the other hand, humans tend to concentrate on one particular type of 
information, typically stored over a few files in a single directory. For the above reasons, the standard 
deviation of requested pages’ depths, i.e., feature 9, should be high for web robot sessions and low for 
sessions belonging to human users. Note that feature 9 will be effective at distinguishing crawlers from 
human visitors only when applied on log files generated from web sites with large number of distinct web 
pages such as a university department web site.  
 
Also the number of resources requested in a single session is another distinction between robot and human 
traffic that is not expected to change over time. This distinction arises because human users retrieve 
information from the web via a web browser. This interface forces the user’s session to request additional 
resources automatically. Recall from section 3.2.3 in chapter 3 that web browsers, after retrieving the 
HTML page, parse through it, and then send a barrage of requests to the server for embedded resources on 
the page such as images, videos, and client side scripts to execute. Thus, the temporal resource request 
patterns of human visitors are best represented as short bursts of a large volume of requests followed by a 
period of little activity. In contrast, web robots tend to generate their request in a more systematic and 
time-wise uniform (i.e., better paced) manner. For the above reasons, the number of consecutive sequential 
HTTP requests should be high in human user sessions and low in web robot sessions. 
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4.2.1.3 Why Only These 10 Features? 
Note that the set of the 10 features we employed in our study is not an exhaustive set of all features that 
could possibly be used. For instance, in previous research such as [56], [154], [136] and [147], authors 
have employed additional features such as:  
1) Percentage of binary execution files download from the server (e.g., .cgi/.exe/.class),  
2) Percentage of ASCII files download from the server,  
3) Percentage of zip files download from the server, percentage of Multimedia files download from the 
server (e.g., .wav/.mpeg),  
4) Percentage of HTTP POST request types, 
5) Percentage of other HTTP method request types,  
6) The Boolean feature that indicates whether the page requests were made during the night time (e.g., 
between 12am and 7am) and  
7) The Boolean feature that indicates whether a web visitor employed multiple user agent strings while 
browsing the web site. 
 
We did not employ these additional features for the following reasons: 
 Some of the features were not applicable since the content of the web sites we have examined either did 
not contain any or we saw very few of such files/request types. These features are: percentage of binary 
Execution Files download from the server (e.g., .cgi/.exe/.class), percentage of ASCII files download 
from the server, percentage of Zip files download from the server, percentage of Multimedia files 
download from the server (e.g., .wav/.mpeg), percentage of HTTP POST request types and percentage 
of other HTTP method request types. 
 The night time feature is nowadays rather outdated. Specifically, in our experimentation we have 
noticed that many legitimate-looking crawlers initiated requests during the daytime (after 7am), while 
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many browser-based requests were made during the night time thus contributing very little to effective 
differentiation between human and machine-generated sessions. 
 The Boolean feature that indicates whether a web visitor employed multiple user agent strings while 
browsing the web site may appear as a useful labeling feature to differentiate between legitimate and 
suspicious web visitors. However, in practice, human visitors could potentially switch from one type of 
browser to another when visiting sites (i.e., web-pages) that require a unique set of plugins. Also, two 
different versions of well-behaved web crawlers can share the same IP address (note that we identify 
unique web visitors based on their IP address) and therefore that visitor’s requests would have different 
user agent strings. Thus, for the above reasons, this feature was not employed in our analysis. 
 When justifying our feature selection choices, it is important to emphasize that our primary concern 
was to employ features that are general and independent of the web site or domain content and 
structure. For instance, percentage of HEAD requests, percentage of erroneous requests, click number 
and consecutive repeated request ratio are features that should have similar values across various web 
domains.  
 Our objective was also to select features that cannot be easily emulated by crawler designers. For 
instance, features such as popularity index, server-to-client bytes and standard deviation of page request 
depth are very difficult to model or guess by malicious crawler designers, as they do not have a full 
insight into the content, structure and statistics of the victim site. Therefore, we believe that the ten 
features employed in our work are a reasonable choice, and are applicable in differentiating between 
human and machine-generate web sessions on a wide range of sites. 
4.2.1.4 Dataset Labelling 
Supervised data-mining algorithms require pre-labelled training samples in order to learn (i.e., build) a 
classification model for a particular dataset. Therefore, after the log analyzer parses the log file and 
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extracts the individual visitor sessions, each session (i.e. the respective feature vector) is labelled as 
belonging to a particular class.  
In this study, we perform two types of classifications/experiments: 
1) In the first experiment we examine whether human users and well-behaved crawlers can be 
separated by the classification algorithms. This experiment is somewhat similar to what has been 
previously done in [56], [136] and [147]. However, the novelty of our work is that we perform the 
classification with two additional (novel) features and by applying seven different well-established 
supervised data mining classifiers. 
2) The goal of the second experiment is to investigate whether the browsing characteristics of 
malicious crawlers and unknown visitors are sufficiently different from browsing characteristics of 
human visitors and well-behaved crawlers to enable automatic classification.  
 
The specifics of dataset labelling for two experiments are described in the following two sections. 
a) Dataset Labelling in Experiment 1 
The log analyzer maintains a table of user agent fields of all known (malicious or well-behaved) web 
crawlers. This table is built using the data found on web sites [150] and [151]. Given the information 
contained in this table, the dataset labelling employed in the first experiment is performed as follows: 
1) If the user agent field of a session matches the entry in the table of a known well-behaved crawler, 
the respective feature vector is labeled as such (the vector’s class label is set to 1). 
2) If the user agent string matches the user agent string of a browser, the respective feature vector is 
labeled as belonging to a human visitor (the vector’s class label is set to 0). 
 
Otherwise, if neither of the above is satisfied, we ignore the session since it belongs either to the malicious 
crawler or unknown visitor.  
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Note that in this experiment we also ignore all sessions that carry a user agent string of a known browser 
(indicating a human visitor) but access the robots.txt (operation performed only by crawlers), as they are 
likely to be malicious. The dataset labelling process is shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
New Web Session
Does Session’s User 
Agent String matches a User 
Agent string of a well-
behaved crawler?
Yes
Does Session’s 
User Agent String matches a 
User Agent String of a 
known browser?
Yes
No No
Label as
Class 1
(Well-behaved Crawler)
Ignore Session
Label as
Class 0
(Human Visitor)
Accesses 
robots.txt file?
No
Yes
 
Figure 4.2 – Dataset labelling flow chart for Experiment 1 
 
b) Dataset Labelling in Experiment 2 
In the second experiment, we again utilize the table of known user agent fields in order to perform the 
dataset labelling. The labelling is performed as follows:  
1) If the user agent string of a session matches the user agent string of a known browser or of a known 
well-behaved crawler, the respective feature vector is labeled with class label 0. 
2) If the user agent string matches the user agent string of a known malicious crawler, or is not enlisted 
in the table of known user agents, the respective feature vector is labeled with class label 1.  
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As in the previous experiment, we assume that any session that carries a user agent string of a known 
browser but accesses the robots.txt is malicious, and consequently gets assigned class label 1. The dataset 
labelling process is shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
New Web Session
Session’s User Agent string 
matches a User Agent string 
of a known browser ?
Yes Yes
No
No
Label as
Class 1
(Unknown Visitor)
Label as
Class 0
(Well-behaved Crawler)
Session’s User Agent string 
matches a User Agent string 
of a malicious crawler ?
Accesses 
robots.txt file?
Yes
Session’s User Agent string 
matches a User Agent string 
of a well-behaved crawler ?
NoNo
Yes
Label as
Class 1
(Malicious Crawler)
Label as
Class 0
(Human Visitor)
No
 
Figure 4.3 – Dataset labelling flow chart for Experiment 2 
 
4.2.2 Experimental Design 
 
In the previous section, we have described the process of dataset preparation (including session 
identification, feature extraction and vector labelling) as performed by our log analyzer. Assuming the 
correctness of the labelling process, the main goal of our work is to examine the classification accuracy of 
seven selected supervised learning algorithms when applied to the prepared dataset, as well as to evaluate 
the effectiveness of utilized web-session features in improving the algorithms’ classification accuracy. In 
this section, we outline the details of the experimental study that followed the dataset preparation process. 
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4.2.2.1 Experimental Setup 
In both experiments we have conducted two types of tests: one test involving only features 1-8 and the 
other involving all 10 features, as discussed in the previous section. Subsequently, the results of the two 
tests are compared in order to examine whether features 9 and 10 can improve the accuracy rate of the 
classification algorithms. 
4.2.2.2 Web Server Access Logs 
Note that we were unable to employ standard datasets for HTTP/web traffic mining, such as [158], [159] 
and/or [160]. These datasets are incomplete for the following reasons: 
1. A unique identifier (e.g., IP address) for each source of HTTP/web requests is absent from all three 
datasets and/or 
2. HTTP packet contents are omitted, e.g., user agent strings in [158] and [159], etc..  
Therefore, in order to be able to group HTTP/web requests into a valid user web session, we had to rely on 
the following three (complete) datasets: 
1. Web server access log files provided by York University’s Computer Science and Engineering 
(CSE) department, i.e., www.cse.yorku.ca (referred to as CSE dataset in the remainder of the 
document). 
2. Web server access log files provided by York University’s main Internet domain, i.e. www.yorku.ca 
(referred to as YORKU dataset in the remainder of the document).  
3. Web server access log files provided by SharpSchool [161] - web portal consisting of close to 1500 
distinct K-12 school web sites across U.S. and Canada. 
 
The purpose of performing our analysis on both, a smaller CSE and larger YORKU and SharpSchool web 
domains, was to evaluate whether our analysis can be generalized to larger, i.e., different web domains.  
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A typical entry in all three server access log files resembles the following line of data: 
122.248.163.1 - - [09/Nov/2011:04:37:38 -0500] "GET /course_archive/2008-
09/W/3421/test/testTwoPrep.html HTTP/1.1" 200 5645 Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; 
+http://www.google.com/bot.html) 
Each file entry contains information in the following order from left to right: IP address of the source of 
the request (122.248.163.1), the timestamp of the request (09/Nov/2011:04:37:38 -0500), the HTTP 
method (GET), the file on the server that was requested (/course_archive/2008-
09/W/3421/test/testTwoPrep.html), the response code from the server (200), the size of the data retrieved 
from the server (5645 bytes) and user agent field (Mozilla/5.0 compatible; Googlebot/2.1; 
+http://www.google.com/bot.html). The information provided in individual entries is employed by the log 
analyzer in all three stages of dataset preparation: session identification, feature-vector extraction, and 
dataset labelling. 
 
The CSE log file stores detailed information about user web-based access into the domain 
www.cse.yorku.ca during an 2-week interval – Fall 2013. There are a total of over 7 million log entries in 
the file. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 list the number of sessions and class label distributions generated by the log 
analyzer from CSE log data for experiments 1 and 2, respectively. The YORKU log file stores detailed 
information about user web-based access into the domain www.yorku.ca during a 10 day interval – last 10 
days of April 2012. There are a total of over 50 million log entries (14GB worth of data) in the file. Tables 
4.4 and 4.5 list the number of sessions and class label distributions generated by the log analyzer from the 
YORKU log data for experiments 1 and 2, respectively. The SharpSchool log files store detailed 
information about user web-based access into various web sites as part of the SharpSchool web portal 
during a 7 day interval in June of 2013. There are a total of over 75 million log entries (18GB worth of 
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data) in the file. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 list the number of sessions and class label distributions generated by 
the log analyzer from the SharpSchool log data for experiments 1 and 2, respectively. 
 
Table 4.2 – Class distributions in datasets generated from CSE logs and used in Experiment #1 
 Session Samples 
Total Number of Sessions 98793 
Total # of Sessions with Class Label = 0 92149  
Total # of Sessions with Class Label = 1 6644 (up-sampling = 13.8) 
 
Table 4.3 – Class distributions in datasets generated from CSE logs and used in Experiment #2 
 Session Samples 
Total Number of Sessions 100151  
Total # of Sessions with Class Label = 0 98793  
Total # of Sessions with Class Label = 1 1358 (up-sampling = 7.8) 
 
Table 4.4 – Class distributions in datasets generated from YORKU logs and used in Experiment #1 
 Session Samples 
Total Number of Sessions 716868  
Total # of Sessions with Class Label = 0 707854  
Total # of Sessions with Class Label = 1 9014 (up-sampling = 78.4) 
 
Table 4.5 – Class distributions in datasets generated from YORKU logs and used in Experiment #2 
 Session Samples 
Total Number of Sessions 721173 
Total # of Sessions with Class Label = 0 716868 
Total # of Sessions with Class Label = 1 4305 (up-sampling = 167) 
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Table 4.6 – Class distributions in datasets generated from SharpSchool logs and used in Experiment #1 
 Session Samples 
Total Number of Sessions 776050  
Total # of Sessions with Class Label = 0 650526  
Total # of Sessions with Class Label = 1 125524 (up-sampling = 5.26) 
 
Table 4.7 – Class distributions in datasets generated from SharpSchool logs and used in Experiment #2 
 Session Samples 
Total Number of Sessions 793845  
Total # of Sessions with Class Label = 0 776050  
Total # of Sessions with Class Label = 1 17795 (up-sampling = 43) 
 
4.2.2.3 Classification Algorithms 
The detection of web crawlers is evaluated with the following seven supervised classifiers: C4.5 [153], 
RIPPER [162], Naïve Bayesian [163], Bayesian Network [163], K-Nearest Neighbour [164], LibSVM 
(Support Vector Machines) [165]  and Multilayer Perceptron (Neural Networks) [155]. The 
implementation of each algorithm is provided in the WEKA software package [166] and the parameter 
settings for each algorithm are shown in Table 4.8. This table also lists the basic methodology employed 
by each algorithm. All input vectors were normalized between 0 and 1, prior to being fed to the seven 
classifiers. 
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Table 4.8 – The classifier methodology and Weka parameter settings in our experiments 
Classifiers Methodology Weka Parameters  
C4.5  
 
(weka.classifiers.trees.J48) 
Decision Trees 
binarySplits = false; 
confidenceFactor = 0.25; 
minNumOfObj = 2; numFolds = 3; 
seed = 1; subtreeRaising = true; 
unpruned = false; useLaplace = false 
RIPPER  
 
(weka.classifiers.rules.JRip) 
Decision Rules 
checkErrorRate = true; folds = 3; 
minNo = 2.0; optimizations = 2; seed 
= 1; usePruning = true 
Naïve Bayesian  
 
(weka.classifiers.bayes.NaiveBayes) 
Bayesian 
Classification 
useKernelEstimator = false; 
useSupervisedDiscretization = false 
Bayesian Network  
 
(weka.classifiers.bayes.BayesNet) 
Bayesian 
Classification 
estimator = (SimpleEstimator -A 
0.5); searchAlgorithm = (K2 -P 1 -S 
BAYES); useADTree = false 
K-nearest Neighbours 
 
(weka.classifiers.lazy.IBk) 
Lazy Learners 
KNN = 1; crossValidate = false; 
distanceWeighting = (No distance 
weighting); meanSquared = false; 
nearestNeighbourSearchAlgorithm = 
(EuclideanDistance -R first-last); 
windowSize = 0 
LibSVM  
 
(weka.classifiers.functions.LibSVM) 
Support Vectors 
Classification 
SVMType = C-SVC; cacheSize = 
40.0; coef0 = 0.0; cost = 1.0; degree 
= 3; doNotReplaceMissingValues = 
false; eps = 0.001; gamma = 0.0; 
kernelType = (Radial Basis 
Function); loss = 0.1; normalize = 
false; nu = 0.5; probabilityEstimates 
= false; seed = 1; shrinking = true 
Multilayer Perceptron  
 
(weka.classifiers.functions.MultilayerPerceptron) 
Neural 
Networks 
hiddenLayer = a; learningRate = 0.3; 
momentum = 0.2; 
nominalToBinaryFilter = true; 
normalizeAttributes = true; 
normalizeNumericClass = true; reset 
= true; seed = 0; trainingTime = 500; 
validationSetSize = 0; 
validationThreshold = 20 
 
4.2.2.4 10-fold Cross Validation and Dataset Up-sampling 
A simple evaluation of imbalanced datasets based on accuracy, i.e. the percentage of correct 
classifications, can be misleading. To illustrate this, assume a dataset with 100 cases out of which 90 cases 
belong to the majority class and 10 cases belong to the minority class. Then a classifier that classifies 
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every case as a majority class will have 90% accuracy, even though it failed to detect every single target of 
the minority class.  
 
It is evident from Tables 4.2-4.7 that our original datasets suffered from serous class imbalance. In order to 
overcome this problem, and be able to conduct a more meaningful performance evaluation, we have 
applied the process of dataset up-sampling
7
. The up-sampling factor of the underrepresented class 1 
samples is shown in Tables 4.2-4.7. 
 
We also employed, as recommended in [155], stratified 10-fold cross-validation. In 10-fold cross-
validation, the training samples are randomly partitioned into 10 mutually exclusive subsets or “folds,” D1, 
D2, ... , D10, each of approximately equal size. Training and testing is performed 10 times. In iteration i, 
partition Di is reserved as the test set, and the remaining partitions are collectively used to train the model. 
That is, in the first iteration, subsets D2, : : : , D10 collectively serve as the training set in order to obtain a 
first model, which is tested on D1; the second iteration is trained on subsets D1, D3, : : : , D10 and tested on 
D2; and so on. 
4.2.2.5 Recall, Precision and F1 score 
In order to test the effectiveness of our classifiers, we have adopted the following three metrics: recall, 
precision, and the F1 score [136]. The definitions of these three metrics are presented in Appendix B. The 
exact expressions for the three metrics, as used in Experiment 1 and 2, are presented in (4.3) to (4.9). Note 
that in both experiments, we evaluate the precision and recall scores for the underrepresented class only, 
i.e., Class 1. (Recall from section 4.2.1.4 that in Experiment 1 Class 1 comprises well-behaved crawlers, 
                                                     
7
 Up-sampling is a data mining pre-processing technique that balances the class distribution in the dataset by 
duplicating the training examples belonging to the class with fewer samples. The amount of up-sampling can be 
controlled by the number of training examples that are duplicated. 
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and in Experiment 2 it comprises malicious crawlers and unknown visitors.) This is justified by the fact 
that the main objective of our work is to be able to identify automated web-crawler visitors to a web site, 
and in particular web-crawlers that exhibit malicious behaviour and/or intent. However, we also calculate 
the precision (accuracy of classification) for both classes as well (presented in (4.8) and (4.9) as utilized 
for experiments 1 and 2, respectively). 
 
It is also worth nothing from (4.7) that F1 score summarizes the first two metrics into a single value, in a 
way that both metrics are given equal importance. Namely, the F1 score penalizes a classifier that gives 
high recall but sacrifices precision and vice versa. For example, a classifier that classifies all examples as 
positive has perfect recall but very poor precision. Recall and precision should therefore be close to each 
other, otherwise the F1 score yields a value closer to the smaller of the two. The definition of these metrics 
is given below: 
 Experiment 1: Precision (class 1 only) = 
     
                                                      
                                                                                                     
        (4.3) 
Experiment 2:  Precision (class 1 only) =  
                                                         
                                                                                               
      (4.4) 
Experiment 1: Recall (class 1 only) = 
 
                                                      
                                                                                                        
  (4.5) 
Experiment 2:  Recall (class 1 only) =  
                                                         
                                                                                                                          
      
              (4.6) 
                F1  = 
                     
                
                                                   (4.7)  
Experiment 1:  Precision for both classes =  
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                  (4.8) 
 
Experiment 2:   Precision for both classes = 
                                                                                
                   
        (4.9) 
 
4.2.2.6 Entropy Metrics: Information Gain and Gain Ratio  
In addition to ranking the classifiers, we also rank the most important dataset features by employing 
attribute/feature selection methods such as information gain and gain ratio. The ranking provides the purity 
test of the two proposed features. Basically, a higher ranking, by either of the two metrics, implies that a 
feature is more valuable to a classifier in separating sessions into classes. 
a) Information Gain 
The information gain for a feature A is a measure of the information needed to classify the new previously 
unseen sessions in the log file by partitioning the dataset on feature A. In a dataset composed of nominal 
features, the information gain is calculated as follows (from [155]). Let the partition D be the collection of 
all web sessions extracted from a web access log file. The expected information needed to classify a 
session in D is given by (from [155] ): 
 
                      
 
                                       (4.10) 
 
where m is the number of classes in D, pi is the ratio (i.e., probability) that an arbitrary session in D 
belongs to class i and is estimated by the number of sessions classified with class i out of the total number 
of sessions in D. Info(D) (also known as the entropy of D) is the amount of information needed to identify 
the class label of a session in D.  
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Let us suppose that we partitioned sessions in D on some feature A having v distinct values, {a1, a2, ... , 
av}. Feature A can be used to split D into v partitions or subsets, {D1, D2, ... , Dv}, where Dj contains those 
sessions in D that have outcome aj of A. Ideally, we would like this partitioning to be a collection of 
sessions that map to a unique class in D (i.e., we would like for each partition to be pure). However, it is 
quite unlikely that the partitions will be pure (e.g., a partition may contain a collection of sessions from 
different classes rather than from a single class). The amount of information we still need (after the 
partitioning based on feature A) in order to arrive at an exact classification is measured by (from [155] ) 
 
           
    
   
           
 
                                    (4.11) 
 
where      is the number of sessions in partition Dj,     is the total number of sessions in the set D and 
Info(Dj) is defined in Expression 4.10. InfoA(D) is the expected information required to classify a session 
from D based on the partitioning by feature A. Clearly, different partitions of A will result in different 
values of InfoA(D). The partition that achieves the minimum entropy is the most optimal, as it implies the 
best possible purity of partitions. Information gain is then defined as the difference between the original 
information requirement (i.e., based on just the proportion of classes), that is Expression 4.10, and the new 
requirement (i.e., obtained after optimal partitioning on feature A), that is Expression 4.11. The 
information gain formula is, (from [155] ) 
 
Gain(A) = Info(D) - InfoA(D)                                                       (4.12) 
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In other words, Gain(A) is the expected reduction in the information requirement caused by knowing the 
value of feature A. Or, in other words, Gain(A) tell us how much would be gained by branching on A. The 
feature A with the highest information gain, (Gain(A)), is chosen/ranked as the most pure feature.  
 
Note that in our dataset, all 10 features are numerical. Hence, partitioning the sessions in D on a feature A 
with v distinct values is a non-trivial task. Namely, as suggested in [155], the procedure for finding the 
optimal (i.e., best/smallest) InfoA(D) requires that the “best” split-point for a numerical feature A be found. 
We can accomplish this by first sorting the values of a numerical feature A in increasing order. Typically, 
the midpoint between each pair of adjacent increasingly ordered values is considered as a possible split-
point. E.g., given t values of A, t-1 possible splits are evaluated. For example, the midpoint between the 
values ai and ai+1 of A is 
        
 
. Next, for each possible split-point for A, we evaluate InfoA(D), where 
the number of partitions is two, that is v = 2 (or j = 1..2) in (4.11). D1 is the set of sessions in D satisfying 
A ≤ split point, and D2 is the set of sessions in D satisfying A > split point. Once the minimal InfoA(D) is 
calculated based on one of the possible split points, the gain for that feature can be calculated using the 
(4.12). 
b) Gain Ratio 
The information gain measure is biased toward tests with many outcomes. That is, the gain will be larger 
for features having a large number of distinct values. Therefore, in our analysis, we additionally rank 
features with an extension of information gain metric known as gain ratio, which attempts to overcome the 
bias of information gain metric. It applies a kind of normalization to information gain using a “split 
information” value defined analogously with Info(D) as (from [155] ): 
 
                 
    
   
       
    
   
                                   (4.13) 
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This value represents the potential information generated by splitting the training data set, D, into v 
partitions, corresponding to the v outcomes of a test on feature A. In our dataset, v = 2. Then, the gain ratio 
is defined as (from [155] ) 
 
              
       
            
                                                            (4.14) 
 
4.2.2.7 Significance of the Difference Test (t-test) 
In addition, the effectiveness of the new attributes in classifying visitor’s sessions is further evaluated by 
applying the significance of difference test or t-test. Namely, after we generate the classification results 
with all seven classifiers, we separate the sessions in 2 groups, true negatives and true positives. The 
sessions are grouped into true negatives if both the log analyzer and classification algorithms label the 
session with class label 0. On the other hand, the sessions are grouped into true positives if both the log 
analyzer and classification algorithms label the session with class label 1.  
 
Next, we calculate means and variances for each of 10 features in both groups of sessions and perform the 
significance of the difference test (alternatively called the t-test) with 95% confidence interval. The 
calculation of the significance of the difference test is based on (4.15) (from [167]): 
 
   
                   
 
       
  
  
       
  
                                                             (4.15) 
 
Note that we cannot assume the normality of the feature values distributions. However, as central limit 
theorem proves, the distribution of means of two group means, mean1(f) and mean2(f), in repeated 
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sampling, converges to a normal distribution, irrespective of the distribution of f in the population. 
Typically, the rule of thumb is that the sample size greater than 20 is sufficient to satisfy this condition. 
 
In (4.15) mean1 and mean2 are means of the feature values in two groups, Var1 and Var2 are the variances 
of the feature values in two groups, and n1 and n2 are the number of elements in two groups. The degrees 
of freedom value used in the t-test is: (from [167]) 
 
                    
  
       
 
  
  
       
 
  
 
 
 
         
 
  
 
 
    
  
 
         
 
  
 
 
    
                                       (4.16) 
 
Note that (4.16) is used because we assume that Var1 ≠ Var2 and n1 ≠ n2. The mean values between the two 
groups of sessions will be significantly (statistically) different with 95% confidence if the t score (4.15) is 
greater than 1.96 and degrees of freedom (4.16) are greater than or equal to 200. In general, for a fixed 
confidence percentage, there exists an inverse relationship between the value of the degrees of freedom 
calculation and the t score threshold. The exact t score threshold based on the calculated degrees of 
freedom can be determined by consulting the t-table found in [168].  
4.2.3 Classification Results 
 
In this section we present and discuss the results of our two experiments. Namely, in the next two 
subsections, we give a detailed summary of the results of Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. In the third 
subsections, we derive additional observation and conclusions from the presented results.  
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4.2.3.1 Experiment 1 
The motivation for this experiment was to test the classification accuracy of the seven data-mining 
algorithms, as well as to evaluate whether features 9 and 10, can improve the accuracy in classifying 
sessions as either belonging to a human user or a well-behaved web crawler.  
a) Recall, Precision and F1 Score (class 1 only) 
The comparisons of the recall, precision and F1 scores for the CSE dataset with features 1-8 and with all 10 
features are shown in Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, respectively. The results generated from the YORKU and 
SharpSchool data for the same three metrics are shown in Figures 4.7-4.12. As explained in 4.1.2.5, we 
only show the precision and recall scores for the underrepresented class, i.e., Class 1. It is evident from the 
presented graphs that the use of all 10 features generally improves both, the recall and precision scores, for 
all classifiers except for the Bayesian Network in CSE and SharpSchool data (there is no improvement in 
either recall or precision), Naive Bayesian in YORKU data and Neural Network in Sharpschool data where 
the precision is slightly lower with 10 features. Similarly, in three datasets, the use of 10 features results in 
improved F1 score (between 0.5% up to nearly 10%) in six out of seven examined algorithms. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 – Recall scores for various classifiers trained on the CSE datasets that contain only features 1-8 
and all 10 features 
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Figure 4.5 – Precision scores for various classifiers trained on the CSE datasets that contain only features 
1-8 and all 10 features 
 
 
Figure 4.6 – F1 scores for various classifiers trained on the CSE datasets that contain only features 1-8 and 
all 10 features 
 
 
Figure 4.7 – Recall scores for various classifiers trained on the YORKU datasets that contain only features 
1-8 and all 10 features 
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Figure 4.8 – Precision scores for various classifiers trained on the YORKU datasets that contain only 
features 1-8 and all 10 features 
 
 
Figure 4.9 – F1 scores for various classifiers trained on the YORKU datasets that contain only features 1-8 
and all 10 features 
 
 
Figure 4.10 – Recall scores for various classifiers trained on the Sharpschool datasets that contain only 
features 1-8 and all 10 features 
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Figure 4.11 – Precision scores for various classifiers trained on the Sharpschool datasets that contain only 
features 1-8 and all 10 features 
 
 
Figure 4.12 – F1 scores for various classifiers trained on the Sharpschool datasets that contain only 
features 1-8 and all 10 features 
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as can be observed, there is a slight improvement in accuracy rate when all 10 features are used for six out 
of seven algorithms in both datasets. 
 
 
Figure 4.13 – Classification accuracy rates for various classifiers trained on the CSE datasets that contain 
only features 1-8 and all 10 features 
 
 
Figure 4.14 – Classification accuracy rates for various classifiers trained on the YORKU datasets that 
contain only features 1-8 and all 10 features 
 
  
Figure 4.15 – Classification accuracy rates for various classifiers trained on the SharpSchool datasets 
containing only features 1-8 and all 10 features 
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c) Entropy-based Feature Rankings 
Tables 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 show the rankings of all 10 features in terms of the information gain and gain 
ratio metrics sorted in the descending order for the CSE, YORKU and SharpSchool datasets, respectfully. 
The ranking scores derived from the 3 datasets are almost identical. As expected, the percentage of 
unassigned referrers is one of the most valuable features for classifying sessions. Recall, the referrer 
parameter is typically only assigned by a browser of the user visiting the web site and is left blank if the 
visitor is a web crawler.  
 
Also, note that both the information gain and gain ratio metrics similarly rank the 10 features in both 
datasets. The only major/noticeable difference between the two sets of rankings is that the percentage of 
HEAD requests feature is ranked much higher by the gain ratio than by the information gain metric. As 
explained in section 4.2.2.6, the gain ratio prefers features that have more unbalanced split and that 
information gain prefers features that have more balanced split among the two classes. This implies that 
the percentage of HEAD requests has a very unbalanced split among the two classes.  
 
Table 4.9 – Attribute rankings in terms of Information Gain and Gain Ratio metrics (ordered top down 
from best to worst) for CSE dataset 
Information Gain Gain Ratio 
1. % of Unassigned Referrers 1. Popularity Index 
2. Popularity Index 2. % of Unassigned Referrers 
3. % of Sequential HTTP requests 3. % of HEAD requests  
4. Standard Deviation of Page Depth 4. % of Sequential requests 
5. Click Number 5. Standard Deviation of Page Depth  
6. HTML to Image ratio  6. Click Number 
7. % of PDF documents 7. % of PDF documents 
8. % of Error requests 8. % of Error requests 
9. # of Server to Client Bytes 9. HTML to Image ratio 
10. % of HEAD requests 10. # of Server to Client Bytes 
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Table 4.10 – Attribute rankings in terms of Information Gain and Gain Ratio metrics (ordered top down 
from best to worst) for YORKU dataset 
Information Gain Gain Ratio 
1. Popularity Index 1. % of Unassigned Referrers  
2. % of Unassigned Referrers 2. % of HEAD requests 
3. % of Sequential requests 3. Popularity Index  
4. Standard Deviation of Page Depth  4. % of Sequential requests 
5. HTML to Image ratio  5. Standard Deviation of Page Depth  
6. % of Error requests  6. % of Error requests  
7. Click Number 7. Click Number 
8.  # of Server to Client Bytes 8. % of PDF documents 
9. % of PDF documents 9. HTML to Image ratio 
10. % of HEAD requests  10. # of Server to Client Bytes 
 
Table 4.11 – Attribute rankings in terms of Information Gain and Gain Ratio metrics (ordered top down 
from best to worst) for SharpSchool dataset 
Information Gain Gain Ratio 
1. % of Unassigned Referrers 1. % of Unassigned Referrers 
2. Popularity Index 2. HTML to Image ratio 
3. Click Number 3. Popularity Index 
4. % of Sequential requests 4. Click Number 
5. Standard Deviation of Page Depth 5. % of PDF documents 
6. # of Server to Client Bytes 6. Standard Deviation of Page Depth 
7. % of Error requests 7. % of Sequential HTTP requests 
8. HTML to Image ratio 8. # of Server to Client Bytes 
9. % of PDF documents 9. % of Error requests 
10. % of HEAD requests 10. % of HEAD requests 
 
It is also interesting to note that the two new features introduced in this study are rather highly positioned 
in all of the presented rankings, ultimately proving that these attribute - % of Sequential Requests and 
Standard Deviation of Page Depth - can be very helpful in determining whether the session belongs to a 
human user or to a benign web-crawler.  
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d) Significance of the Difference Test 
The significance of the differences of values between true positive and true negative sessions for all 10 
features can be confirmed by applying the significant difference of the mean test (Equation 4.15 or the t-
test) [168]. As can be observed in Table 4.12, the mean values of features 9 and 10 are significantly 
different between true positive and true negative sessions extracted from the CSE web log files in the case 
of all seven classifiers (bold-lettered values indicate significant difference with 95% confidence). The 
mean values of the other features (except features 5 and 7) are also significantly different between the two 
groups of sessions. 
 
The significance of the differences of values between true positive and true negative sessions extracted 
from the YORKU web log data are shown in Table 4.13. As can be observed, the results are highly similar 
with t-scores being slightly smaller in Table 4.13 than in the Table 4.12. The generally smaller t-scores 
with YORKU data can be probably attributed to the fact that visitors to the much larger web domain are 
generally more diverse than the visitors that visit a small sub-domain. Nevertheless, all features (except for 
% of PDF requests) that are significantly different between true positive and true negative sessions in 
Table 4.12 are also significantly different between true positive and true negative sessions in Table 4.13. 
The SharpSchool dataset generate significance of the differences results, presented in Table 4.14, are 
similar to CSE and YORKU results. 
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Table 4.12 – T-scores for the difference test on mean values of all 10 features between true positive and 
true negative sessions extracted from CSE web log data (note: bold-lettered numbers indicate the 
significant difference with 95% confidence) 
Classifiers 
1          
t-score 
2          
t-score 
3          
t-score 
4          
t-score 
5          
t-score 
6          
t-score 
7          
t-score 
8          
t-score 
9          
t-score 
10          
t-score 
C4.5 11.68 4.06 4.46 4.71 0.88 25.17 2.09 77.76 23.05 16.88 
RIPPER 11.61 4.00 4.21 4.69 1.01 25.65 1.91 79.55 22.81 16.75 
k-Nearest 
Neighbour 
11.51 4.06 4.24 4.53 1.12 24.41 2.37 71.62 22.45 16.11 
Naive 
Bayesian 
11.97 5.22 4.47 5.35 1.56 26.46 1.96 78.29 21.95 15.79 
Bayesian 
Network 
11.52 4.07 4.16 5.01 0.98 25.69 1.57 80.79 23.4 17.19 
SVM 12.69 4.08 4.14 4.69 0.7 25.41 1.23 79.4 23.08 17.08 
Neural 
Network 
11.37 4.00 4.49 4.58 0.75 25.26 2.00 78.2 23.24 17.48 
 
 
Table 4.13 – T-scores for the difference test on mean values of all 10 features between true positive and 
true negative sessions extracted from YORKU web log data (note: bold-lettered numbers indicate the 
significant difference with 95% confidence) 
Classifiers 
1          
t-score 
2          
t-score 
3          
t-score 
4          
t-score 
5          
t-score 
6          
t-score 
7          
t-score 
8          
t-score 
9          
t-score 
10          
t-score 
C4.5 5.34 3.71 1.55 2.44 0.71 22.69 1.7 37.25 3.72 5.4 
RIPPER 5.09 4.41 1.78 2.55 0.78 21.43 1.52 37.99 3.82 5.31 
k-Nearest 
Neighbour 
4.35 4.42 1.05 2.75 0.71 22.03 1.51 35.29 3.43 5.34 
Naive 
Bayesian 
4.13 4.59 1.51 3.35 0.89 23.58 1.96 35.54 2.46 5.15 
Bayesian 
Network 
5.68 4.5 1.29 2.66 0.81 22.88 1.57 41.21 3.84 5.36 
SVM 6.04 3.7 1.14 1.99 0.78 22.56 2.13 51.27 3.2 5.7 
Neural 
Network 
5.51 3.52 1.07 2.3 0.69 23.47 1.86 41.87 3.93 5.52 
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Table 4.14 – T-scores for the difference test on mean values of all 10 features between true positive and 
true negative sessions extracted from SharpSchool web log data (note: bold-lettered numbers indicate the 
significant difference with 95% confidence) 
Classifiers 
1          
t-score 
2          
t-score 
3          
t-score 
4          
t-score 
5          
t-score 
6          
t-score 
7          
t-score 
8          
t-score 
9          
t-score 
10          
t-score 
C4.5 104.32 3.3 1.33 5.29 0.3 15.6 105.74 43.81 12.47 107.88 
RIPPER 110.24 3.31 1.29 5.3 0.29 15.74 117.6 44.1 12.44 109.67 
k-Nearest 
Neighbour 
94.62 3.25 1.31 5.28 0.31 15.53 96.52 43.39 12.41 106.52 
Naive 
Bayesian 
125.9 3.39 1.51 6.19 0.52 15.57 140.79 46.39 13.63 112.56 
Bayesian 
Network 
126.8 3.37 1.377 5.78 0.44 15.74 123.3 46.24 13.35 113.55 
SVM 115.08 3.12 1.08 4.53 0.25 15.08 108.93 44 9.78 111.65 
Neural 
Network 
120.07 3.27 1.31 5.3 0.29 15.69 131.98 44.02 12.22 110.04 
 
4.2.3.2 Experiment 2 
In this section, we present the results derived in the second experiment of our supervised learning study. 
The goal of the experiment was to test the classification accuracy of the seven data-mining algorithms, as 
well as to evaluate whether features 9 and 10 can improve the accuracy in classifying sessions as 
belonging to malicious web crawlers and unknown visitors.  
a) Recall, Precision and F1 Score (Class 1 Only) 
The comparisons of the recall, precision and F1 scores for the CSE dataset are shown in Figures 4.16, 4.17 
and 4.18, respectively. The results generated from the YORKU and SharpSchool datasets for the same 
three metrics are shown in Figures 4.19-4.24. Again, we only show the precision and recall scores for the 
underrepresented class, i.e., Class 1. In both datasets, it is evident from the presented results that in five out 
of seven classifiers the use of all 10 features results in noticeably higher recall, precision, and F1 scores. 
Although, note that precision scores are quite low (i.e., the false positive rate is fairly high for class 1) 
implying that the supervised learning cannot accurately detect the difference in the browsing behaviour 
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between sessions belonging to malicious and unknown visitors and sessions belonging to human visitors 
and well-behaved crawlers. 
 
 
Figure 4.16 – Recall scores for various classifiers trained on the CSE datasets that contain only features 1-
8 and all 10 features 
 
 
Figure 4.17 – Precision scores for various classifiers trained on the CSE datasets that contain only features 
1-8 and all 10 features 
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Figure 4.18 – F1 scores for various classifiers trained on the CSE datasets that contain only features 1-8 
and all 10 features 
 
Figure 4.19 – Recall scores for various classifiers trained on the YORKU datasets that contain only features 
1-8 and all 10 features 
 
 
Figure 4.20 – Precision scores for various classifiers trained on the YORKU datasets that contain only 
features 1-8 and all 10 features 
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Figure 4.21 – F1 scores for various classifiers trained on the YORKU datasets that contain only features 1-8 
and all 10 features 
 
Figure 4.22 – Recall scores for various classifiers trained on the SharpSchool datasets that contain only 
features 1-8 and all 10 features 
 
 
Figure 4.23 – Precision scores for various classifiers trained on the SharpSchool datasets that contain only 
features 1-8 and all 10 features 
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Figure 4.24 – F1 scores for various classifiers trained on the SharpSchool datasets that contain only 
features 1-8 and all 10 features 
 
b) Classification Precision for Both Classes (i.e. Classification Accuracy) 
The Figure 4.25 shows the comparison of the classification accuracy rate (Equation 4.9) when the seven 
classification algorithms are trained on the entire CSE dataset. The Figure 4.26 and 4.27 shows the results 
generated from the YORKU and SharpSchool dataset for the same metric, respectively. Again, as 
expected, due to class imbalance, the classification accuracy is very high (at 95% or above) for all seven 
classification algorithms in both datasets. However, as can be observed, there is a slight improvement in 
accuracy rate when all 10 features are used in five out of seven examined algorithms. 
 
 
Figure 4.25 – Classification accuracy rates for various classifiers trained on the CSE datasets containing 
only features 1-8 and all 10 features 
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Figure 4.26 – Classification accuracy rates for various classifiers trained on the YORKU datasets 
containing only features 1-8 and all 10 features 
 
  
Figure 4.27 – Classification accuracy rates for various classifiers trained on the SharpSchool datasets 
containing only features 1-8 and all 10 features 
c) Entropy-based Attribute Rankings 
Lastly, Tables 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17 show the rankings of 10 features in terms of the information gain and 
gain ratio metrics for the sessions extracted from CSE, YORKU and SharpSchool datasets, respectfully. 
Again, the ranking scores derived from all three datasets follow the similar trend. Also, the ranking scores 
are similar to those from the first experiment.  
 
The major/noticeable difference between the three sets of rankings is that the two features, percentage of 
HEAD requests and percentage of erroneous requests, are ranked much higher by the gain ratio than by the 
information gain metric. As explained in section 4.2.2.6, this implies that the percentage of HEAD 
requests and the percentage of erroneous requests have a very unbalanced split among the two classes. 
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Additionally, the two new metrics, standard deviation of page depth and percentage of sequential HTTP 
requests, do not perform as well in comparison to the first experiment. Note that given the low precision of 
all supervised learning algorithms in this particular case (malicious vs. non malicious visitors), these 
ranking should be taken with ‘some reservations’ (i.e., we cannot expect them to be 100% reliable). 
 
Table 4.15 – Attribute rankings in terms of Information Gain and Gain Ratio metrics (ordered top down 
from best to worst) for CSE dataset 
Information Gain Gain Ratio 
1. % of Unassigned Referrers 1. % of HEAD requests 
2. Popularity Index 2. Click Number 
3. Click Number  3. % of Unassigned Referrers  
4. % of Sequential HTTP Requests  4. Popularity Index 
5. # of Server to Client Bytes 5. % of Error requests  
6. HTML to Image ratio  6. % of PDF documents  
7. Standard Deviation of Page Depth 7. % of Sequential HTTP requests 
8. % of PDF documents 8. # of Server to Client Bytes 
9. % of HEAD requests 9. HTML to Image ratio 
10. % of Error requests 10. Standard Deviation of Page Depth 
 
Table 4.16 – Attribute rankings in terms of Information Gain and Gain Ratio metrics (ordered top down 
from best to worst) for YORKU dataset 
Information Gain Gain Ratio 
1. Popularity Index  1. % of HEAD requests 
2. % of Unassigned Referrers 2. Popularity Index  
3. % of Sequential HTTP Requests  3. % of Unassigned Referrers  
4. Click Number 4. % of Error requests 
5. HTML to Image ratio 5. % of PDF documents 
6. # of Server to Client Bytes 6. Click Number 
7. Standard Deviation of Page Depth 7. % of Sequential HTTP requests 
8. % of PDF documents 8. # of Server to Client Bytes 
9. % of HEAD requests 9. HTML to Image ratio 
10. % of Error requests 10. Standard Deviation of Page Depth 
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Table 4.17 – Attribute rankings in terms of Information Gain and Gain Ratio metrics (ordered top down 
from best to worst) for SharpSchool dataset 
Information Gain Gain Ratio 
1. Popularity Index  1. % of HEAD requests  
1. % of Unassigned Referrers 2. % of Error requests  
3. Click Number 3. Popularity Index 
4. % of HEAD requests  4. % of Unassigned Referrers  
5. % of Error requests  5. HTML to Image ratio  
6. Standard Deviation of Page Depth  6. Click Number  
7. # of Server to Client Bytes  7. Standard Deviation of Page Depth  
8. % of Sequential requests  8. # of Server to Client Bytes 
9. HTML to Image ratio 9. % of Sequential HTTP requests 
10. % of PDF documents 10. % of PDF documents 
 
d) Significance of the Difference Test 
The significance of the differences of results between true positive and true negative sessions extracted 
from the CSE web log data are shown in Table 4.18. As can be observed, the mean values of features 9 
and 10 are significantly different between true positive and true negative sessions in the case of four out of 
seven classifiers (bold-lettered values indicate significant difference with 95% confidence). However, the 
most significantly different features between the two groups of sessions are popularity index, HTML-to-
Image ratio and unassigned referrer. Additionally, the results show that differences between the features 
values among the two groups of sessions in this experiment are not as significantly different as is the case 
in the first experiment. 
 
The significance of the differences results between true positive and true negative sessions extracted from 
the YORKU and SharpSchool web log data are shown in Tables 4.19 and 4.20. In general, the results are 
somewhat different between the three datasets. The features that are significantly different in the three 
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datasets are click number and popularity index. In general, fewer features are significantly different in this 
experiment than in the first experiment. 
 
Table 4.18 – T-scores for the difference test on mean values of all 10 features between true positive and 
true negative sessions extracted from CSE web log data (note: bold-lettered numbers indicate the 
significant difference with 95% confidence) 
Classifiers 
1          
t-score 
2          
t-score 
3          
t-score 
4          
t-score 
5          
t-score 
6          
t-score 
7          
t-score 
8          
t-score 
9          
t-score 
10          
t-score 
C4.5 9.30 2.60 0.8 6.14 1.82 66.89 2.35 5.76 0.69 0.67 
RIPPER 17.52 17.10 8.45 5.56 1.44 67.04 3.27 5.24 29.33 1.82 
k-Nearest 
Neighbour 
2.56 15.43 1.00 0.58 1.83 5.21 0.70 8.71 1.52 0.88 
Naive 
Bayesian 
2.09 14.93 2.24 1.84 0.73 6.37 2.13 16.77 3.13 3.22 
Bayesian 
Network 
26.76 2.26 2.04 0.35 1.91 11.00 1.33 6.67 2.41 2.02 
SVM 13.74 15.83 2.32 0.75 1.02 3.8 1.15 6.49 1.25 1.45 
Neural 
Network 
12.31 9.45 1.47 6.76 1.83 8.62 2.84 5.79 1.87 3.39 
 
 
Table 4.19 – T-scores for the difference test on mean values of all 10 features between true positive and 
true negative sessions extracted from YORKU web log data (note: bold-lettered numbers indicate the 
significant difference with 95% confidence) 
Classifiers 
1          
t-score 
2          
t-score 
3          
t-score 
4          
t-score 
5          
t-score 
6          
t-score 
7          
t-score 
8          
t-score 
9          
t-score 
10          
t-score 
C4.5 3.61 4.96 1.9 0.86 1.17 43.21 1.6 7.66 1.81 0.67 
RIPPER 5.33 4.16 1.81 1.78 1.44 32.83 1.32 7.43 2.2 1.82 
k-Nearest 
Neighbour 
3.38 6.87 0.9 0.59 1.83 9.43 1.27 10.07 1.26 0.88 
Naive 
Bayesian 
2.73 3.72 1.18 1.34 0.73 3.97 0.68 12.47 2.4 3.22 
Bayesian 
Network 
4.54 6.23 0.64 0.92 1.91 19.42 1.13 15.08 2.11 2.02 
SVM 6.21 5.48 1.99 0.81 1.02 8.96 0.99 6.25 2.01 1.45 
Neural 
Network 
6.95 5.53 2.88 1.52 1.83 35.89 1.56 24.46 2.5 2.5 
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Table 4.20 – T-scores for the difference test on mean values of all 10 features between true positive and 
true negative sessions extracted from SharpSchool web log data (note: bold-lettered numbers indicate the 
significant difference with 95% confidence) 
Classifiers 
1          
t-score 
2          
t-score 
3          
t-score 
4          
t-score 
5          
t-score 
6          
t-score 
7          
t-score 
8          
t-score 
9          
t-score 
10          
t-score 
C4.5 34.19 0.75 1.14 5.85 4.79 1.12 12.45 15.04 7.84 18.61 
RIPPER 38.67 0.61 1.04 5.68 5.27 1.36 72.88 21.05 9.94 21.38 
k-Nearest 
Neighbour 
34.3 0.77 0.91 5.19 4.48 1.56 13.47 16.04 8.13 21.43 
Naive 
Bayesian 
58.56 0.98 0.65 6.88 4.48 2.45 37.37 27.84 12.33 34.07 
Bayesian 
Network 
60.14 0.93 0.55 6.09 4.43 2.62 50.94 28.85 13.62 33.72 
SVM 42.87 0.87 1.5 5.98 5.38 1.79 42.54 22.97 11.68 26.54 
Neural 
Network 
38.87 0.71 1.4 5.85 5.41 1.39 37.65 19.14 9.63 19.95 
 
4.2.4 Discussion and Observations 
 
The classification results of Experiment 1 are quite close to what we have expected to see. Namely, the 
characteristics of web site usage by well-behaved web crawlers are inherently different from the usage by 
human users in terms of the features examined in our study. Hence when faced with the problem of 
differentiating between such two diverse groups of web users (i.e. their respective feature vectors), all of 
the examined classification algorithms end up producing highly favourable results. 
 
The classification task in Experiment 2 is more complex than that in Experiment 1 because the 
classification algorithms are now required to differentiate between four different types of sessions (see 
Figure 4.28). The results in the second experiment prove that the browsing behaviour of malicious and 
unknown sessions (as an aggregate group) is quite similar to the browsing behaviour of human users and 
well-behaved crawlers (as another aggregate group), and thus present a far more challenging task to all 
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examined algorithms. Consequently, the obtained classification results are far less favourable than those 
observed in Experiment 1.  
 
classify
classify
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Human Well-behaved Bot
Malicious Bot Unknown
Human Well-behaved Bot
 
Figure 4.28 – Classification experiments 
 
4.3 Summary 
 
The following three general conclusions were derived from our study: 
 The classification accuracy of classification algorithms such as Neural Networks, C4.5, RIPPER and k-
Nearest Neighbour algorithms is close to 100% in the first experiment. From the data mining 
perspective, the identification/classification and separation of well-behaved crawlers and human 
visitors is very much a feasible task. These results are in line with the results derived in the previous 
studies on web crawler classification (such as [56], [154], [136], [147]). 
 The two new features proposed - the consecutive sequential requests ratio and standard deviation of 
page request depths - are highly ranked among the other features used in the study by the information 
gain. The new features are also explicitly shown to improve the classification accuracy, recall, 
precision and F1 score of most evaluated algorithms, in both conducted experiments. 
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 As evident in the second experiment of our study, the browsing behaviours of majority of malicious 
and unknown visitors as well as well-behaved crawlers and human users is not significantly different. 
Therefore, from the data mining perspective, their identification/classification is a more difficult task 
than a simple classification of known well-behaved crawlers. Specifically, effective 
identification/classification of web crawlers that attempt to mimic human behaviour remains a 
challenging classification problem. A particular challenge in detection of (malicious) crawlers that 
attempt to mimic human behaviour is the existence of information that is easily alterable and, as such, 
can lead to inaccurate classification results. (Note that all 10 features defined in section 4.2.1.2 can 
ultimately be spoofed; yet, there exists no simple mechanism that can reliably detect whether any 
spoofing has taken place.) Supervised machine-learning techniques that rely on alterable data – 
especially for the purposes of data labeling – are particularly susceptible to the problem of web-visitor 
misclassification. In contrast to supervised learning, unsupervised learning is generally known to be 
less sensitive to the presence of sporadic data outliers (i.e. presence of sporadically alterable features), 
and more effective in providing unbiased look and understanding of the underlying data set. Due to this 
very promise of more robust and unbiased classification, we turn to unsupervised learning in the next 
stage of our study, as described in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 Detecting Differences in Browsing 
Behavior of Web Visitors with 
Unsupervised Clustering Algorithms 
 
 
In this chapter, we present our second study on detection of suspicious web visitors using two 
unsupervised neural network (NN) learning algorithms: the Self-Organizing Map (SOM) [137] and 
Modified Adaptive Resonance Theory 2 (Modified ART2)
8
 [169]. (The results of this study have been 
published in [9] and [10].) In section 5.1, we describe our work on static web domains that employs 
unsupervised neural network algorithms to cluster web visitors using the same features employed in 
chapter 4. Again, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that has used unsupervised, i.e. 
unbiased learning, to detect differences in browsing behaviour between malicious and benign web site 
visitors. In section 5.2, we propose a framework for detecting differences in browsing behaviour between 
non-outlier and outlier human and malicious web visitors by employing non-parametric correlation 
analysis. Lastly, in section 5.3, we present our concluding remarks. 
                                                     
8
 Modified ART2 is a variation of the original ART algorithm [143]. Its advantages over the original algorithm are: 
1) stable learning that results in gradually increasing/merging clusters, and 2) learning/clustering that can be 
terminated either when the radius of the formed clusters reaches some predetermined size, or when the number of 
formed clusters reaches some predetermined number. 
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5.1 Study on Unsupervised Clustering of Web Visitors Sessions 
 
Among many possible unsupervised NN algorithms, we have chosen to work with the SOM and Modified 
ART2, for the following reasons: 
 The goal of the SOM algorithm is to cause the underlying neural network to respond similarly to 
similar input patterns. From the practical point of view, the SOM algorithm is well known for: a) its 
topology preservation ability, which implies that similar input samples activate topologically close 
neurons, b) its ability to produce natural clustering, i.e. clustering that is robust to statistical anomalies, 
and c) superior visualization of high-dimensional input data in 2D-representation space. Note that we 
chose SOM over an alternative clustering visualization technique such as Multi-Dimensional Scaling 
(MDS) [170]. As shown in [171] and [172], both SOM and MDS generate similar mappings for the 
principle of data visualization. Note that unlike MDS, SOM algorithm is well known for its topology 
preservation ability. The topology-preserving property enables extraction and visualization of relative 
mutual relationships among the data. The exhaustive overview of application of various visual 
clustering techniques on our data is beyond the scope of this study. 
 The ART2 algorithm also deploys the concept of competitive learning, but in combination with the so-
called winner-takes-all rule, ultimately producing fundamentally different clustering results. Namely, in 
contrast to SOM, the ART2 algorithm is able to: a) preserve the balance between retaining previously 
learned patterns and learning new ones – a feature known as stability-plasticity property; and b) 
identify statistically underrepresented but significant clusters, thus being greatly suited for imbalanced 
datasets. 
 
In the view of the previous works, the novelty of our research is twofold. Firstly, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study that applies unsupervised learning to the problem of web-visitor 
95 
 
categorization, ultimately aiming to promote effective differentiation between malicious web-crawlers and 
other (non-malicious) visitor groups to a web site. (Note, in two other studies deploying SOM [138], 
[173], and one other study deploying ART [144], only human web-visitors have been considered, and little 
to no attention has been given to automated web crawlers. Secondly, this is the first study that specifically 
focuses on the detection of “outlier” points (i.e., web visitors) such as malicious crawlers that exhibit 
human-like browsing behaviour.) 
5.1.1 Pre-processing of Web Server Logs 
 
In this study, the process of session identification is exactly the same as in previous study presented in 
section 4.2.1. The dataset labelling process, as performed by our log analyser, is illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
Recall from section 4.1.3 that in unsupervised machine learning cluster labelling is performed after the 
learning process derives the cluster distributions.  
 
Original Web Server 
Access Logs
Session 
Identification
Feature 
Extraction
Cluster Labelling
(based on 4 types)
Clustering with SOM and 
Modified ART2
Dataset
 
Figure 5.1 – Web server access log pre-processing 
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5.1.1.1 Features 
In order to be consistent with our previous experiments, in this unsupervised learning study we have 
utilized the same 10 features as in the previous supervised learning study.  
5.1.1.2 Dataset Labelling 
Once the training dataset (comprising feature-vector representations) is generated, the log analyzer labels 
each feature-vector as belonging to one of the following 4 categories: human visitors, well-behaved web 
crawlers, malicious crawlers and unknown visitors. As in the previous study, the log analyzer maintains a 
table of user agent fields of all known (malicious or well-behaved) web crawlers and browsers. This table 
can be built from the data found on web sites [64], [150], [151]. The dataset labelling process is shown in 
Figure 5.2. 
 
New Web Session
Session’s User Agent string 
matches a User Agent string 
of a known browser ?
Yes Yes
No
No
Label as
Unknown Visitor
Label as
Well-behaved Crawler
Session’s User Agent string 
matches a User Agent string 
of a malicious crawler ?
Accesses 
robots.txt file?
Yes
Session’s User Agent string 
matches a User Agent string 
of a well-behaved crawler ?
NoNo
Yes
Label as
Malicious Crawler
Label as
Human Visitor
No
 
Figure 5.2 – Dataset labelling flow chart 
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As explained previously, in unsupervised learning, the goal of data labelling is to facilitate our 
understanding and validation of the results that are to be obtained by the actual clustering process. Namely, 
through quick association of feature-vectors corresponding to a cluster with their pre-assigned labels, we 
hope to be able to obtain a better understanding of the cluster’s nature and significance. 
5.1.2 Experimental Design 
 
5.1.2.1 Training Data 
In this unsupervised learning study we have used the same log files as in the supervised learning study 
described in section 4.2.2.2. Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 list the number of sessions and class label distributions 
generated by the log analyzer and extracted from the CSE, YORKU and SharpSchool web log datasets, 
respectfully. 
Table 5.1 – Class distributions in the 
CSE dataset   
 Table 5.2 – Class distributions in the YORKU 
dataset 
 Number of Sessions   Number of Sessions 
Total # of Human Sessions 92149  Total # of Human Sessions 707854 
Total # of Well-behaved 
Crawler Sessions  
6644 
 Total # of Well-behaved 
Crawler Sessions  
9014 
Total # of Malicious 
Crawler Sessions 
448 
 Total # of Malicious Crawler 
Sessions 
860 
Total # of Unknown 
Visitor Sessions 
910 
 Total # of Unknown Visitor 
Sessions 
3445 
Total #  100151  Total #  721173 
Table 5.3 – Class distributions in the SharpSchool dataset 
 Number of Sessions 
Total # of Human Sessions 650526 
Total # of Well-behaved Crawler Sessions  125524 
Total # of Malicious Crawler Sessions 7166 
Total # of Unknown Visitor Sessions 10629 
Total #  793845 
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5.1.2.2 Clustering Algorithms 
The detection of web crawlers was evaluated with the following two unsupervised neural network 
algorithms: SOM and Modified ART2. The implementation of SOM algorithm is provided within 
MATLAB as a part of Neural Network Toolbox software package. We have chosen a SOM comprising 
100 neurons in 10-by-10 hexagonal arrangement. The map was trained with 200 epochs. The Modified 
ART2 implementation was based on the pseudo-code outlined in [169]. The algorithm parameters were set 
to: ρmax = 1.5, Δρ = 0.005 and nmax = 1. These parameters ensure that cluster generation will be stable 
regardless of the initial ordering of the input data. All input vectors were normalized prior to being fed to 
SOM and Modified ART2.  
 
Note that the size of the SOM map and number of clusters in Modified ART2 were selected strategically to 
help us understand and visualize the distribution of input sessions (i.e., web browsing behavior) and to 
simplify the identification of outlier web sessions. Also, a larger SOM map was computationally very 
expensive and would not have helped us identify outlier neurons/web sessions in a more meaningful way. 
5.1.3 Clustering Results 
 
In this section, we present the results obtained by clustering data sets with SOM and Modified ART2 
unsupervised neural network algorithms. 
5.1.3.1 SOM Results 
Figures 5.3-5.5 display the SOM clustering results obtained with CSE, YORKU and SharpSchool web log 
datasets, respectfully. On each of the shown 10-by-10 neuron maps, the size of the blue region inside a 
neuron’s hexagon is proportional to the number of session hits for that neuron, i.e. number of sessions 
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whose feature vectors are the closest to the (same) given neuron. The exact number of a neuron’s session 
hits is also explicitly provided within the neuron’s hexagon region. 
 
The maps in Figures 5.3.a), 5.4.a) and 5.5.a) show the neuron hits for all sessions and thus helps us 
visualise the actual distribution of the training dataset (i.e. helps us get an idea about the number, size and 
spatial proximity of the dataset’s most dominant clusters). Figures 5.3-5.5.b)-e) show the neuron hits for 
sessions that were pre-labelled as belonging to human, well-behaved crawler, malicious crawler and 
unknown visitor, respectively.  
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5.3.a)   All sessions neuron hits 5.3.b)   Human visitor sessions hits 
               
5.3.c)   Well-behaved crawler sessions hits 5.3.d)   Malicious crawler sessions hits 
 
5.3.e)  Unknown visitor sessions associations with neurons 
Figure 5.3 – Session hits per neuron visualized in 2 dimensional SOM map (CSE web log data) 
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5.4.a)   All sessions neuron hits 5.4.b)   Human visitor sessions hits 
                   
5.4.c)   Well-behaved crawler sessions hits              5.4.d)   Malicious crawler sessions hits 
 
5.4.e)  Unknown visitor sessions associations with neurons 
Figure 5.4 – Session hits per neuron visualized in 2 dimensional SOM map (YORKU web log data) 
102 
 
                  
5.5.a)   All sessions neuron hits            5.5.b)   Human visitor sessions hits 
                   
5.5.c)   Well-behaved crawler sessions hits             5.5.d)   Malicious crawler sessions hits 
 
5.5.e)  Unknown visitor sessions associations with neurons 
Figure 5.5 – Session hits per neuron visualized in 2 dimensional SOM map (SharpSchool web log data) 
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From the obtained maps, the following interesting conclusions can be drawn: 
 Human vs. crawlers sessions: Based on the distribution of fired neurons in Figures 5.3.b)-d), 
5.4.b)-d) and 5.5.b)-d), there appears to be a reasonably good separation between human visitor 
sessions and web-crawler sessions (both malicious and well-behaved). Namely, in CSE web log data, 
while crawler sessions are almost exclusively associated with neurons in the lower right corner of the 
map, human sessions are spread over a large area of the map, with most human sessions firing the 
neurons in the upper left corner of the map. Similarly, in YORKU and SharpSchool web log data, same 
conclusions can be derived. It might be worth pointing out that the large spread of fired neurons in the 
map of Figures 5.3.b), 5.4.b) 5.5.b) is not an indicator of greater variability in humans sessions 
compared to other session groups. Instead, it is the result of the statistical dominance of training-data 
corresponding to human sessions - see Tables 5.1-5.3. (As indicated in the introduction, the SOM 
algorithm produces results that are dependent on the input data density; hence, data clusters with higher 
density tend to ‘win-over’ a larger number of SOM neurons, regardless of their inter-cluster variance.) 
 Sessions that are labeled as human but ‘behave’ like malicious crawlers: A detailed inspection of 
Figures 5.3.b) and 5.3.d) reveals that, in spite of the well-formed separation between human and 
malicious web-crawlers, a percentage of web visitor sessions that declare themselves as regular 
(human) visitors
9
 end up firing neurons in the region (or close to the region) dominated by malicious 
web-crawlers – lower right corner of the map. In the view of our data-labeling algorithm from section 
5.1.1.2, this observation raises the question whether those sessions, in fact, correspond to malicious 
crawlers whose aim is to bypass web site security by simply not accessing the robots.txt file and/or 
falsifying the value of user agent string field. Recall, the initial accessing of the robots.txt file would 
ideally be performed by automated crawlers visiting a web site, but cannot be enforced. Similarly, user 
                                                     
9
 Recall from section 4.2.1.4 that we consider all sessions that carry the name of a well-known browser in the user 
agent field and that do not access the robots.txt to be human sessions.  
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agent string appears as a parameter in HTML requests, and can be relatively easily altered. Same 
conclusions can be made with the clustering results shown in Figure 5.4.b) and d) and 5.5.b) and d). 
 Sessions that are labeled as malicious crawlers or unknown visitors but ‘behave’ like humans: A 
detailed inspection of Figures 5.3.b), 5.3.d) and 5.3.e) also reveals that a number of sessions that are 
identified as belonging to malicious crawlers or unknown visitors end up firing neurons in the region 
dominated by human generated sessions – left and top half of the map. It is reasonable to assume that 
these visitors are indeed malicious crawlers or unknown crawlers, as it is unlikely that any regular 
human visitor would change the value of its agent string into ‘malicious crawler’, thus risking to be 
blocked by the web site. Same conclusion, as stated above, can be made with the YORKU and 
SharpSchool clustering results in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. Accordingly, this observation implies that the 
behaviour of some malicious crawlers and most unknown visitors - those that fire the nodes in the left 
half of the map - is very similar to the behaviour of regular users. It should be obvious that such 
malicious crawlers and unknown visitors are potentially very dangerous. Namely, had they attempted to 
falsify the value of agent string (i.e. declare themselves as regular visitors), they would have ‘perfectly’ 
blended into the population of regular human visitors, and would be very hard to detect by the web 
site’s security system.  
 
5.1.3.2 Modified ART2 Results 
Figures 5.6-5.8 display the results of CSE, YORKU and SharpSchool dataset clustering using Modified 
ART2, respectfully. Each plot displays the ratio of each session type (human, well-behaved crawler, 
malicious crawler and unknown visitor) per cluster placement. A session is placed in cluster i, if its 10-
dimensional vector representation is the closest (measured in the Euclidean distance) to the centroid of 
cluster i among all other clusters. The plots a), b), c), d), e), f), g) and h) display the sample results when 
Modified ART2 algorithm generates 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4 and 3 clusters of sessions, respectively.  
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5.6.a)   Distribution across 9 clusters 
 
5.6.b)   Distribution across 8 clusters 
  
5.6.c)   Distribution across 7 clusters 
   
5.6.d)   Distribution across 6 clusters 
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5.6.e)   Distribution across 5 clusters 
 
5.6.f)   Distribution across 4 clusters 
 
5.6.g)   Distribution across 3 clusters 
Figure 5.6 – Session type percentage distribution in CSE web log data 
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 5.7.a)   Distribution across 9 clusters 
  
5.7.b)   Distribution across 8 clusters 
 
5.7.c)   Distribution across 7 clusters 
 
5.7.d)   Distribution across 6 clusters 
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5.7.e)   Distribution across 5 clusters 
 
5.7.f)   Distribution across 4 clusters 
 
5.7.g)   Distribution across 3 clusters 
Figure 5.7 – Session type percentage distribution in YORKU web log data 
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 5.8.a)   Distribution across 9 clusters 
  
5.8.b)   Distribution across 8 clusters 
 
5.8.c)   Distribution across 7 clusters 
 
5.8.d)   Distribution across 6 clusters 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
 Cluster 1  Cluster 2  Cluster 3  Cluster 4  Cluster 5  Cluster 6  Cluster 7  Cluster 8  Cluster 9 
% 
Session Type Percentage Distribution across 9 clusters  
Human 
Well-behaved 
Malicious 
Unknown 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
 Cluster 1  Cluster 2  Cluster 3  Cluster 4  Cluster 5  Cluster 6  Cluster 7  Cluster 8 
% 
Session Type Percentage Distribution across 8 clusters  
Human 
Well-behaved 
Malicious 
Unknown 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
 Cluster 1  Cluster 2  Cluster 3  Cluster 4  Cluster 5  Cluster 6  Cluster 7 
% 
Session Type Percentage Distribution across 7 clusters  
Human 
Well-behaved 
Malicious 
Unknown 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
 Cluster 1  Cluster 2  Cluster 3  Cluster 4  Cluster 5  Cluster 6 
% 
Session Type Percentage Distribution across 6 clusters  
Human 
Well-behaved 
Malicious 
Unknown 
110 
 
 
5.8.e)   Distribution across 5 clusters 
 
5.8.f)   Distribution across 4 clusters 
 
5.8.g)   Distribution across 3 clusters 
 
5.8.h)   Distribution in the last learning stage 
Figure 5.8 – Session type percentage distribution in SharpSchool web log data 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
 Cluster 1  Cluster 2  Cluster 3  Cluster 4  Cluster 5 
% 
Session Type Percentage Distribution across 5 clusters  
Human 
Well-behaved 
Malicious 
Unknown 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
 Cluster 1  Cluster 2  Cluster 3  Cluster 4 
% 
Session Type Percentage Distribution across 4 clusters  
Human 
Well-behaved 
Malicious 
Unknown 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
% 
Session Type Percentage Distribution across 3 clusters  
Human 
Well-behaved 
Malicious 
Unknown 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
% 
Session Type Percentage Distribution in the last learning stage 
Human 
Well-behaved 
Malicious 
Unknown 
111 
 
 
While the results generated with SOM are useful for obtaining information about the spatial distribution, 
i.e. proximity, of data clusters, Modified ART2 gives us an insight into the inter-cluster variance. (As 
indicated in the introduction, Modified ART2 creates equal-size clusters and is not influenced by statistical 
irregularities in the training dataset.) With this in mind, and by expecting Figures 5.6-5.8, we derive the 
following conclusions: 
 Cluster Relationships:  We plot the session type distributions in Figure 5.6 starting from 9 
clusters and moving down to a single cluster in order to show how clusters (and session types) are 
merged together in the last 8 learning stages (epochs) of an application of Modified ART2 algorithm 
on our dataset. By observing the seven plots and noting the session type percentages among the 
clusters, we can conclude the following. Firstly, sessions grouped together in cluster 1 and belonging 
to malicious crawlers, unknown visitors and human visitors, are, in terms of the Euclidean space of 
their feature vectors, in very close proximity to each other, i.e. the malicious crawlers and unknown 
visitors have very similar browsing behaviour to the human visitors. Secondly, the malicious crawler 
sessions and unknown visitor sessions grouped together in clusters 2-5 in Figure 5.6.a)-e) are 
significantly distant from sessions in cluster 1 and hence exhibit a significantly different browsing 
behaviour than sessions belonging to cluster 1. 
 Cluster Relationships in YORKU and SharpSchool logs: The cluster relationships are similar to 
the results shown in Figure 5.6. In general, the sessions that are grouped together inside cluster 1 in the 
Figure 5.7.a) remain together for the final 8 learning stages in Figures 5.7.b)-f). The rest of the 
sessions grouped together in clusters 2-10 in the Figure 5.6.a) are mostly distributed among clusters 2-
5 in the final learning stages. 
 Human sessions: Over 90% of human sessions fall into cluster 1 in Figures 5.6.a)-e), over 85% of 
human sessions fall into cluster 1 in Figures 5.7.a)-e) and over 65% of human sessions fall into cluster 
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1 in Figures 5.8.a)-e), thus suggesting a relatively small behavioural variance of this user group in both 
datasets. In practical terms, this implies that human users tend to follow very similar web browsing 
patterns. 
 Unknown sessions: Over 80% of unknown sessions in Figures 5.6.a)-e), over 60% of unknown 
sessions in Figures 5.7.a)-e) and over 60% of unknown sessions in Figures 5.8.a)-e) belong to the 
same clusters as human sessions, namely cluster 1. This confirms our hypothesis from the previous 
section, that most unknown sessions follow very human-like browsing characteristics. 
 Malicious web-crawler sessions: Out of all session groups, malicious crawlers (and well-behaved 
crawlers) exhibit the greatest variability in both datasets – they are spread over most of the clusters in 
Figures 5.6-5.8 with most being assigned to cluster 1. It is interesting to observe that 50%-60% of 
malicious web-crawler sessions are assigned to cluster 1, together with human visitors in Figures 5.6 
a)-e) and 20% - 60 % of malicious web-crawler sessions are assigned to cluster 1, together with human 
visitors in Figures 5.7.a)-e) and 5.8.a)-e). This again confirms our earlier hypothesis, that some 
malicious web crawlers behave very-much like regular users, and in the case of a falsified user agent 
string value their detection would have presented a particular challenge.  
5.1.4 Outlier Analysis 
 
In the preceding section, we have identified three groups of sessions that could present a particular 
challenge for web intrusion detection systems:  
1) Sessions that are labeled as malicious crawlers but 'behave' like humans - outlier malicious sessions. It 
is very important to detect/identify such sessions since with higher level of sophistication (i.e., by 
employing a browser-type user agent string and not accessing robots.txt file) they could easily blend in 
with actual/regular human sessions and become undetectable. 
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2) Sessions that are labeled as unknown visitors but 'behave' like humans outlier unknown sessions. As in 
the case of outlier malicious sessions, the outlier unknown sessions could be also challenging to 
detect/identify if they had employed a higher level of sophistication as described above. 
3) Sessions that are labeled as humans but 'behave' like malicious crawlers or unknown visitors outlier 
human sessions. These sessions, in fact, already present a detection challenge since there is a possibility 
that they might actually belong to malicious crawlers that are spoofing their user agent string to hide 
their true identity. Web administration staff would be very interested in detection of such sessions. 
 
The positions of outlier and non-outlier web sessions in the SOM diagrams are shown in Figures 5.9-5.11. 
The procedure for separating web sessions into outliers and non-outliers is as follows: 
1. The neurons are sorted in ascending order based on the number of human web sessions clustered within 
their region. 
2. The human web sessions clustered within the first 20 neurons after the ordering are marked as outlier 
human web sessions and the remainder are marked as non-outliers. 
3. The non-outlier malicious and unknown web sessions are identified as belonging to the 20 "outlier" 
neurons identified in step 2. The remainder are marked as outliers. 
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a) Non-outlier and outlier malicious sessions b) Non-outlier and outlier unknown sessions 
         
c) Non-outlier and outlier human sessions 
Figure 5.9 – Positions of outlier and non-outlier sessions in the SOM generated from CSE dataset  
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a) Non-outlier and outlier malicious sessions b) Non-outlier and outlier unknown sessions 
 
c) Non-outlier and outlier human sessions 
Figure 5.10 – Positions of outlier and non-outlier sessions in the SOM generated from YORKU dataset 
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a) Non-outlier and outlier malicious sessions b) Non-outlier and outlier unknown sessions 
          
c) Non-outlier and outlier human sessions 
Figure 5.11 – Positions of outlier and non-outlier sessions in the SOM generated from SharpSchool dataset 
 
In this section we undertake a detailed analysis of the underlying characteristics of these three groups of 
sessions, which we will refer to as outlier sessions in the remainder of this chapter. Our analysis of outlier 
sessions entails:  
1) Identifying the user agent strings (UASs) and the respective source IP addresses associated with 
human, malicious and outlier unknown sessions. 
2) Applying the significance of the difference test between individual feature values of outlier sessions 
and non-outlier session types. We believe that from the point of view of web administrators, they 
would be most interested in discovering malicious and unknown sessions once they start appearing as 
human (i.e., by using legitimate-looking browser-based UASs). In this scenario, the administrator 
should, from the entire group of human sessions, be able to quickly identify those that are, in fact, 
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malicious. Accordingly, in the case of malicious and outlier unknown sessions, we would identify 
features that make them most distinguishable/distant relative to the non-outlier human sessions. 
Contrarily, in the case of human outlier sessions, web administrators would be most interested in 
identifying features that make them most similar relative to actual non-outlier malicious sessions. 
5.1.4.1 Outlier Malicious Sessions 
In order to gain a better understanding of the malicious crawler sessions that 'behave' like humans - i.e., 
outlier malicious sessions, we identified and grouped together all outlier malicious crawler sessions in the 
SOM generated from the CSE log data (see Figure 5.9.a)). Note that these sessions are also associated with 
cluster 1 in Figure 5.6 a)-c). There has been a total of 235 such sessions. Secondly, we grouped together all 
outlier malicious crawler sessions in the SOM generated from the YORKU log data (see Figure 5.10.a)). 
Note that these sessions are also associated with cluster 1 in Figure 5.7 a)-c). There has been a total of 177 
such sessions. Thirdly, we identified together all outlier malicious crawler sessions in the SOM generated 
from the SharpSchool log data (see Figure 5.11.a)). Note that these sessions are also associated with 
cluster 1 in Figure 5.8 a)-c). There has been a total of 1427 such sessions.  
a) User Agent Strings and Source-IP Addresses of Malicious Crawlers that ‘behave’ Like 
Humans 
Tables 5.4-5.6 display the UASs of outlier malicious sessions extracted from CSE, YORKU and 
SharpSchool web log datasets, respectfully. These three tables also show the source IP addresses of user 
sessions, as well as the overall number of sessions that have employed the given UASs. (Note that in most 
cases, multiple web sessions originated from the same IP address.) According to the information posted on 
http://www.botsvsbrowsers.com/ , http://www.useragentstring.com and http://www.user-agent-string.info 
web sites, these sessions are either known as malicious (e.g., sogou web crawler), belong to unknown bots 
that access the robots.txt file (all other user agent strings describing crawlers/bots in Tables 5.4-6) or 
employ valid browser-type UASs but suspiciously access the robots.txt file.  
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In the case of the outlier malicious sessions in all three datasets, more than three quarters of these outlier 
malicious sessions employ valid browser-type (Firefox, IE or Chrome browser’s) UASs. (Note that these 
are marked as malicious because they access the robots.txt file.) As documented in [52], the DDoS agents 
are known to employ valid UASs. Therefore, it is possible that these sessions could, in fact, be malicious 
DDoS bots.  
 
Also note in Table 5.4 that 14 (6%) of the malicious crawler outlier sessions have a blank UAS. As 
explained in section 4.2.1.4, these sessions are labelled as malicious and are not placed in the unknown 
session group because they access the robots.txt file. We have observed, from the clustering results of 
SOM and Modified ART2 that these malicious sessions with a blank UAS turn up in the same area as non-
outlier human sessions. Therefore, web administrators should take a note of all sessions with a blank UAS. 
 
Also note that "sogou" is a UAS that appears in all three Tables 5.4-5.6. However, there are also a number 
of unique UASs that appear exclusively in each of the three datasets. 
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Table 5.4 – Common types of user agent strings among outlier malicious crawlers in CSE web log 
User Agent String Originating IP Addresses 
Number of 
Outlier Malicious 
Sessions with this 
User Agent String 
Valid Firefox User 
Agent String 
199.246.40.54 (Canada), 99.228.37.126 (Canada), 
130.45.78.140 (United States),, 117.211.118.7 (India), 
115.75.75.14 (Vietnam), 92.255.64.120 (Russian 
Federation), 91.197.223.93 (Ukraine), 58.147.172.162 
(Bangladesh), 203.141.92.14(Japan), 82.137.200.48 
(Syrian Arab Republic), 76.67.100.9 (Canada), 
218.248.5.222 (India),  193.138.110.138 (Poland), 
14.52.133.143 (Korea, Republic of), 174.95.169.181 
(Canada), 62.128.6.5 (Germany) 
136 
Valid Chrome User 
Agent String 
205.211.168.16 (Canada), 82.192.87.31 (Netherlands) 57 
Empty User Agent 
String 
199.187.125.26 (United States), 78.46.78.40 
(Germany), 123.30.175.68 (Vietnam), 67.251.82.134 
(United States), 66.249.68.4 (United States) 
14 
Valid  Internet 
Explorer String 
62.24.252.133 (United Kingdom), 78.113.135.126 
(France), 110.172.152.159 (India), 118.192.35.60 
(China), 46.208.73.19 (United Kingdom) 
11 
ahrefsbot 213.186.127.2 (Ukraine) 6 
sogou 123.126.50.76 (China) 3 
heritrix 79.175.162.122 (Iran, Islamic Republic of) 3 
topyx-crawler 194.199.60.68 (France) 1 
linkchecker/6.9 24.89.182.19 (United States) 1 
quickobot 110.234.114.50 (India) 1 
dibot 188.40.99.137 (Germany) 1 
qryos 202.71.101.68 (Malaysia) 1 
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Table 5.5 – Common types of user agent strings among outlier malicious crawlers in YORKU web log 
User Agent String Originating IP Addresses 
Number of 
Outlier Malicious 
Sessions with this 
User Agent String 
Valid Firefox UA string 
220.181.61.187(China), 24.78.200.51(Canada), 
70.162.138.18(United States), 174.89.44.95(Canada), 
130.63.236.137(Canada), 99.235.7.6(Canada), 
188.165.235.21(France), 173.34.108.78(Canada), 
149.255.33.35(N/A), 149.255.33.34(N/A), 
123.125.169.88(China), 69.58.178.56(United States) 
84 
Valid Internet Explorer 
UA string 
62.24.252.133(United Kingdom), 80.40.134.120(United 
Kingdom), 41.131.253.57(Egypt), 
199.187.122.98(United States), 41.189.43.115(Cote 
D'Ivoire) 
51 
blekkobot 
199.87.252.52(United States), 199.87.252.49(United 
States), 199.87.252.102(United States) 
10 
ahrefsbot 213.186.127.2(Ukraine) 7 
pear http_request 
74.115.1.48(Anonymous Proxy), 
74.115.0.27(Anonymous Proxy), 
74.115.0.38(Anonymous Proxy) 
4 
sogou 123.126.68.17(China) 3 
careerbot 178.77.126.55(Germany) 2 
orbitspiderbot 176.9.90.105(Germany) 2 
mozilla/5.0 () 1.202.221.3(China) 2 
squirrobot 
23.20.159.217(United States), 23.20.94.137(United 
States) 
2 
Blank UA string 123.126.51.51(China), 98.111.48.78(United States), 2 
findcanbot 173.13.143.78(United States) 1 
acoonbot 95.211.139.1(Netherlands) 1 
mail.ru 217.69.133.30(Russian Federation) 1 
linkfluence 94.23.0.209(France) 1 
citeseerxbot 130.203.133.123(United States), 1 
itim 123.30.175.68(Vietnam) 1 
cdlwas_bot  128.48.120.140(United States) 1 
obot 206.253.226.14(United States) 1 
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Table 5.6 – Common types of user agent strings among outlier malicious crawlers in SharpSchool web log 
data. 
User Agent String Originating IP Addresses 
Number of 
Outlier Malicious 
Sessions with this 
User Agent String 
genieo/1.0 various IPs from US 335 
sogou various IPs from China 118 
daumoa various IPs from South Korea 116 
Valid IE UA string various IP s from China, US 170 
Valid Chrome UA string various IP s from China, US 147 
Valid Firefox UA string various IP s from Turkey, China, US 133 
ncbot 85.25.137.24(Germany) 46 
pear http_request 
74.115.1.48(Anonymous Proxy), 
74.115.0.27(Anonymous Proxy), 
74.115.0.38(Anonymous Proxy) 
18 
apple-pubsub/65.28  207.29.222.245(United States) 3 
davclnt 65.217.172.18(United States) 1 
bl.uk_lddc_bot 194.66.232.88(United Kingdom) 1 
empty User Agent String 204.100.126.254(United States), 1 
 
b) Significance of the Difference Test 
In our second experiment, we have applied the significance of the difference test on individual feature 
values between outlier malicious sessions that ‘behave’ like human and the non-outlier human sessions. 
The calculation of the significance of the difference test (i.e. t-test) is based on the Expression (4.15). The 
results of the significance of the difference test for the CSE, YORKU and SharpSchool web log data are 
shown in Tables 5.7-5.9, respectfully. The tables also display the mean and variance for each feature value 
in the two groups of sessions. Based on the overall t-test results, the malicious sessions that 'behave' like 
humans are shown to NOT exhibit human-like browsing characteristics in terms of the mean value of all 
features except feature 5 in the CSE dataset (relatively small percentage of HEAD requests by outlier 
malicious sessions) and feature 7 in the YORKU dataset (relatively low amount of data downloaded from 
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the server by outlier malicious sessions). Hence, it is our recommendation that web administrators pay 
special attention to all features except feature 5 and 7. 
 
Note the differences in the mean/variance results between the three datasets. This shows that differences in 
behaviour of malicious bots can be significant. Note also that this is in line with the clustering results 
generated with Modified ART2 algorithm. 
Table 5.7 – Mean, variance and significance of the differences test results on feature values between non-
outlier human sessions and outlier malicious sessions extracted from CSE web log data.  
Features 
Significant 
Difference? 
Mean / Variance            
Non-outlier Human 
Sessions 
Mean / Variance 
Outlier Malicious 
Sessions 
1. Click Rate Yes 0.34/0.48 0.14/0.082 
2. Html to image ratio Yes 0.72/3.93 60.59/138038 
3. % of PDF documents Yes 0.11/0.073 0.14/0.056 
4. % of Error requests Yes 0.048/0.011 0.12/0.022 
5. % of HEAD requests No 0.0013/0.00024 0.002/0.0009 
6. % of Unassigned Referrers Yes 0.044/0.011 0.13/0.039 
7. Number of Bytes Requested Yes 5.25/0.87 5.4/0.98 
8. Popularity Index  Yes 7.21/4.85 5.5/7.51 
9. Std. Dev. of Page Depth  Yes 0.58/0.2 0.89/0.34 
10. % of Sequential requests Yes 0.65/0.047 0.51/0.047 
 
Table 5.8 – Mean, variance and significance of the differences test results on feature values between non-
outlier human sessions and outlier malicious sessions extracted from YORKU web log data.  
Features 
Significant 
Difference? 
Mean / Variance          
Non-outlier Human 
Sessions 
Mean / Variance 
Outlier Malicious 
Sessions 
1. Click Rate Yes 0.4/0.35 0.26/0.17 
2. Html to image ratio Yes 0.33/1.17 0.82/6.41 
3. % of PDF documents Yes 0.019/0.015 0.17/0.072 
4. % of Error requests Yes 0.01/0.002 0.042/0.014 
5. % of HEAD requests Yes 0.00051/0.00034 0.0357/0.031 
6. % of Unassigned Referrers Yes 0.031/0.026 0.19/0.072 
7. Number of Bytes Requested No 5.33/0.58 5.26/0.84 
8. Popularity Index  Yes 11.52/2.27 5.27/10.86 
9. Std. Dev. of Page Depth  Yes 0.63/0.05 0.79/0.1 
10. % of Sequential requests Yes 0.46/0.03 0.33/0.06 
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Table 5.9 – Mean, variance and significance of the differences test results on feature values between non-
outlier human sessions and outlier malicious sessions extracted from SharpSchool web log data.  
Features 
Significant 
Difference? 
Mean / Variance           
Non-Outlier Human 
Sessions 
Mean / Variance 
Outlier Malicious 
Sessions 
1. Click Rate Yes 4.36/44.63 0.79/7.46 
2. Html to image ratio Yes 0.001/0.007 0.81/0.32 
3. % of PDF documents Yes 0.002/0.00093 0.001/0.00038 
4. % of Error requests Yes 0.03/0.00093 0.12/0.035 
5. % of HEAD requests Yes 0.00027/0.000085 0.0047/0.00049 
6. % of Unassigned Referrers Yes 0.042/0.0062 0.15/0.033 
7. Number of Bytes Requested Yes 5.83/0.42 6.16/0.41 
8. Popularity Index  Yes 6.5/13.7 6.88/9.8 
9. Std. Dev. of Page Depth  Yes 1.93/0.26 1.91/0.24 
10. % of Sequential requests Yes 0.46/0.02 0.42/0.025 
 
5.1.4.2 Outlier Unknown Sessions 
We have also tried to gain a better understanding of unknown visitor sessions that 'behave' like humans - 
i.e., outlier unknown sessions. Namely, we grouped together all outlier unknown crawler sessions in the 
SOM generated from the CSE log data (see Figure 5.9.b). Note that these sessions are also associated with 
cluster 1 in Figure 5.6.a)-c). There has been a total of 564 such sessions. Next, we grouped together all 
outlier unknown crawler sessions in the SOM generated from the YORKU log data (see Figure 5.10.b). 
These same sessions are also associated with cluster 1 in Figure 5.7.a)-c). There has been a total of 2093 
such sessions. Lastly, we grouped together all outlier unknown crawler sessions in the SOM generated 
from the SharpSchool log data (see Figure 5.11.b). These same sessions are also associated with cluster 1 
in Figure 5.8.a)-c). There has been a total of 1854 such sessions.   
a) User Agent Strings and Source-IP Addresses of Malicious Crawlers that ‘behave’ Like 
Humans  
Tables 5.10-5.12 display the user agent string information of outlier malicious sessions extracted from 
CSE, YORKU and SharpSchool web log datasets, respectfully. According to information posted on 
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http://www.botsvsbrowsers.com/, http:/www.user-agent-string.info and http://www.useragentstring.com 
web sites, these sessions are labelled by an unrecognizable user agent string. 
 
As can be observed in Table 5.10, 92% of outlier unknown sessions, extracted from CSE web log data, are 
observed to have a blank UAS. As explained in section 4.2.1.4, these sessions are labelled as not malicious 
and instead are placed in the unknown session group because they do not access the robots.txt file. We 
have observed, however, that in the SOM map some of these unknown sessions with a blank UAS turn up 
in the same area as outlier malicious sessions. This is a strong indication that such unknown sessions are 
also likely malicious crawlers that are pretending to be human, but end up in the unknown group just by 
virtue of avoiding to access the robots.txt file. Therefore, web administrators should take a note of all 
sessions with a blank UAS. 
 
We can also observe a large number of blank UASs in YORKU and SharpSchool web log data. There is 
also a number of unique UA strings that appear exclusively in each of the three datasets (e.g., inc in CSE, \ 
in YORKU and rarely used in SharpSchool). 
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Table 5.10 – Common types of user agent strings among outlier unknown visitors in CSE web log 
User Agent String 
Originating IP Addresses (Geographical Location of the 
IP Addresses) 
Number of 
Outlier 
Unknown 
Sessions with 
this User Agent 
String 
Empty User Agent String 
99.34.147.95 (United States), 188.54.201.36 (Saudi Arabia), 
113.140.84.109 (China), 122.174.93.244 (India), 
187.193.235.228 (Mexico), 112.210.167.77 (Philippines), 
41.235.127.108 (Egypt), 158.94.65.231 (United Kingdom), 
94.71.171.85 (Greece), 113.246.187.169 (China), 
119.152.122.232 (Pakistan), 117.205.59.210 (India), 
69.165.160.43 (Canada), 173.206.174.224 (Canada), 
97.101.246.66 (United States), 117.200.53.9 (India), 
173.248.212.71 (Canada), 173.35.244.203 (Canada), 
76.68.16.33 (Canada), 75.68.161.147 (United States), 
188.159.128.60 (Iran) … and 300 additional unique IP 
addresses 
519 
htc_maple 199.7.156.34 (Canada) 16 
Java(JDK version) 
134.59.2.173(France), 90.218.5.14(United Kingdom), 
67.194.86.169(United States), 130.236.182.150(Sweden), 
96.22.105.67(Canada), 79.117.69.200(Romania), 
193.170.75.225(Austria), 173.250.139.224(United States), 
192.107.175.11(United States), 99.226.218.75(Canada), 
150.214.108.217(Spain), 202.4.178.38(India) 
10 
iuc 65.255.37.199 (United States) 3 
zmeu 
188.165.213.213(France), 211.233.71.244(Korea, Republic 
of) 
2 
ivborw 173.252.20.27 (Canada), 117.196.99.238 (India), 2 
pagepeeker.com 188.40.84.81 (Germany) 2 
gvfs 132.180.194.76(Germany), 132.67.104.205(Israel) 2 
Bot, links, midori,  
webprocess, juc, ossproxy, 
sogouframework, cuteftp 
69.84.154.155 (United States), 72.28.188.180 (United 
States), 109.204.40.122 (United Kingdom), 175.152.2.167 
(China), 113.210.253.174 (Malaysia), 121.14.162.110 
(China), 175.140.19.107 (Malaysia), 165.246.166.240 
(Korea, Republic of), 124.121.241.216 (Thailand), 
1 (each) 
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Table 5.11 – Common types of user agent strings among outlier unknown visitors in YORKU web log 
User Agent String 
Originating IP Addresses (Geographical Location of 
the IP Addresses) 
Number of 
Outlier 
Unknown 
Sessions with 
this User Agent 
String 
Empty User Agent String 
14.98.60.93(India), 184.144.76.55(Canada),, 
206.192.70.55(United States), 23.21.180.100(United 
States), 79.125.12.71(Ireland) and additional IP 
addresses from 50 different countries 
780 
facebookplatform 69.171.228.248(United States) 361 
Java(JDK version) 
65.97.144.106(United States), 72.21.217.65(United 
States), 72.21.217.2(United States), 
206.123.170.188(Canada), 24.231.88.130(Canada) 
89 
site24x7 208.69.56.166(Canada) 56 
yahooexternalcache 8.137.88.40(United States) 33 
jakarta 206.187.5.200(United States) 21 
ossproxy 
99.235.106.207(Canada), 108.162.161.76(United 
States), 74.14.116.138(Canada), 67.82.228.143(United 
States), 
19 
htc_maple 207.245.236.101(Canada) 15 
vonchimpenfurlr 184.173.98.68(United States) 12 
\ 
174.18.92.139(United States), 188.29.43.99(United 
Kingdom), 65.103.210.96(United States), 
72.152.192.209(United States), 184.36.251.73(United 
States), 188.29.121.168(United Kingdom), 
7 
goo_search 218.213.143.193(Hong Kong) 4 
360se, apple-pubsub, rget, 
unwindfetchor, testagent, 
msdw, gbplugin, juc, 
goscraper, user-agent:, 
tencenttraveler, ning, 
contribute, iuc, nitro pdf 
download, linux, pbbrbot, 
ucweb, \x95mozilla 
Various International IP addresses 696 
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Table 5.12 – Common types of user agent strings among outlier unknown visitors in SharpSchool web log 
User Agent String 
Originating IP Addresses (Geographical Location of the 
IP Addresses) 
Number of 
Outlier Unknown 
Sessions with this 
User Agent String 
apple-pubsub/65.28 various IPs from US 617 
web sitepulse checker 
72.32.122.236(United States), 204.15.198.210(United 
States), 
266 
Empty UA string 
various IPs from US, 162.72.192.195(N/A), 
175.42.85.247(China), 175.44.11.164(China), 
123.151.148.155(China), 91.207.4.117(Ukraine), 
142.4.100.60(Canada), 
206 
windows-update-agent various IPs from US 100 
spiceworks 
64.68.251.210(United States), 74.94.10.58(United States), 
24.247.236.163(United States) 
97 
nsplayer various IPs from US 61 
twitterfeed various IPs from US 47 
kaseya network monitor 24.247.88.44(United States) 24 
ossproxy various IPs from US 24 
vb project 218.213.143.193(Hong Kong) 17 
rarely used 
151.224.71.45(N/A), 70.230.150.249(United States), 
174.255.128.137(United States), 108.54.174.36(United 
States), 166.137.156.26(United States), 173.18.1.33(United 
States), 166.137.156.28(United States), 72.204.29.21(United 
States), 166.137.209.144(United States), 
70.63.132.150(United States), 24.167.85.117(United States), 
198.228.200.158(United States), 71.235.122.107(United 
States), 166.147.121.148(United States), 
166.137.156.25(United States), 
15 
zte-z431, pantechp6030, 
ios/6.1.3 (10b329) 
dataaccessd, feedbot, 
windows-media-player, 
windows-rss-platform, <ua 
u= c=rm-255-smith/> , 
(null), kwc-torino/, 
r355[tf26843546020563439
1000000012525083723], 
sophosautoupdate, 
azbul.net, user-agent: user-
agent:, nsplayer, netfront, 
shockwave flash, 
queryseekerspider, acrobat 
viewer,one browser, 
camelhttpstream, cricket, 
Various International IP addresses 380 
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sam455/1.0[tf268435460815
71798048021001563419746
4] , <ua u= c=d4h92vm1/>, 
go http package 
 
b) Significance of the Difference Test 
The results of the significance of the difference test for the sessions generated with CSE, YORKU and 
SharpSchool web log data are shown in Tables 5.13-15, respectfully. Based on the overall t-test results in 
three datasets, the unknown sessions that 'behave' like humans are shown to NOT exhibit human-like 
browsing characteristics in terms of all features except relatively small percentage of erroneous requests 
and relatively high variance of the HTML-to-image ratio by outlier unknowns. 
 
Note the differences in the mean/variance results between the three datasets. This shows that differences in 
behaviour of unknown bots can be significant.  
 
Table 5.13 – Mean, variance and significance of the differences test results on feature values between non-
outlier human sessions and outlier unknown sessions extracted from CSE web log data.  
Features 
Significant 
Difference? 
Mean / Variance Non-
outlier Human 
Sessions 
Mean / Variance 
Outlier Unknown 
Sessions 
1. Click Rate Yes 0.34/0.48 0.45/0.56 
2. Html to image ratio Yes 0.72/3.93 0.32/0.54 
3. % of PDF documents Yes 0.11/0.073 0.23/0.15 
4. % of Error requests No 0.048/0.011 0.04/0.012 
5. % of HEAD requests Yes 0.0013/0.00024 0.0069/0.0036 
6. % of Unassigned Referrers Yes 0.044/0.011 0.02/0.01 
7. Number of Bytes Requested Yes 5.25/0.87 5.44/1.03 
8. Popularity Index  Yes 7.21/4.85 6.49/3.73 
9. Std. Dev. of Page Depth  Yes 0.58/0.2 0.49/0.22 
10. % of Sequential requests Yes 0.65/0.047 0.68/0.052 
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Table 5.14 – Mean, variance and significance of the differences test results on feature values between non-
outlier human sessions and outlier unknown sessions extracted from YORKU web log data.  
Features 
Significant 
Difference? 
Mean / Variance Non-
outlier Human 
Sessions 
Mean / Variance 
Outlier Unknown 
Sessions 
1. Click Rate Yes 0.4/0.35 0.16/0.12 
2. Html to image ratio No 0.33/1.17 2.33/3990 
3. % of PDF documents Yes 0.019/0.015 0.051/0.034 
4. % of Error requests Yes 0.01/0.002 0.049/0.022 
5. % of HEAD requests Yes 0.00051/0.00034 0.17/0.1 
6. % of Unassigned Referrers Yes 0.031/0.026 0.018/0.056 
7. Number of Bytes Requested Yes 5.33/0.58 5.04/2.55 
8. Popularity Index  Yes 11.52/2.27 9.67/9.58 
9. Std. Dev. of Page Depth  Yes 0.63/0.05 0.59/0.14 
10. % of Sequential requests Yes 0.46/0.03 0.43/0.11 
 
Table 5.15 – Mean, variance and significance of the differences test results on feature values between non-
outlier human sessions and outlier unknown sessions extracted from SharpSchool web log data.  
Features 
Significant 
Difference? 
Mean / Variance Non-
outlier Human 
Sessions 
Mean / Variance 
Outlier Unknown 
Sessions 
1. Click Rate Yes 4.36/44.63 1.48/10.27 
2. Html to image ratio No 0.001/0.007 0.0016/0.00029 
3. % of PDF documents Yes 0.002/0.00093 0.0011/0.000074 
4. % of Error requests Yes 0.03/0.00093 0.064/0.033 
5. % of HEAD requests Yes 0.00027/0.000085 0.0015/0.00015 
6. % of Unassigned Referrers Yes 0.042/0.0062 0.076/0.012 
7. Number of Bytes Requested Yes 5.83/0.42 5.73/1.3 
8. Popularity Index  Yes 6.5/13.7 6.85/13.33 
9. Std. Dev. of Page Depth  Yes 1.93/0.26 1.65/0.56 
10. % of Sequential requests Yes 0.46/0.02 0.49/0.042 
 
5.1.4.3 Outlier Human Sessions 
Another interesting group of sessions are sessions that are labelled as human but ‘behave’ like malicious 
crawlers - i.e., outlier human sessions. Recall that in the terms of the CSE web log data, these are the 
sessions that end up firing neurons in the lower right quarter/corner of the map (see Figure 5.9.c)) and are 
also associated with clusters 2-9 in Figure 5.6.a)-c). There has been a total of 8122 such sessions. In the 
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terms of the YORKU web log data, these are the sessions that end up firing neurons in the lower left 
quarter/corner of the map (see Figure 5.10.c)). Note that most of these sessions are also associated with 
clusters 2-9 in Figure 5.7.a)-c). There has been a total of 109645 such sessions. In the terms of the 
SharpSchool web log data, these are the sessions that end up firing neurons in the far right end of the map 
(see Figure 5.11.c)). Note that most of these sessions are also associated with clusters 2-9 in Figure 5.8.a)-
c). There has been a total of 122467 such sessions.  
a) User Agent Strings and Geographical Location of Source-IP Addresses of Human 
Crawlers that ‘behave’ Like Malicious  
Due to privacy reasons we cannot list the IP addresses of the most common types of UASs among the 
human outlier sessions. However, we can list various types of browsers (derived from UASs) which were 
utilized by human visitors that ‘behave’ like malicious crawlers, and those include: Mozilla Firefox, 
Internet Explorer, Safari, Google Chrome and Opera. Also there are a number of visitors that have utilized 
mobile platforms such as smart phones and tablet PCs. 
 
The geographical distributions of human outlier sessions extracted from CSE, YORKU and SharpSchool 
web log data are presented in Tables 5.16-5.18. Note that the information on geographic locations of the 
origin IP addresses was retrieved from the http://www.geobytes.com web site. By examining CSE and 
YORKU tables, we can observe that majority of sessions are originating from Canada with much smaller 
proportions originating from other countries such as China, United States, India, UK, Iran, Thailand, 
Australia, Japan, Germany, Brazil, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, France, and South Korea. The 
sessions originating from Canadian IP addresses are mostly from Toronto area with great majority of those 
originating from the York University’s workstations and on-campus computers. It is very possible that 
some of these outlier human sessions are actual human users with browsing characteristics similar to that 
of malicious crawlers or that some of the ‘on campus’ machines – especially laptops – are infected with 
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malware that, in fact, generates these requests in a fashion similar to malicious bots. It could also be the 
case that some of the identified geographical locations are, in fact, inaccurate since the malicious bots are 
known to frequently employ proxies. In SharpSchool dataset, the majority of visitors are from U.S. since 
the web portal hosts mostly web sites for U.S. K-12 schools. 
Table 5.16 – Geographical location distribution of outlier human sessions in CSE web log 
Country Origin of IP addresses %   City Origin of IP addresses %  
Canada 53 
 Toronto and York University 
Domain 
35 
China 10  Jinan 7 
United States, India 7  New Delhi, Beijing 3 
UK, Iran, Thailand, Germany, Brazil, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ukraine, 
France, Korea 
3 
 London, Bangalore, Oxford, 
Tehran 
1 
 
Other  
~ 41%  (1000 
unique cities) 
Others  
~24% 
(113 
unique 
countries) 
 
Unknown 13 
 
Table 5.17 – Geographical location distribution of outlier human sessions in YORKU web log 
Country Origin of IP addresses %   City Origin of IP addresses %  
Canada 55 
 Toronto and York University 
Domain 
42 
United States 16  Various US cities 14 
UK 5  London, York 1 
India, China 2 (each)  New Delhi, Beijing 1 
Australia, Germany, Brazil, France, 
Russia, Japan, Pakistan 
1 (each) 
 
Bangalore, Oxford, Tehran 1 
Unknown 1 
 
Other  
~ 28%  (7000 
unique cities) 
Others  
~8% (185 unique 
countries) 
 
Unknown 13 
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Table 5.18 – Geographical location distribution of outlier human sessions in SharpSchool web log 
Country Origin of IP addresses %  
 City Origin of IP 
addresses 
%  
United States 64  Unknown 42 
Unknown 15  Various US cities 37 
Japan 7  Beijing, Seoul, Shenzen 1 
China 5  Others < 1 (each) 
Germany 2  Unknown 42 
Russia, Canada, France, Ukraine 1 (each)    
 
b) Significance of the Difference Test 
The results of the significance of the difference test for the sessions generated with CSE, YORKU and 
SharpSchool web log data are shown in Tables 5.19-5.21, respectively. Again, for each feature, we display 
the mean and variance values. Based on the presented results for the CSE datasets, the human sessions that 
'behave' like malicious crawlers are shown to exhibit atypical (i.e., non-human-like) browsing 
characteristics in terms of mean values of features 2 (relative low HTML to image file retrievals), 5 
(relatively high percentage of HEAD request ), and 7 (relatively low number of bytes sent to the client by 
the server). In case of YORKU data set, only one such feature has been identified - (relatively high 
percentage of HEAD request), while no such features have been identified for SharpSchool dataset.  
Table 5.19 – Mean, variance and significance of the differences test results on feature values between non-
outlier malicious sessions and outlier human sessions extracted from CSE web log data. 
Features 
Significant 
Difference? 
Mean / Variance Non-
Outlier Malicious 
Sessions 
Mean / Variance 
Outlier Human 
Sessions 
1. Click Rate Yes 0.062/0.039 0.21/0.27 
2. Html to image ratio No 2.08/438.9 0.82/3.34 
3. % of PDF documents Yes 0.21/0.045 0.11/0.078 
4. % of Error requests Yes 0.096/0.035 0.12/0.08 
5. % of HEAD requests No 0.017/0.013 0.012/0.0055 
6. % of Unassigned Referrers Yes 0.86/0.071 0.2/0.08 
7. Number of Bytes Requested No 5.11/1.24 5.1/1.2 
8. Popularity Index  Yes 3.65/5.41 5.2/4.7 
9. Std. Dev. of Page Depth  Yes 1.17/0.43 0.69/0.3 
10. % of Sequential requests Yes 0.37/0.12 0.54/0.048 
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Table 5.20 – Mean, variance and significance of the differences test results on feature values between non-
outlier malicious sessions and outlier human sessions extracted from YORKU web log data. 
Features 
Significant 
Difference? 
Mean / Variance Non-
Outlier Malicious 
Sessions 
Mean / Variance 
Outlier Human 
Sessions 
1. Click Rate Yes 0.13/0.15 0.45/0.56 
2. Html to image ratio Yes 1.77/183.9 0.41/259.3 
3. % of PDF documents Yes 0.054/0.009 0.009/0.002 
4. % of Error requests Yes 0.12/0.034 0.027/0.012 
5. % of HEAD requests No 0.0017/0.0014 0.0005/0.00018 
6. % of Unassigned Referrers Yes 0..45/0.11 0.24/0.047 
7. Number of Bytes Requested Yes 5.03/0.85 5.25/0.39 
8. Popularity Index  Yes 1.94/2.94 6.48/6.22 
9. Std. Dev. of Page Depth  Yes 0.89/1.52 0.58/0.21 
10. % of Sequential requests Yes 0.52/0.08 0.6/0.04 
 
Table 5.21 – Mean, variance and significance of the differences test results on feature values between non-
outlier malicious sessions and outlier human sessions extracted from SharpSchool web log data. 
Features 
Significant 
Difference? 
Mean / Variance Non-
outlier Malicious 
Sessions 
Mean / Variance 
Outlier Human 
Sessions 
1. Click Rate Yes 0.30/0.5 0.93/5.75 
2. Html to image ratio Yes 0.009/0.0025 0.021/0.235 
3. % of PDF documents Yes 0.005/0.0017 0.025/0.018 
4. % of Error requests Yes 0.11/0.031 0.15/0.088 
5. % of HEAD requests Yes 0.052/0.037 0.021/0.015 
6. % of Unassigned Referrers Yes 0.99/0.004 0.76/0.11 
7. Number of Bytes Requested Yes 4.98/0.43 5.24/0.78 
8. Popularity Index Yes 11.49/5.34 10.7/23.53 
9. Std. Dev. of Page Depth Yes 0.62/0.15 1.01/0.59 
10. % of Sequential requests Yes 0.62/0.03 0.55/0.073 
 
5.1.5 Main Conclusions 
 
In general, there exists a reasonably good separation between malicious and non-malicious web users in 
terms of their browsing behaviour. And, while mostly human visitors tend to follow rather similar 
browsing patterns, automated web crawlers (and in particular malicious web crawlers) exhibit a range of 
browsing strategies. Moreover, in all three datasets we have employed in our study, over 20% of malicious 
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web crawlers and over 40% of unknown visitors employ browsing strategies that are somewhat similar to 
those of regular human web-visitors. Clearly, with a higher level of sophistications, these crawlers could 
pose a serious challenge for current web site security systems, especially those that perform simple 
screening of their visitors, e.g., by examining the value of user-agent string and/or looking for attempts to 
access the robots.txt file. 
 
5.2 Detecting Differences in Browsing Behavior of Web Visitors 
with Non-Parametric Correlation Analysis 
 
The results from the previous section have shown that unsupervised learning can be applied to detect 
potentially dangerous “outlier” web visitors. Now, it is worth noting that our work presented so far has 
been conducted without considering the time-dimension (i.e., time-domain) characteristics of the identified 
web-sessions. However, as illustrated in Figure 5.12, it seems reasonable to expect that time-domain 
related browsing statistics is significantly different between human- and machine-generated sessions, and 
hence this statistics can be used to additionally aid the process separation/identification of human vs. 
machine, or benign vs. malicious web-visitors.  
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Figure 5.12 – Comparison of the timing differences in web page access behaviour between a human 
visitor and a web crawler  
 
Here are the two simple illustrations as for how the inclusion of time-domain analysis may benefit the task 
of web user classification:  
 For instance, two sessions might comprise exactly the same sequence of web pages, visited in exactly 
the same order. However, the information on whether these pages are accessed in a rapid sequence or 
over a longer period of time, is clearly of great significance. Namely, a rapid sequence access is likely 
to belong to a crawler, while sessions that span over a longer period of time are likely to belong to 
humans. 
 The time spent viewing each individual page is another important parameter to consider. Namely, as 
previously discussed in chapter 3, crawlers are likely to spend the same or constant amount of time 
viewing, i.e., visiting a web page regardless of the amount of contextual information that the given 
page provides or its actual byte-wise size. On the other hand, the amount of time that humans spend 
viewing a page will be highly correlated to the contextual importance and byte-wise size of that page 
relative to others. 
 
Based on the above, it seems reasonable to conclude that the task of distinguishing between human and 
automated web-visitors will likely benefit from a time-domain analysis of web-browsing session. 
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In this section, we outline the methodology and results of our analysis involving time-domain 
characteristics of web sessions. In particular, in section 5.2.1, we introduce the model of human browsing 
behaviour that deploys three well-known statistical distributions. Using this model, in section 5.2.2, we 
present the correlation analysis of browsing behaviour characteristics of various identified web visitor 
groups. Finally, in section 5.2.3, we present several practical recommendations arising from this work.  
5.2.1 Introduction  
 
In the study presented in [57], authors state that the human browsing characteristics can be modelled by 
three statistical distributions:  
1) Zipf-Mandelbrot distribution for web page popularities, which models users’ page selection 
behaviour; 
2) Pareto distribution for page viewing times by an individual browser; 
3) Inverse Gaussian distribution for the overall length of a browsing sequence (i.e., number of ‘clicks’ in 
a session). 
(Note that, indirectly, features 1) and 3) have already been employed in our supervised/unsupervised 
studies, and are known to be very effective at distinguishing between human and machine-generated 
sessions. Feature 2) has not been previously used for the purposes of web-user classification.) 
 
In the following sections, we present a short overview of these three statistical distributions and the way 
they have been studied in the past literature. 
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5.2.1.1 Zipf-Mandelbrot Distribution for Web Page Popularities 
To introduce the concept of web-page popularity (in a given web site), let us assume that there are N (N > 
0) web-pages in total. The popularity of a web page can be seen as a measure of the frequency (i.e., 
probability) at which this page is accessed relative to other N-1 pages. Now, let random variable W be the 
requested web page, and Pr(W = i) be the access probability of page wi. If we further assume that the 
pages are sorted by their popularity, then in the case of most web sites the page popularity distribution is 
shown to follows Zipf-Mandelbrot distribution (a generalized Zipf distribution): 
 
        
 
      
                                                               (5.1) 
 
where i is the rank of the data, α (α > 0) is the bias factor, which characterizes the length of the tail of the 
distribution, and q (q ≥ 0) is the plateau factor, which make the probability of the highest ranked pages 
flatted. The observed value of the exponent α varies from one traffic trace (i.e., one web domain) to 
another. That is, the request distribution does not follow the strict Zipf's law (for which α = 1), but instead 
follows a more general Zipf-like distribution with varying α.  
 
There are a number of studies, published in the last 18 years, that confirm the above hypothesis - that the 
web page popularities closely follow the Zipf-Mandelbrot distribution. Table 5.22 presents a summary of 
various datasets analyzed in the previous studies and also lists the reported exponent α. The documented 
values of α parameter range from 0.47 to 2.5 with most being below 1.0.  
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Table 5.22 – Summary of previous research analysis on web page popularity  
Reference  α Date of the log file  Type of web site 
[57] 1.31 June, 2010 Chinese backbone network 
[58] 
0.77 August, 1996 Digital Equipment Corporation web proxy traces 
0.69 November, 1996 Home IP service offered by UC Berkeley 
0.78 May, 1997 Computer Science Department at University of Pisa 
0.73 January, 1998 Questnet, a regional ISP in Australia 
0.64 December, 1997 National Lab for Applied Networking Research 
0.83 June, 1998 
FuNet, a regional ISP network serving the academic 
communities in Finland 
[174] 1.0-1.5 
January, 001-
December, 2001 
Mobile Internet News Service 
[175] 1.35 June, 2004 University of Stuttgart web servers traces 
[176] 0.85 October, 1996 
web servers at the Computer Science Department at Boston 
University 
[177] 1.35 
November, 1994-
March, 2005 
web servers from the Computer Science Department at Boston 
University 
[178] 0.96 January, 1994 Digital Equipment Corporation web cache 
[179] 0.65 
April, 1998 – May, 
1998 
web servers from the Department of Computer Science at 
Boston University 
[180] ~1 September, 1998 web servers at INRIA, a French national research institution 
[181] 1.6 
November, 1998-
April, 2001 
HP Laboratories web servers 
[182] 1.23 July, 1999-April, 2001 HP Laboratories web servers 
[183] 0.6 September, 2004 Internet Service Provider, unknown location 
[184] 0.47 April, 2000 University of Washington web servers 
[185] 0.25-2.5 September, 2000 web servers at UC at Berkeley 
[186] ~1.0 
November, 2001- 
June, 2002 
web Servers from the Department of Computer Science at 
University of Toronto, web servers from National Technical 
University of Athens in Athens, Greece, web Servers from the 
Department of Computer Science at University of Cyprus 
[187] 
0.7, 
0.97 
January, 2006 – 
February, 2006 
ISP in Brazil 
[188] 1.156 
December, 2007 – 
January, 2008 
UOL, video content provider located in Brazil 
 
5.2.1.2 Pareto Distribution for Web Page Viewing Times 
Let the random variable V represent the page viewing time for a particular web page, and let vm be the 
minimum viewing time for all web pages in a given web site. Consequently, the probability density 
function of web-page viewing times in the given web site is shown in (5.2), 
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                                                                (5.2) 
 
where α is called the Pareto index. In previous studies such as [57], [189], [175], [190], [191], [192] and 
[193], the observed minimum viewing time vmin is on average 30 seconds, while exponent α varies between 
0.31 and 1.5. Table 5.23 presents a summary of various datasets analyzed in the previous studies and also 
lists the reported exponent α and parameter vmin.  
Table 5.23 – Summary of previous research analysis on web page viewing time 
Reference α / vmin Date of the log file  Type of web site 
[57] 1.31 / N/A June, 2010 Chinese backbone network 
[189] 1.5 / 30 sec 
January, 1994-February, 
1995  
web servers from the Computer Science 
Department at Boston University 
[175] 0.7 / 10 sec June, 2004 University of Stuttgart web servers traces 
[190] 0.9 / 56 August, 1995 
web servers at GTE Laboratories in 
Waltham, Massachusetts 
[191] 1.5 / 30 Various Log Files from 1998 web Servers at Boston University 
[192] 0.31 – 1.15 / 29-99 Various Log Files from 2004 
web servers from Automobile 
Manufacturing Company 
[193] N/A/ / 30 sec 
Not available, paper 
published in 2009 
web servers at Network Center of Sun 
Yat-Sen University 
[194] 0.9 / N/A December, 1989 
web servers from University of California 
at Berkeley 
 
5.2.1.3 Inverse Gaussian Distribution for Number of Clicks in a Session 
Let L be the number of links that a visitor visits (i.e., follows or clicks) on a web site during a single web 
session, then the probability density function of L is known to follow the distribution below: 
 
         
 
    
     
       
    
                                            (5.3) 
 
140 
 
where the average value of L is, E[L] = μ, variance Var[L] = μ3 / λ and λ > 0 is the shape parameter 
describing the length of the distribution’s tail. Note that as λ → ∞, inverse Gaussian distribution 
approximates to the normal Gaussian distribution. 
 
A number of the past studies have documented values of μ and λ parameters to show that the browsing 
length of human visitors follows an inverse Gaussian distribution. Table 5.24 presents a summary of 
various datasets analyzed in the previous studies and also lists the reported μ and λ parameters. 
 
Table 5.24 – Summary of previous research analysis on web session's browsing length  
Reference  μ / λ Date of the log file  Type of web site 
[195] 
2.98 / 6.24 December, 1997 AOL web servers 
3.86 / 6.08 August, 1997 Xerox Corporation 
[180] 5.96 / 3.0 September, 1998 
web servers at INRIA, a French 
national research institution 
[196]  3.65 / 2.69 September, 2002 European web Portal 
[197] 4.75 / 3.08 September, 1999 msnbc.com 
[198] 
Only μ available: 
2.08, 2.12, 2.26, 2.5, 2.72, 
2.82, 2.85, 2.93, 3.1 
Not available, paper 
published in 2007 
Educational, Commercial web sites 
in Chile, US, Spain and Italy 
 
5.2.1.4 Motivation 
As previously argued in chapter 3, it will be fairly difficult for an attacker to estimate the page popularity 
and page viewing times of regular human visitors of either a dynamic or a static web site. We expect that 
the distribution of web page popularities, page viewing times and sessions’ sequence length will be 
significantly different between human and malicious/unknown web visitors.  
 
Therefore, we propose an extended analytical framework to evaluate the potential of our methodology to 
separate non-outlier human visitors from outlier malicious/unknown visitors. (Recall that non-outlier and 
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outlier visitors were defined in section 5.1.4). Namely, we employ two correlation tests, Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test 2 (K-S2 test) and Mann-Whitney Rank Sum test, to measure the differences in distributions 
and medians, respectively, of web page popularity rankings, page viewing times and number of pages 
visited during a session. From the point view of web administrators, we believe that they would be most 
interested in discovering malicious or unknown sessions once they start appearing as human (i.e., by using 
proper browser-based UASs). In that case, the administrator should, from the entire group of human 
sessions, be able to quickly identify those that are, in fact, malicious by evaluating whether their browsing 
behaviour is significantly different from the browsing behaviour of non-outlier human visitors in terms of 
the 3 features discussed above. On the other hand, in the case of outlier human sessions, web 
administrators would be mostly interested in evaluating whether their browsing behaviour is (or is not) 
significantly different from non-outlier malicious behaviour, in which case the likelihood that these 
sessions are actually malicious would be rather small.  
 
Additionally, as a part of our study, we compare the parameters (α, vmin, μ and λ) of Zipf, Pareto and 
Inverse Gaussian distributions derived with our fairly recent web log traces against the distribution 
parameters previously reported in the research literature. (Note that the traffic traces are 8 years or older in 
previous research works listed in Tables 5.22-5.24.) 
5.2.2 Correlation Analysis of CSE, YORKU and SharpSchool Datasets  
 
In this section, we present the results of the correlation analysis of outlier and non-outlier web sessions 
extracted from CSE, YORKU and SharpSchool web server logs.  
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5.2.2.1 Time series data 
For the purposes of correlation analysis we have collected three sets of data: the web page popularity 
rankings, the web page visiting/viewing times and browsing lengths of each session. The datasets were 
collected for non-outlier human sessions, outlier human sessions, non-outlier malicious sessions, outlier 
malicious sessions and outlier unknown sessions. Note that in our datasets we only include requests for 
primary web pages - as defined in section 3.2.3. We do not include the secondary content requests as these 
are usually indirectly requested by a user when downloading a HTML page via a web browser. 
5.2.2.2 Correlation metrics 
In this study we employ the following 2 nonparametric statistical tests (from [167]):  
 
1) Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test which detects the significant difference between two sample 
medians. 
2) Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of 2 Independent Samples, which measures the significant difference at 
any point along the two cumulative frequency distributions derived from two samples.  
 
The short overview of these two techniques is presented in Appendix C. 
 
Note that these two correlation tests apply two different techniques to evaluate the differences between the 
given samples. By applying both techniques, we tend to provide a more holistic evaluation of the statistical 
differences between various session types examined in our analysis.  
5.2.2.3 Results of the correlation analysis  
In this section, we present the results of the correlation analysis of CSE, YORKU and SharpSchool web 
log data. We also plot the three distributions in log-log space (Figures 5.13 to 5.18). Log-log space reveals 
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the differences in the various exponential distribution families that are just not apparent by viewing a non-
log-log plot because all such distributions have long tails. Also, we document the parameters of the three 
statistics and show the results of the two statistical tests: Mann-Whitney Rank Sum and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 2 independent sample test. The main conclusions derived from the observed results are presented 
in the last section of this chapter, 5.2.3. 
a) Web Page Popularity Rankings 
The Mann-Whitney Rank Sum and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were employed to investigate whether the 
differences in the web page popularity ranks are significant in Figures 5.13 and 5.14. Note that in these 
graphs, the empirical distribution of web page popularity ranks for various session types are shown with 
either blue, red or green markings, depending on the session type. The dashed black lines represent the 
fitted PMFs of data with slope equal to exponent α in the Zipf-Mandelbrot’s PMF. Now, if we examine 
each graph individually in Figures 5.13 and 5.14, we can observe that the fitted PMFs of data (dashed 
lines) are quite varied between different session types. 
 
     
a) CSE data b) YORKU data c) Sharpschool data 
Figure 5.13  Log-log representation of Zipf-Mandelbrot’s PMFs describing the web page 
popularity ranks for non-outlier human, outlier malicious and outlier unknown visitors 
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a) CSE data b) YORKU data c) Sharpschool data 
Figure 5.14 – Log-log representation of Zipf-Mandelbrot’s PMFs describing the web page popularity 
ranks for outlier human and non-outlier malicious visitors 
 
 
Table 5.25 – Correlation metric scores between various session types extracted from CSE web log data 
(bold-lettered values indicate that the two samples are uncorrelated with 95% confidence when the given 
correlation metrics are applied) 
Session Type Comparisons Mann-Whitney z-score 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov K-S 
statistic / K statistic 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Malicious  -5.38 0.36 / 0.015 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Unknown  -14.53 0.22 / 0.044 
Non-outlier Human vs. Non-outlier Malicious  -36.2 0.36 / 0.029 
 
Table 5.26 – Correlation metric scores between various session types extracted from YORKU web log 
data (bold-lettered values indicate that the two samples are uncorrelated with 95% confidence when the 
given correlation metrics are applied) 
Session Type Comparisons Mann-Whitney z score 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov K-S 
statistic / K statistic 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Malicious  -45.55 0.534 / 0.03 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Unknown  -19.1 0.25 / 0.038 
Outlier Human vs. Non-outlier Malicious  -69.14 0.34 / 0.014 
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Table 5.27 – Correlation metric scores between various session types extracted from Sharpschool web log 
data (bold-lettered values indicate that the two samples are uncorrelated with 95% confidence when the 
given correlation metrics are applied) 
Session Type Comparisons Mann-Whitney z score 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov K-S 
statistic / K statistic 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Malicious  3.56 0.177 / 0.068 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Unknown  -4.51 0.21 / 0.096 
Outlier Human vs. Non-outlier Malicious  -18.65 0.29 / 0.027 
 
The α parameters (part of Equation 5.1) for Zipf-Mandelbrot’s PMFs shown in Figures 5.13 and 5.14 are 
displayed in Table 5.28. These two tables also list the size of each sample. The α parameters are derived 
utilizing the method of maximum likelihood described in [199].  
 
Table 5.28 – α parameters of Zipf-Mandelbrot’s PMF and sample sizes for various session types extracted 
from CSE/YORKU/SharpSchool web logs 
Session Types 
CSE web log YORKU log SharpSchool log 
α  Sample size α  Sample size α  Sample size 
Human Sessions 
Non-outlier  1.86 14447 1.88 27209 1.79 15694 
Outlier  2.01 7501 2.29 35176 1.59 6894 
Malicious Sessions 
Non-outlier 2.81 2981 3.6 12279 1.5 4087 
Outlier 2.06 15530 2.9 2227 1.39 410 
Unknown Sessions Outlier 2.26 1009 1.85 1310 1.38 201 
 
b) Web Page Viewing Time Results 
The distributions of web page viewing times for non-outlier human, outlier malicious and outlier unknown 
visitors are shown in Figure 5.15 and for outlier human and non-outlier malicious visitors are shown in 
Figure 5.16. As in the previous graphs, the dashed black lines represent the fitted PDFs of data with slope 
equal to exponent α in the Pareto’s PDF.  
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a) CSE data b) YORKU data c) SharpSchool data 
Figure 5.15 – Log-log representation of Pareto's PDFs describing the web page visiting times for non-
outlier human visitors, outlier malicious and outlier unknown visitors 
 
      
a) CSE data b) YORKU data                   c)   SharpSchool data 
Figure 5.16 – Log-log representation of Pareto's PDFs describing the web page visiting times for 
outlier human and non-outlier malicious visitors 
 
Table 5.29 – Correlation metric scores between various session types extracted from CSE web log data 
(bold-lettered values indicate that the two samples are uncorrelated with 95% confidence when the 
given correlation metrics are applied) 
Session Type Comparisons Mann-Whitney z-score 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov K-S 
statistic / K statistic 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Malicious 119.3 0.62 / 0.016 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Unknown -14.7 0.22 / 0.046 
Outlier Human vs. Non-outlier Malicious -23.48 0.33 / 0.03 
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Table 5.30 – Correlation metric scores between various session types extracted from YORKU web log 
data (bold-lettered values indicate that the two samples are uncorrelated with 95% confidence when the 
given correlation metrics are applied) 
Session Type Comparisons Mann-Whitney z score 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov K-S 
statistic / K statistic 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Malicious -27.77 0.36 / 0.03 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Unknown -2.86 0.1 / 0.04 
Outlier Human vs. Non-outlier Malicious -22.58 0.18 / 0.015 
 
 
 
Table 5.31 – Correlation metric scores between various session types extracted from SharpSchool web 
log data (bold-lettered values indicate that the two samples are uncorrelated with 95% confidence when 
the given correlation metrics are applied) 
Session Type Comparisons Mann-Whitney z score 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov K-S 
statistic / K statistic 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Malicious  8.84 0.28/0.068 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Unknown  -1.38 0.11/0.1 
Outlier Human vs. Non-outlier Malicious  -14.27 0.16/0.027 
 
The α and vmin parameters (part of Equation 5.2) of Pareto’s PDFs shown in Figures 5.15 and 5.16 are 
displayed in Table 5.32. The α and vmin parameters are derived utilizing the method described in [199].  
 
Table 5.32 – α and vmin parameters of Pareto’s PDF and sample sizes for various session types extracted 
from CSE/YORKU/SharpSchool web logs 
Session Types 
CSE web log YORKU web log SharpSchool web log 
α  
vmin  
(s) 
Sample 
size 
α  
vmin  
(s) 
Sampl
e size 
α  
vmin  
(s) 
Sample 
size 
Human Sessions 
Non-
outlier 
1.71 1086 13613 1.88 1356 25139 1.75 154 14573 
Outlier 2.16 1124 6981 2.32 4544 32846 2.07 405 6596 
Malicious Sessions 
Non-
outlier 
3.4 1302 2936 3.12 1125 12016 2.35 540 4035 
Outlier 1.88 8 15480 1.79 58 2168 1.45 58 406 
Unknown Sessions Outlier  1.5 13 934 1.94 900 1130 1.37 68 196 
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c) Browsing Sequence Length Results 
The distributions of browsing sequence lengths for non-outlier human visitors, outlier malicious visitors 
and outlier unknown visitors are shown in Figure 5.17 and for outlier human visitors and non-outlier 
malicious visitors are shown in Figure 5.18.   
 
The results of the two statistical tests between the session types extracted from CSE/YORKU/SharpSchool 
web log data are shown in Tables 5.33, 5.34 and 5.35 respectfully. The significance of the difference with 
the browsing length metric is much less pronounced than with the other metrics discussed in the previous 
two sections. For instance, note that the U and K-S statistic scores in Tables 5.33-5.35 are somewhat 
smaller proportionally than the U and K-S statistics scores reported in the previous two sections. This 
implies that the length of a sequence belonging to a non-outlier and outlier visitor is not as different as in 
the case of web page popularity rankings and web page viewing times. 
 
 
     
a) CSE data b) YORKU data c) SharpSchool data 
Figure 5.17 – Log-log representation of Inverse Gaussian's CDFs describing the browsing lengths of 
the sessions for non-outlier human visitors, outlier malicious visitors and outlier unknown visitors 
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a) CSE data b) YORKU data c) SharpSchool data 
Figure 5.18 – Log-log representation of Inverse Gaussian's CDFs describing the browsing lengths of the 
sessions of human outlier visitors and non-outlier malicious visitors 
 
 
Table 5.33 – Correlation metric scores between various session types extracted from CSE web log data 
(bold-lettered values indicate that the two samples are uncorrelated with 95% confidence when the given 
correlation metrics are applied) 
Session Type Comparisons Mann-Whitney z-score 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov K-S 
statistic / K statistic 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Malicious  -1.97 0.14 / 0.09 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Unknown  -2.92 0.066 / 0.065 
Outlier Human vs. Non-outlier Malicious  8.43 0.28 / 0.1 
 
Table 5.34 – Correlation metric scores between various session types extracted from YORKU web log 
data (bold-lettered values indicate that the two samples are uncorrelated with 95% confidence when the 
given correlation metrics are applied) 
Session Type Comparisons Mann-Whitney z score 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov K-S 
statistic / K statistic 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Malicious  8.24 0.35 / 0.11 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Unknown  19.38 0.28 / 0.034 
Outlier Human vs. Non-outlier Malicious  16.98 0.3 / 0.058 
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Table 5.35 – Correlation metric scores between various session types extracted from SharpSchool web log 
data (bold-lettered values indicate that the two samples are uncorrelated with 95% confidence when the 
given correlation metrics are applied) 
Session Type Comparisons Mann-Whitney z-score 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov K-S 
statistic / K statistic 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Malicious  -1.6 0.2/0.043 
Non-outlier Human vs. Outlier Unknown  -29.37 0.31/0.031 
Outlier Human vs. Non-outlier Malicious  13.79 0.11/0.02 
 
The μ and λ parameters (from Equation 5.3) of Inverse Gaussian’s CDFs shown in Figure 5.17 and 5.18 
are displayed in Table 5.36. The μ and λ parameters are derived utilizing the maximum likelihood 
estimation function provided with Matlab software package.  
 
Table 5.36 – μ and λ parameters of Inverse Gaussian's CDF and sample sizes for various session types 
extracted from CSE, YORKU and SharpSchool web logs 
Session Types 
CSE web log YORKU web log SharpSchool web log 
μ λ 
Sample 
size 
μ λ 
Sample 
size 
μ λ 
Sample 
size 
Human Sessions 
Non-outlier  9.63 5.53 67899 5.73 4.84 563661 56.1 18.05 617476 
Outlier  25.61 3.03 6849 5.1 3.13 63636 48.05 8.88 24240 
Malicious 
Sessions 
Non-outlier  31.36 5.92 190 32 4.08 715 24.58 11.66 6060 
Outlier  360.7 3.2 211 21.57 5.81 165 362.8 8.07 1017 
Unknown 
Sessions 
Outlier  10.04 4.45 435 271.8 3.27 1622 120.03 28.7 1898 
 
5.2.3 Summary of the Results and Concluding Remarks  
 
We have made the following main conclusions from the results shown in Tables 5.25-5.36 and Figures 
5.13-5.18: 
1. Non-outlier human vs. outlier malicious/unknown sessions. The results derived from applying the 
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum test show that the medians of web page popularity rankings, page viewing 
151 
 
times and browsing sequence lengths metrics are significantly different between non-outlier human 
visitors and outlier malicious/unknown sessions. Furthermore, the results derived from applying the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 2 independent sample test show that the web page popularity rankings, page 
viewing times and browsing sequence lengths metrics of non-outlier human visitors and outlier 
malicious/unknown sessions are derived from different populations. As such, these results have a great 
practical significance. Namely, they suggest that in the case that the outlier malicious sessions were 
marked by a spoofed user agent string – which would make them less ‘obvious’ and not as easily 
identifiable by the SOM algorithm – the use of the correlation analysis would provide for an effective 
way of distinguishing them from true human sessions. 
2. Non-outlier malicious vs. outlier human sessions. The results derived from applying the Mann-
Whitney Rank Sum test show that the medians of the three statistical metrics are significantly different 
between outlier human visitors and non-outlier malicious sessions. The results derived from applying 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 2 independent sample test show that the three statistical metrics of outlier 
human visitors and non-outlier malicious sessions are also derived from different populations. These 
results may be an indication that the outlier human session, as identified by the SOM algorithm (see 
section 5.1.3.1), are not actually malicious but instead may be generated by legitimate human visitors 
that happen to exhibit non-typical human browsing behaviour.  
3. Lastly, by examining Tables 5.28, 5.32 and 5.36, we have discovered that the parameters of Zipf-
Mandelbrot, Pareto and Inverse Gaussian distributions are significantly different from the same 
distribution parameters reported in the past research literature (refer to Tables 5.22-5.24). This result 
provides further evidence that browsing characteristics of human visitors and various crawler visitors 
vary among different web domains and also over time. 
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5.3 Summary 
 
Our work, up to this point, has focused on detecting suspicious web visitors offline
10
 and assuming a very 
stable/static web domains. Same can be said about previous research on this problem, as already outlined 
in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. However, such an approach will not be effective in real-time where the web 
sessions continuously arrive at a very high data rate. In real-time detection of suspicious web visitors, it 
will not be possible/feasible to store the entire dataset for the classification/clustering tasks and to 
repeatedly examine the data instances in the dataset. Most importantly, in dynamic web domains, some of 
the data will have to discarded over time and may be harmful in the clustering process as the web content 
of the web site is changed or updated. Recall our discussion from chapter 3 that as the web content 
changes the browsing behaviour of visitors of that site is expected to change as well. 
 
Thus, in the next chapter, we present our next-generation system for real-time detection of various HTTP-
based DDoS attacks in both static and dynamic web domains. 
 
  
                                                     
10
  In offline machine learning, the classification model is built once, after the training phase, and assuming the 
presence of the entire dataset that can be examined repeatedly. 
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Chapter 6 Next-Generation System for HTTP-based 
DDoS Defence 
 
 
In this chapter, we present our system for detection of HTTP-based DDoS attacks. In section 6.1, we 
provide a general overview of our system and also provide a brief summary of the methodology used to 
detect the most sophisticated attacks - outlier detection algorithms for data streams with concept drift. In 
section 6.2, we present a detail overview of the 3-stages of detection employed in our system. In section 
6.3, we present the details on the performance evaluation of our system and finally, in section 6.4, we 
summarize our main findings. 
6.1 System Overview 
 
Our system employs a 3-stage approach for detection and protection of trivial, intermediate and advanced 
variants of HTTP-based DDoS attacks, respectively (recall Table 3.1). The high-level workflow of our 
proposed application-layer anti-DDoS system is shown in Figure 6.1. An overview of different possible 
categories of browsing behaviour (both human and bot), and the specific stages of our system in which 
each of these categories are likely to be dealt with, is presented in Figure 6.2. (Note that Figure 6.2 is the 
modified version of Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 6.1 – The workflow of the next-generation anti-DDoS system 
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Figure 6.2 – Types of bots detected in our system and their browsing behaviour characteristics 
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As indicated in Figure 6.1, all categories of trivial (non-browser-like) bot behaviour are likely to be 
detected in Stage 1. This is accomplished by employing syntactical log parsing and traffic pattern analysis 
techniques described in sections 3.2.5 and 4.1. Bots that exhibit intermediate attack behaviour (i.e., 
generate browser-like HTTP requests, but these requests arrive in a sequence that is atypical of 
normal/legitimate human browsing) are likely to be detected in Stage 2. The most sophisticated types of 
attacks (advanced attacks), in which the bots generate browser-like HTTP requests in sequences that 
resemble legitimate human browsing but with atypical page stay-times
11
, are likely to be detected in Stage 
3. The last two stages employ analytical techniques from outlier detection in data streams with concept 
drift. The brief overview of these techniques and our motivation for using them are described in section 
6.1.2. 
 
Note that given that our system operates on the principle of ‘outlier detection’, there is a possibility that 
some actually legitimate but very atypical instances of truly human sessions could initially be labeled as 
‘outlier’ (i.e., suspicious) by our system. As shown in Figure 6.1, users generating such sessions will be 
presented with a challenge-response test (e.g., CAPTCHA), in order to resolve any uncertainty about their 
true status. If CAPTCHA test is successfully passed, the ‘outlier’ label will be removed from the 
respective session and, furthermore, the sessions will be used to refine what currently constitutes 
legitimate human behaviour. We would like to emphasize, however, that our system resorts to the use of 
CAPTCHA only in case of human sessions that are shown to considerably deviate from the majority of 
previously seen human sessions. 
                                                     
11 Recall, automated estimation of true human-like web-page stay-times is a particularly challenging task for a 
bot/attacker, as the stay-time on a web-page depends not only on the byte-wise amount of information found in the 
given page but also on the contextual popularity/importance of that information to the human population visiting the 
given page. 
156 
 
6.1.1 Threat Model and System Limitations 
 
In this section, we outline the characteristics of the threat model and limitations of our system. 
6.1.1.1 Adversary/Bot Sophistication 
The trivial, intermediate and advanced HTTP-based DDoS bots will be detected in one of the 3 stages of 
the system. Namely, trivial bots will be detected in the first stage, intermediate bots in the second stage 
and advanced bots in the third stage. As such, it is assumed that all three types of bots either do not visit 
pages in a typical sequential order of human web visitors or do not spend typical time viewing pages in the 
sequence as human web visitors. 
6.1.1.2 Expected Attack Traffic Rate 
It is assumed that our system can provide protection from attacks where the attack rate is as much as 99 
times the rate of legitimate (human) traffic. Note that this implies that out of every 100 packets received by 
the system, 99 packets will be generated by bots while only 1 packet will be generated by a human visitor. 
The severity of the attack rates were based on our own assumptions as previous surveys on real-world 
DDoS attacks (from Akamai [45] and Arbor Networks [4]) did not provide the ratio of attack traffic to 
legitimate traffic. Additionally, it is assumed that the total amount of both legitimate and attack traffic is 
less than or equal to the overall system traffic capacity. 
6.1.1.3 Expected Attack Duration 
We assume that the DDoS attack duration will be less than 60 minutes. Note that according to the Arbor 
Network survey on real-world DDoS attacks [4], 91% of DDoS attacks stopped within 60 minutes. 
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6.1.1.4 Expected Botnet Size 
Also, we assume that the attack traffic will be spread out over a number of Botnet machines. Namely, it 
assumed that each bot will generate attack traffic at a rate similar to regular human visitors. Therefore, in 
order to generate attack traffic much larger than the legitimate traffic, a large Botnet has to be employed. 
Note that the reason for this assumption is to justify the motivation for our system as DDoS attacks where 
an individual bot generates a significantly larger traffic rate than an individual human web visitors can be 
easily detected with traditional DDoS defenses based on hard-thresholds, as discussed in chapter 3. 
Previous research [190] has shown that inter-arrival time between web requests of human visitors is on 
average 1 minute.  
6.1.1.5 CAPTCHA Engine Assumptions 
As shown in our workflow diagram of our system in Figure 6.1, suspicious traffic is redirected to the 
CAPTCHA Engine, which is responsible for making the final decision on whether to grant or not to grant 
further access to the suspicious web visitor. Please note, in case of web sites with server-only processing, 
each visitor identified as suspicious/outlier by our system would be asked to solve CAPTCHA on the very 
next request/session to the web server. On the other hand, in case of web sites (i.e., web pages) that assume 
client-side processing/scripting (e.g., through use of AJAX), a client-side script could be used to 
immediately prompt the user to solve a CAPTCHA test. 
 
Note that after successfully passing the CAPTCHA test, the visitor could be exempted from solving 
another CAPTCHA puzzle for a specified amount of time, even if the visitor's subsequent sessions are 
labelled as outliers by the system. This step will ensure that the actual human visitors will not be 
additionally bothered by CAPTCHA puzzles in the case, e.g., they repeatedly request the brand new 
content very recently added to the web site (i.e., their subsequent outlier-labeled sessions will not trigger 
additional CAPTCHA tests). 
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6.1.1.6 Types of Web Sites Protected by Our System 
It is assumed that our system would provide protection to web sites of non-trivial size. Namely, we assume 
that a website has a significant number of unique primary web pages and paths through the web site that a 
visitor can traverse by following hyperlinks from the top main web page. This assumption is made to 
ensure that bot designers cannot easily guess what are typical browsing sequences that human visitors 
would follow on a web site. For instance, the 3 web sites that we were able to evaluate our system against 
(see section 6.3) were of non-trivial size as they have at least 8419 unique paths through the web site and 
also over 117,060 unique primary web pages. 
6.1.1.7 System Deployment 
As illustrated in Figure 6.3, our anti-DDoS system could be deployed as a dedicated device or in a 
combination with a scrubbing/cloud anti-DDoS center (recall the definition of this deployment type from 
Table 2.2). In the case of a cloud deployment scenario, the traffic to the web site could be rerouted for 
further processing inside the scrubbing center once the detection system detects the presence of an attack, 
e.g., when there are a number of "outlier" web visitors that have failed the CAPTCHA test. 
 
Regardless of the deployment scenario, a visitor that fails the CAPTCHA test will have its IP address 
added to the list of black-holed/blocked IP addresses inside the dynamic Firewall (similarly to [68]). The 
subsequent requests from that IP address/visitor will be dropped by the Firewall. 
 
Additionally, we assume that our system will be deployed in parallel with the existing commercial anti-
DDoS defenses, as overviewed in Section 3.4.2. This approach will ensure that trivial high-volume 
flooding attacks (such as Random recursive HTTP GET attack discussed in Chapter 3) will be detected 
before they can inundate our CAPTCHA engine with web requests and cause it to crash. The specifics 
regarding this parallel deployment are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Figure 6.3 - A possible deployment scenario for our next-generation anti-DDoS system 
 
6.1.2 Outlier Detection in Data Streams with Concept Drift - Overview and 
Motivation 
 
The majority of research in data mining is devoted to static off-line environments, where the hidden 
patterns of interest are stable (i.e., do not change over time) and each data input can be repeatedly 
presented to the learning system. However, over the last decade, there has been an increasing interest in 
managing the so-called data streams − massive, continuously-generated sequences of data that are likely to 
evolve over time [200]. Real-world examples of data that fall in the category of data streams are: web 
click-stream data, computer network monitoring data, readings from sensor networks and stock quotes, 
etc.. 
 
The main characteristics of data streams imply the following constraints on the design and operation of 
algorithms that deal with the processing and learning from data streams (from [201] and [202]): 
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1. Bounded Storage − It is often impractical if not impossible to store all the data from a data stream. In 
many applications, only small summaries of a data stream can be computed and stored, and the rest of 
the information must be discarded. The common approach to handling this constraint is by employing a 
summarization structure, such as: 
(a) Sliding time window ([203] and [204]) − a time-ordered list of N most recent data instances 
observed over the data stream.  
(b) Micro-cluster [205] − a synopsis data structure that, instead of storing all points associated with a 
cluster, only stores the aggregate statistical information about the data points mapped to the given 
cluster.  
(c) Density Grid [206] − a partitioning of n-dimensional data space which, similarly to micro-cluster, 
only maintains the aggregate statistical information about the data mapped onto different cells of the 
grid. 
2. Real-Time, Single-Pass – The overall volume as well as the arrival speed of data stream instances often 
implies that each particular element can be processed only once, and in real time. Data stream 
systems/algorithms must be able to efficiently identify whether the new input is an outlier based on the 
available past (limited) information. This constraint is generally handled by employing an efficient 
indexing data structure for rapid processing of arriving data instances, such as M-trees ([203] and 
[204]) or hash tables [206]. 
3. Concept Drift − The distribution generating the inputs can change/evolve over time due to a drift in the 
underlying concept. I.e., data from the past may become irrelevant or even harmful (i.e., misguiding) 
for the current summary. Data stream systems/algorithms must be able to recognize and adequately 
adjust to such a phenomenon. There are two major types of concept drifts: sudden and gradual. In a 
sudden drift a new input distribution abruptly emerges and quickly overtakes the previously-observed 
input distribution while in a gradual drift this processes is more subtle and happens over a longer period 
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of time. The problems associated with the concept drift phenomenon are typically addressed by one of 
the following approaches: 
(a) Employing a sliding time window where all elements are given the same weight ([203] and [204]). 
This technique is more suited for slow/gradual drifts where the new and the old input-generating 
distributions are more equally to be ‘intertwined’ in time. However, a more suitable approach would 
be to apply a decaying weight function over the elements in the sliding time window. 
(b) Assigning a decaying weight function to the synopsis data structure such as a micro-cluster [205] or 
a density-grid [206]. The weight of a micro-cluster/grid is directly related to the arrival time of 
points placed inside the micro-cluster/grid. Also, a micro-cluster/grid is removed from the list of 
existing clusters if its weight falls below a specified threshold. This approach ensures that old and 
no-longer-relevant clusters do not influence the future learning as the data stream input distribution 
evolves over time. 
6.1.2.1 Data Stream with Concept Drift as Pertaining to Detection of Application Layer DDoS 
in Dynamic Web Domains: Motivation for Our Approach 
 
In web domains that experience high volumes of data and undergo dynamic changes, the problem of 
HTTP-based DDoS defense against the current and next generation attacks naturally falls within the 
framework of unsupervised learning for data streams with concept drift. Namely, a) the notion of ‘data 
streams with concept drift’ is clearly applicable to this problem due to the very nature of the assumed 
domain (high-volume and dynamically changing), b) the problem is ‘unsupervised’, as the knowledge of 
what constitutes normal vs. attack behaviour is not known in advance.  
 
Now, while building/training an application-layer anti-DDoS system for a dynamic web domain that 
receives high volumes of web requests, it may be redundant to keep track of all patterns of past user 
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behaviour. Namely, in dynamic web domains the browsing behaviour of legitimate/human visitors is likely 
to change over time, and therefore only the most recently observed trend(s) will be helpful in correctly 
distinguishing between the typical/non-outlier human and any atypical/outlier malicious bot behaviour. 
 
From the implementation point of view, distinguishing between the emergence of new legitimate (i.e., 
benign) human sessions and new malicious sessions could be a challenging task. Specifically, as the nature 
of legitimate user behaviour changes, the new emerging groups/profiles will inevitably, at least initially, be 
identified as outliers - the same way that the new emerging attack profiles/sessions will also be identified 
as new outliers. For that reason, the sub-category of unsupervised data stream with concept drift 
algorithms most suited to deal with the given problem (identification and separation of benign vs. 
malicious outliers) are algorithms that specialize in outlier detection.  
 
It should be observed, however, that the outlier detection algorithms alone are effective in (only) 
identification of newly-emerging outliers. However, to facilitate effective separation of newly identified 
outliers into benign vs. malicious, in our work we propose (very limited) use of CAPTCHA test. If this 
session is an instance of emerging and truly human behaviour, then upon successfully solved CAPTCHA 
test the session (i.e., the respective outlier) will be labeled ‘valid’. After a number of subsequent alike 
sessions also pass the CAPTCHA test, their 'outlier' status will change to non-outlier and they will start 
forming a proper/non-outlier clusters. Once this happens, all subsequent sessions belonging to (i.e., falling 
within) this cluster will no longer be presented with the CAPTCHA test. On the other hand, as discussed in 
chapter 3, malicious bots pretending to be human visitors by spoofing the UAS, are generally not able to 
fully model typical human behaviour, and will be failing the CAPTCHA test. Consequently, such sessions 
will end up being labeled as ‘malicious’ outliers. By confirming that these outlier web visitors are in fact 
malicious bots with the help of CAPTCHA tests, our technique ensures that in the case of high-volume 
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DDoS attacks - where the bot sessions constitute the majority of incoming sessions - such sessions will be 
‘rejected’ and will not be employed to refine, i.e., distort the profile(s) of typical valid human browsing 
behaviour. 
 
We would like to emphasize that our system falls in the category of semi-supervised machine learning 
algorithms as it only performs machine learning using feedback from the CAPTCHA engine. 
6.1.2.2 Techniques for Outlier Detection in Data Streams with Concept Drift 
The taxonomy of outlier detection algorithms for data streams with concept drift is presented in Table 6.1 
(adapted from [207]).  
 
Each algorithm is characterized by the type of technique employed to address the bound memory, real-
time/single pass and concept drift constraints of data streams. Also, we present the time and processing 
complexity for labeling an arriving data stream instance as an outlier and the space complexity of the 
utilized summarization model/synopsis data structure. Note that this is the comprehensive list of outlier 
detection algorithms for data streams that address all of the 3 constraints of data streams: bounded storage, 
single-pass processing and concept drift handling. 
Table 6.1 – The taxonomy of outlier detection algorithms for data streams with concept drift 
n: number of data points/instances, m: number of micro-clusters, g: number of grids 
Category Algorithm 
Bounded Storage  
&  
Concept Drift 
Single-pass / 
Real-time 
Technique 
Time 
Complexity 
Space 
Complexity 
Distance-
based 
COD [203] 
fixed sliding time window model 
with equal weights 
M-tree O(logn) O(n) 
Density-
based 
ILOF [204] 
fixed sliding time window model 
with equal weights 
M-tree O(nlogn) O(n
2
) 
Denstream 
[205] 
Weighted decaying function over 
micro-clusters 
Micro-cluster O(m) O(m) 
D-Stream 
[206] 
Weighted decaying function over 
density-grids  
Density grid O(1) O(g) 
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As shown in Table 6.1, the four algorithms employ unique strategies to detect outliers in data streams with 
concept drift. All four algorithms satisfy the three constraints of data streams: bounded memory, real-
time/single pass processing and concept drift reactivity. (The four algorithms are described in more detail 
in Appendix D). Our system employs modified versions of COD, ILOF, Denstream and D-Stream to 
detect intermediate and advanced HTTP-based DDoS attacks in stages 2 and 3. In the following sections 
we describe the 3 stages of our system in more detail. 
6.2 Implementation of the 3 Stages of Our System 
 
In this section, we present the inner-workings of each stage of our system. 
6.2.1 Stage 1: Trivial Attack Detection 
 
The purpose of Stage 1 is to detect (i.e., eliminate from further processing and analysis) the three types of 
trivial attack sessions, using the methodology previously discussed in section 3.2 in chapter 3. Sessions 
that are identified as malicious by Stage 1 are eliminated from further processing - i.e., are not passed to 
Stage 2. The workflow diagram illustrating the series of steps in Stage 1 is shown in Figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4 – The outline of the steps in the Stage 1 
 
In general, our system can be adapted to optimally operate for each particular web site and its respective 
visitor population. For example, if the web site being protected is an university web site, web administrator 
has the option to allow benign known search engine crawlers to index their web site. Alternatively, if the 
web site being protected is an online content management application, with visitors that are exclusively 
users of the application, web administrator has the option to choose to block everyone but human visitors 
since there is no need for search engines crawlers to index this type of a domain.  
 
6.2.2 Stage 2: Intermediate Attack Detection 
 
In Stage 2, the system specializes in capturing intermediate attack sessions. As indicated in section 3.2.5, 
these types of attack sessions could be detected by examining their chronological browsing sequences (i.e., 
the sequences of actually requested web pages). Thus, in Stage 2, the system first extracts the 
chronological browsing sequence (CBS) from each session passed to it from Stage 1. Subsequently, on 
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such formed CBS, Stage 2 employs data stream algorithms from Table 6.1 (COD, ILOF and our novel 
density-based algorithm for outlier CBS detection we refer to as Density Stream for Sequences (DSS) 
algorithm - described in 6.2.2.2) in order to update what constitutes the currently typical/legitimate CBS 
profile(s) as well as to keep track of new/emerging CBS profiles. The workflow diagram illustrating the 
series of steps in Stage 2 is shown in Figure 6.5.  
 
A new web session S
Pass S to 3
rd
 Stage
 Is CBSs labeled as an 
outlier by Outlier Detection 
Algorithm?
Yes
No
Extract the chronological browsing 
sequence of web pages CBSs from S
Block Session S’s IP
YesPassed the
CAPTCHA test ?
No
Present input CBSs to 
Outlier Detection Algorithm
Extract IP address 
from S
Present CAPTCHA on 
the next request from 
that IP address
Present browsing sequence 
and page viewing times as a 
new learning input to data
stream algorithms that keep 
track of typical and legitimate
human behavior
 
Figure 6.5 – The outline of steps in Stage 2 
 
As indicated in Figure 6.5, for CBSs that are marked as ‘outlier’ (suspicious) by Stage 2, the respective 
sessions are not passed to Stage 3, and the respective users are presented with a CAPTCHA. Clearly, if 
those users happen to be malicious bots, they will fail the CAPTCHA test and be denied a subsequent 
access to the site. Otherwise, if those users are legitimate human visitors, and they successfully pass the 
CAPTCHA test, their respective sessions/sequences will be incorporated into the typical human browsing 
profile(s). 
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6.2.2.1 Chronological Browsing Sequence of Web Page Requests 
Firstly, we formally define the CBS. Assume that a web site has m distinct primary pages or URLs. Let us 
also index these pages in decimal notation sequentially as 1, 2, ..., m. Then, the chronological browsing 
sequence of n visited primary web pages during web session S is defined in (6.1). 
 
 CBSS = [a1, a2, ..., an]                                                                   (6.1) 
 
where ak ϵ {1, 2, ..., m} is the k
th
 page visited in the sequence in web session S and 1 <= n <= m. Recall the 
definition of a web session that no primary web page request may repeat in a web session. Therefore, the 
maximum length of the CBS can be at the most equal to the number of pages on the web site m. Note that 
CBS has been employed previously in intrusion detection studies such as [208], [209] and [210].  
6.2.2.2 Outlier Detection Algorithm for Chronological Browsing Sequences  
The input to this stage is the stream of CBSs extracted from incoming web sessions. Possible choices of 
algorithms for detecting outlier sequences include COD-Sequence, ILOF-Sequence and our own DSS 
algorithm - outlined in the following sections.  
a) COD-Sequence - Modified COD Algorithm for Sequence Outlier Detection 
The COD-Sequence algorithm is the slightly modified version of the original COD algorithm from [203] 
that employs the similarity distance metric called normalized length of the longest common subsequence
12
 
(NLLCS) between a pair of CBSs in the sliding time window. (Note that this distance metric has been 
                                                     
12
 The longest common subsequence (LCS) problem is defined as the search for the subsequence common to all 
sequences in a set of two or more sequences. In mathematics, the subsequence is defined as a sequence that can be 
derived from another sequence by deleting some elements without changing the order of the remaining elements. For 
example, the LCS of two strings "ACBDEGCEDBG", "BEGCFEUBK" is the string "BEGCEB" of length 6. The 
algorithm for calculating the LCS between two sequences x and y can be implemented with a dynamic programming 
algorithm in O(|x|+|y|) time, where |x| and |y| are the lengths of two sequences [237]. 
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employed for detection of outlier sequences in intrusion detection problems in [211], [212] and [213].) The 
similarity between two browsing sequences CBSi and CBSj, is computed as follows: 
 
NLLCS(CBSi, CBSj)  =    
                
             
                                                   (6.2) 
 
The value of NLLCS(CBSi, CBSj) ranges from 1, if CBSi and CBSj have no common subsequence, and 0, 
if CBSi and CBSj are identical. 
b) ILOF-Sequence - Modified ILOF Algorithm for Sequence Outlier Detection 
Similarly, ILOF-Sequence algorithm is the original ILOF algorithm from [203] that employs the NLLCS 
similarity measure (Expression 6.2) instead of Euclidean distance to represent the distances between the 
CBSs in the sliding time window. 
c) DSS - Density Stream for Sequences Algorithm Based on the Denstream and D-Stream 
Algorithms 
The DSS algorithm combines the micro-cluster synopsis structure from Denstream with decaying factor 
function from D-Stream for detection of outlier input sequences. Note the original Denstream algorithm 
cannot be applied on sequences since the computation of the center and radius of the micro-cluster requires 
that the input is composed of continuous values that satisfy the triangle inequality. To overcome this 
limitation, we have proposed DSS - a version of the D-Stream algorithm for sequences that employs the 
following modifications: 
Micro-clusters 
In DSS, a micro-cluster MCi consists of a representative CBS denoted as MCi.RCBS (similar to [211]), 
decaying cluster density function D(c, t) based on the density grid function from D-Stream (Expressions 
D.14-D.16 in Appendix D) and radius ε. MCi.RCBS is the first CBS added to the new micro-cluster (refer 
169 
 
to Figure 6.6). Furthermore, in DSS, we do not label micro-clusters as p- or o-micro-clusters. Instead, each 
micro-clusters is labeled as dense or sparse as in the D-Stream algorithm. 
Online Learning Phase (Insertion of new input CBSi) 
The online learning phase follows the training phase and consists of the insertion of the new input CBS 
into the micro-clusters. As in the original Denstream algorithm, the number of training data points 
processed during the training phase is a user-defined parameter. 
 
The algorithm for insertion of new CBSs into micro-clusters in DSS is shown in Figure 6.6. A CBS Si is 
merged to the closest micro-cluster MCm in which the dissimilarity between Si and MCm.RCBS is less than 
radius ε. As in the COD-Sequence and ILOF-Sequence algorithms, NLLCS similarity measure (shown in 
(6.2)) is employed to calculate similarity/dissimilarity between sequences. If the closest MCm is not within 
radius ε , a new micro-cluster MCn is created with MCn.RCBS set to Si. 
Maintenance of Micro-clusters 
The decaying density function of a micro-cluster in DSS is the same as the density function of a grid in the 
D-Stream algorithm. Namely, the algorithm promotes sparse and sporadic micro-clusters to dense micro-
clusters whenever a micro-cluster's density satisfies the condition in (6.3) and downgrades a dense micro-
clusters to sparse micro-clusters if condition in (6.4) is satisfied. The expressions (6.3) and (6.4) are 
slightly modified version of (D.17) and (D.18), respectively: 
 
D(g, t)                                                                                (6.3) 
 
D(g, t)        
                                                                        (6.4) 
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where AvgMCDensity is the average density of micro-clusters at time t. Note that in the original D-Stream 
algorithm, the average density 
 
    λ 
 is constant, while in DSS, N changes as micro-clusters are added or 
removed. Therefore, AvgMCDensity has to be recalculated as new micro-clusters are added or removed.  
 
Insert(CBSi) 
Let MC be the set of micro-clusters 
find closest micro-cluster MCm in MC to CBSi 
      if NLLCS(CBSi, MCm.RCBS) < ε 
             merge CBSi to MCm by updating MCm's D(c, t) (given in (5.16)) 
      end if 
end for 
if CBSi was not merged with any MCm in MC 
      create new micro-cluster MCn 
      MCn.RCBS = CBSi 
       add MCn to MC 
end if 
Figure 6.6 – The insertion step in DSS 
 
Also, periodically, the algorithm verifies if sparse and sporadic micro-clusters should be discarded. The 
periodicity of the check Tp  is defined in (D.19). The sparse and sporadic micro-cluster is removed if 
condition in (6.3) is satisfied for two Tp periods. 
6.2.3 Stage 3: Advanced Attack Detection 
 
In Stage 3, our system specializes in capturing advanced attack sessions. Now, as explained in section 
3.2.5 in chapter 3, in advanced attacks the attacker is expected to perform a thorough analysis of the target 
web site, and be in the position to generate a sequence of requests that appear as (possibly) produced by a 
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legitimate human visitor. E.g., a request for one web page will be followed by a request for another page 
that is directly linked to it. However, the sequence of requested web-pages is not the only feature that 
characterizes truly human browsing behaviour. Namely, the actual ‘page viewing time’ is another unique 
feature of human browsing – a feature that may be impacted by a multitude of very different and complex 
factors. We believe that the accurate modeling of page viewing times will remain a particularly 
challenging problem for the attacker, as it will require a very thorough understanding of: a) the web site’s 
actual subject matters, b) the relevance of those subjects to the site’s visitor population, c) the impact the 
visual organization of information on each web page has on the amount of time a human visitor needs to 
absorb the given information (before moving to the next page), etc.  
 
Given the above, the detection of advanced attack sessions in Stage 3 is based on time-domain analysis of 
visitors’ browsing behaviour. The workflow diagram illustrating the series of steps in Stage 3 is shown in 
Fig. 6.7.  
 
A new web session S
 Are f% of page viewing times 
in PVTs outliers?
Yes
No
Extract the set PVTs of primary page 
viewing times in S Block Session S’s IP
YesPassed the
CAPTCHA test ?
No
Extract IP address from 
S
Present CAPTCHA on 
the next request from 
that IP address
Present browsing sequence 
and page viewing times as a 
new learning input to data
stream algorithms that keep 
track of typical and legitimate
human behavior
 
Figure 6.7 – The outline of the steps in Stage 3 
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6.2.3.1 Page Viewing Times 
The collection of page viewing times in a session S is defined as follows. The set PVT is the collection of 
primary web page viewing times in web session S where each element t(j) in PVT is the inter-arrival time 
between requests j and j+1 in session S and where j and j+1 are one of the m pages on the web site. Note 
that if the visitor viewed j>1 pages in a session, we can extract the page viewing times for the first j-1 
pages requested.  
6.2.3.2 Modeling Typical and Atypical Page Viewing Times 
The input to this stage of our system is the stream of PVTs extracted from incoming web session. In 
particular, the system deploys algorithms from Table 6.1 to identify outlier/low-frequency page viewing 
times in attacks sessions that are previously marked as typical by Stage 2. Note that the page viewing 
times must be clustered on per-page basis for each web page on the web site. This implies that the system 
in this stage must maintain clustering results (i.e., sliding time windows, micro-clusters or density grids) 
for each individual web page. Also, for each input web session, the system calculates the fraction of page 
viewing times in that session that are identified as outliers by the algorithm. If this fraction exceeds a 
system-defined threshold, the session is identified as an outlier (potentially malicious) by Stage 3, and the 
respective user is requested to solve a CAPTCHA test at the next visit to the web site. 
6.3 Evaluation of the System 
 
In this section we present the results of the performance evaluation of the system. 
6.3.1 Dataset and Simulation Environment 
 
The system is evaluated against the three sets of real-world web server access log files:  
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1. Web log traces provided by York University’s Computer Science and Engineering (CSE) 
department.  
2. Web log traces from Lewis County School board in Iowa, U.S.A.  
3. Web log traces from East Allen County School (EACS) board in Indiana, U.S.A.13.  
As already explained in Chapter 4, we were unable to employ the standard datasets with HTTP packet 
contents. The CSE log files contain detailed information about user web-based access into the domain 
www.cse.yorku.ca during the 9-week interval – in June and July of 2014. A total of about 460000 sessions 
can be extracted from the file. The Lewis log files contain user web-based access into the domain 
www.lewiscentral.org during the 5-week interval – between mid-August 2013 and October 2013. A total 
of about 80000 sessions can be extracted from the file. The EACS log files contain user web-based access 
into the domain www. eacs.k12.in.us during the 5-week interval – between mid-August 2013 and October 
2013. A total of about 70000 sessions can be extracted from the file. 
 
The system itself, including the four algorithms from Table 6.1, are implemented in Java. The 
implementation code for Denstream and COD are borrowed from MOA framework [214]. The simulations 
were executed on a computer with Intel i7 processor and 8GB of RAM. 
6.3.2 Experimental Design 
 
The following 3 synthesized attacks are employed in our evaluation: 
 Attack 1: In this attack, an attacker collects the set of pages directly accessible (through a single 
hyperlink) from the top (i.e., index.html) page of the CSE/Lewis/EACS web site. Next, the attacker 
synthesizes a browsing sequence by randomly selecting pages from this set. The attacker also randomly 
                                                     
13
 Note that Lewis and EACS web sites experience the most inbound traffic among over 1500 web sites that are part 
of Sharpschool web domain.  
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selects the number of requests in a sequence to be between 1 and 10. The page viewing are sampled 
with exponential distribution with exponential mean of 1 minute (based on the average page viewing 
time reported in [190] and employed in [94]), 5 minutes and 10 minutes, respectively. 
 Attack 2: In this attack, the attacker estimates the page popularities by querying the Google search 
engine. (Note that this type of an attack is described in [215].) The motivation for this attack is that an 
outsider, completely deprived of any internal insight on the popularity of individual web pages within a 
particular web domain, would clearly have to rely on external third-party resources (such as Google 
search) to gather this information. For instance, the web page popularity score can be estimated by the 
count of returned hits in the Google search for the given page. As in 1), the attacker selects the set of 
pages directly accessible from the top page of the CSE/Lewis/EACS web site and then orders them in 
terms of their popularity by the web page popularity score derived from the Google search engine. 
Next, the attacker synthesizes a browsing sequence by randomly selecting web pages from the set of 10 
most popular web pages as derived in the previous step. As in 1), the sequence length is randomly 
chosen between 1 and 10 and page viewing times are sampled from the three above mentioned 
exponential distribution. 
 Attack 3: In this attack, the attacker's sequence is synthesized to start from the top (i.e., index.html) 
web page of the CSE/Lewis/EACS web site and the remaining web pages in the sequence are selected 
by following a random link between the web pages. As in 1) and 2) the page viewing times are sampled 
from the exponential distribution and the sequence length is randomly chosen between 1 and 10 web 
pages or until the sequence reaches the web page with no outgoing link to another CSE/Lewis/EACS 
page. 
Note that all 3 attacks assume that each page request is followed by a series of secondary requests for its 
embedded content. As such, all 3 attacks are at least of intermediate attacker/bot level. Attack 1 is an 
intermediate attack as the attacker is not making an attempt to mimic a sequence of web page requests that 
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would be made by a human visitor while viewing content on a web site. Attacks 2 and 3 are advanced 
attacks as the attacker is making an attempt to mimic a typical sequential browsing behavior of human web 
visitors. (Refer to definitions of 3 attack types and typical sequential browsing behavior of human web 
visitors from Chapter 3.) 
 
To the best of our knowledge, attacks 2 and 3 have never been evaluated against a DDoS defensive system 
in previous research literature. A variation of the attack 1 have been evaluated in [70], [84], [94] and [99]. 
Table 6.2 lists the parameters of the synthesized attacks. The progressively challenging attack scenarios 
have been chosen to illustrate the effectiveness and limits of the presented methodology.  
Table 6.2 – The parameters of synthesized attack scenarios 
Attack 
Number of Web 
Pages in a Sequence 
Sequence Generation Process 
Page Viewing 
Times 
1 
uniformly distributed 
between 1 and 10 
Randomly select web pages directly accessible 
from the top (i.e., index.html) web page of 
CSE/Lewis/EACS web sites 
Exponentially 
distributed with 
mean of 1, 5 and 
10 minutes 
2 
Randomly select 10 most popular web pages as 
calculated from Google search engine 
3 
Follow random path through the web site by 
following links between web pages 
 
Note that the input datasets for each individual experiment are generated by uniformly interleaving the 
respective ‘synthetic’ attack sessions into the sample CSE/Lewis/EACS dataset. The percentage of 
synthesized attack sessions in each dataset is set at 20%, 50% and 99%
14
 of all sessions with a browser-
labeled UAS in the dataset. In each attack scenario the same outlier detection algorithm is employed in 
both Stage 2 and Stage 3 (e.g., COD-sequence and original COD, ILOF-sequence and original ILOF). In 
the case of Denstream and D-Stream scenarios, it is assumed that our DSS was employed in the 
                                                     
14
 Note that the dataset where 20% of all sessions are attack sessions implies that for every 100 sessions in the 
dataset, 20 are attack sessions and 80 are actual human sessions. In the dataset where 50% of all sessions are attack 
session implies that for every 100 sessions in the dataset, 50 are attack sessions and 50 are actual human sessions. In 
the dataset where 99% of all sessions are attack session implies that for every 100 sessions in the dataset, 99 are 
attack sessions and 1 is an actual human session. 
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Stage 2 because of the similarities between the three algorithms. In each scenario, the algorithms in 
Stages 2 and 3 were trained for the first 15% of total number of regular human sessions in the dataset 
before the performance results were collected. 
6.3.3 Performance Criteria 
 
The attack detection performance of the four algorithms is evaluated by employing the following metrics:  
 True Positive Rate (TPR) - percentage of human-generated sessions correctly classified as 
‘legitimate’ by the system (i.e., sessions are identified as belonging to non-outlier clusters in the 
algorithms). 
 True Negative Rate (TNR) - the percentage of synthesized attack sessions correctly classified as 
‘malicious’ by the system (i.e., sessions are identified as belonging to outlier clusters in the 
algorithms).  
 The four algorithms are also evaluated based on the average amount of time required to process 
simulated attack scenarios. 
The following aspects of the operation of the system are also investigated: 
 The relationship between the attack sophistication and TPR and TNR rates. 
 The relationship between the page viewing time modeling and TPR and TNR rates. 
 The relationship between the attack intensity (i.e., the number of attack sessions embedded in the 
dataset) and TPR and TNR rates.  
 The relationship between the four data stream algorithm parameters and TPR and TNR rates. 
 The amount of concept drift observed in the 3 datasets. 
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6.3.4 Experimental Results 
 
The TPR and TNR for 3 simulated attack scenarios, where 20%, 50% and 99% of all sessions in the CSE 
dataset are attack sessions, are shown in Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6, respectively. The equivalent results 
pertaining to the Lewis dataset and the EACS dataset are shown in Tables 6.7 to  6.9 and Tables 6.10 to 
6.12, respectively. For each dataset, there are 108 distinct scenarios in total. For each scenario, the average 
TPR/TNR is shown derived from 3 trials. 
 
Note that for each data stream algorithm the maximum achieved TPR and TNR rates are displayed. The 
deployed algorithm parameters, listed in Table 6.3, were determined empirically. The same algorithm 
parameters were employed for 20%, 50% and 99% attack scenarios.  
 
Table 6.3 – The parameters of outlier detection algorithms 
Algorithm Parameter Settings 
COD-Sequence (Stage 2) 
k=2, R=0.2 and N=30000 (in Lewis/EACS datasets) and 
N=150000 in CSE dataset 
COD (Stage 3) 
k=1750, R=25, and N=30000 (in Lewis/EACS datasets) and 
N=150000 in CSE dataset, fOT
15
=0.75 
ILOF-Sequence (Stage 2) 
k=2, and N=30000 (in Lewis/EACS) and N=150000 in CSE 
dataset and L
16
=0.1 
ILOF (Stage 3) 
k=1750, N=30000 (in Lewis/EACS) and N=150000 in CSE 
dataset, L=0.05 and fOT=0.75 
DSS (Stage 2) ε=0.2 λ=0.95, δ=0.3, Cl=0.5 
Denstream (Stage 3) µ=0.5, λ=0.25, δ=0.5, ε=25 and fOT=0.5 
D-Stream (Stage 3) λ=0.95, δ=0.3, Cl=1000 and fOT =0.5 
 
 
                                                     
15
 fOT is the threshold of the fraction of page viewing times in the session that are identified as outliers - recall the 
description of this parameter in section 6.2.3.2. 
16
 Based on the approach from [236], the input instance to ILOF algorithm is labeled as an outlier if its local outlier 
factor (LOF) value is in the top L percentile of all observed LOF values.  
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Table 6.4 – The TPR/TNR values in attack 1-3 scenarios with CSE dataset where attack sessions comprise 
20% of all sessions 
Mean 
Exponential 
Page 
Viewing 
Time (min) 
Attack # 
True Positive Rate True Negative Rate 
COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream 
1.0 1 88 86 88 90 93 93 93 93 
1.0 2 85 82 85 84 92 93 93 94 
1.0 3 75 73 75 73 93 93 94 94 
5.0 1 89 86 88 90 93 94 94 94 
5.0 2 86 82 86 85 93 94 95 96 
5.0 3 75 74 75 73 94 95 95 96 
10.0 1 90 87 90 91 94 95 95 94 
10.0 2 87 83 85 86 94 95 96 97 
10.0 3 76 74 76 74 95 96 97 97 
 
 
Table 6.5 – The TPR/TNR values in attack 1-3 scenarios with CSE dataset where attack sessions comprise 
50% of all sessions 
Mean 
Exponential 
Page 
Viewing 
Time (min) 
Attack # 
True Positive Rate True Negative Rate 
COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream 
1.0 1 86 85 86 86 93 93 93 93 
1.0 2 85 82 85 84 91 91 93 93 
1.0 3 71 70 72 72 90 91 92 91 
5.0 1 86 86 86 87 93 94 94 95 
5.0 2 86 83 85 86 92 91 93 93 
5.0 3 74 71 74 73 91 91 93 91 
10.0 1 87 88 89 89 94 95 95 95 
10.0 2 87 84 86 86 93 92 94 94 
10.0 3 75 72 75 74 92 92 93 92 
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Table 6.6 – The TPR/TNR values in attack 1-3 scenarios with CSE dataset where attack sessions comprise 
99% of all sessions 
Mean 
Exponential 
Page 
Viewing 
Time (min) 
Attack # 
True Positive Rate True Negative Rate 
COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream 
1.0 1 78 77 78 79 92 92 92 93 
1.0 2 77 76 77 78 91 91 92 92 
1.0 3 62 61 62 63 90 89 90 90 
5.0 1 80 80 80 81 94 93 94 94 
5.0 2 78 77 78 79 93 92 93 92 
5.0 3 62 61 64 64 91 90 91 91 
10.0 1 81 81 81 82 94 93 94 94 
10.0 2 81 79 80 81 94 92 93 94 
10.0 3 64 63 65 65 91 91 92 92 
 
 
Table 6.7 – The TPR/TNR values in attack 1-3 scenarios with Lewis dataset where attack sessions 
comprise 20% of all sessions 
Mean 
Exponential 
Page 
Viewing 
Time (min) 
Attack # 
True Positive Rate True Negative Rate 
COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream 
1.0 1 92 91 91 92 95 94 94 95 
1.0 2 91 90 90 90 94 94 94 95 
1.0 3 72 71 74 73 92 91 92 92 
5.0 1 93 93 93 93 96 95 95 96 
5.0 2 92 91 92 92 95 94 95 96 
5.0 3 73 72 74 74 93 92 93 93 
10.0 1 94 93 94 94 97 96 96 97 
97 2 93 92 92 93 96 95 96 97 
10.0 3 74 73 75 75 94 93 93 94 
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Table 6.8 – The TPR/TNR values in attack 1-3 scenarios with Lewis dataset where attack sessions 
comprise 50% of all sessions 
Mean 
Exponential 
Page 
Viewing 
Time (min) 
Attack # 
True Positive Rate True Negative Rate 
COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream 
1.0 1 88 86 89 89 94 92 94 94 
1.0 2 87 86 88 87 93 92 94 94 
1.0 3 68 68 68 69 91 89 91 91 
5.0 1 91 88 90 90 95 94 95 95 
5.0 2 88 87 89 88 94 93 94 94 
5.0 3 70 69 70 70 92 91 92 92 
10.0 1 92 89 92 92 96 95 96 96 
10.0 2 89 88 90 89 95 94 95 95 
10.0 3 72 71 72 72 93 92 93 93 
 
 
Table 6.9 – The TPR/TNR values in attack 1-3 scenarios with Lewis dataset where attack sessions 
comprise 99% of all sessions 
Mean 
Exponential 
Page 
Viewing 
Time (min) 
Attack # 
True Positive Rate True Negative Rate 
COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream 
1.0 1 79 77 79 81 94 92 93 94 
1.0 2 77 76 78 79 92 91 93 93 
1.0 3 58 57 59 59 90 90 90 90 
5.0 1 80 79 80 80 94 94 94 95 
5.0 2 78 77 78 79 93 92 93 93 
5.0 3 59 58 60 59 91 90 91 92 
10.0 1 81 80 81 82 95 93 94 95 
10.0 2 81 79 80 81 94 92 93 93 
10.0 3 60 60 60 60 92 91 92 92 
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Table 6.10 – The TPR/TNR values in attack 1-3 scenarios with EACS dataset where attack sessions 
comprise 20% of all sessions 
Mean 
Exponential 
Page 
Viewing 
Time (min) 
Attack # 
True Positive Rate True Negative Rate 
COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream 
1.0 1 91 90 90 91 96 95 95 95 
1.0 2 90 89 89 89 94 93 94 95 
1.0 3 73 71 74 74 92 91 92 92 
5.0 1 92 92 92 92 96 95 96 97 
5.0 2 91 90 91 91 95 94 95 95 
5.0 3 74 72 75 75 93 92 93 93 
10.0 1 92 93 93 93 96 96 96 97 
10.0 2 91 92 92 92 96 94 95 96 
10.0 3 75 73 76 76 94 93 93 94 
 
 
Table 6.11 – The TPR/TNR values in attack 1-3 scenarios with EACS dataset where attack sessions 
comprise 50% of all sessions 
Mean 
Exponential 
Page 
Viewing 
Time (min) 
Attack # 
True Positive Rate True Negative Rate 
COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream 
1.0 1 88 86 88 89 94 92 94 94 
1.0 2 86 86 87 87 93 92 94 94 
1.0 3 69 69 69 69 91 89 91 91 
5.0 1 91 90 90 90 95 94 95 95 
5.0 2 88 87 88 88 94 93 94 94 
5.0 3 71 71 71 71 92 91 92 92 
10.0 1 92 90 92 92 96 95 96 96 
10.0 2 89 88 90 89 95 93 95 95 
10.0 3 74 72 74 73 93 92 93 93 
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Table 6.12 – The TPR/TNR values in attack 1-3 scenarios with EACS dataset where attack sessions 
comprise 99% of all sessions 
Mean 
Exponential 
Page 
Viewing 
Time (min) 
Attack # 
True Positive Rate True Negative Rate 
COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream COD ILOF Denstream D-Stream 
1.0 1 80 77 79 81 93 91 93 93 
1.0 2 78 76 78 79 92 91 93 93 
1.0 3 57 57 58 59 90 89 90 90 
5.0 1 80 79 80 81 94 93 94 94 
5.0 2 78 77 78 80 94 92 93 93 
5.0 3 58 57 59 59 91 90 91 92 
10.0 1 82 80 81 82 95 94 95 95 
10.0 2 81 79 80 81 94 93 93 93 
10.0 3 59 60 60 60 92 91 91 92 
 
6.3.4.1 The Relationship Between the Attack Sophistication and TPR and TNR Rates 
In general, we observe that for all four algorithms and in all three attack scenarios, TNR is generally very 
good – above 90%. TPR is the most favorable in case of Attack 1 (above 77%), and least favorable in case 
of Attack 3 (above 57%). Recall, the TPR of 57% implies that 43% of actual human visitors, falsely 
identified as attackers, are presented with CAPTCHA (see Figure 6.1). This observation can be explained 
as follows:  
 
In Attack 1 scenario, the attacker synthesizes CBSs by randomly selecting web pages from a relatively 
large pool of web pages (see section 6.3.2). Consequently, the generated CBSs are likely to be very 
different from other (e.g.) human-generated CBSs. As such, these CBSs are likely to be placed in the low-
density (i.e., outlier) clusters/grids in Stage 2. On the other hand, in Attack 2, the attacker synthesizes the 
CBSs by randomly selecting web pages from a smaller set of the 10 most popular web pages as identified 
by Google search engine. Therefore, in this scenario, the attacker-generated CBSs are likely to be more 
similar to other (e.g.) human-generated CBSs than in the case of attack 1 scenario. As such, these CBSs 
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are also likely to be misplaced into a non-outlier cluster/grid in Stage 2. In the Attack 3 scenario, the 
attacker-generated CBSs have an even higher chance of matching against actual human-generated CBSs 
than in Attacks 1 and 2, since the attacker is synthesizing the CBSs as if browsing the web site in a manner 
of true human visitors. Consequently, the sensitivity of the system is further lowered relative to the first 
two scenarios.  
 
Furthermore, in the case of the most sophisticated Attack 3 scenario , the TPR results in Lewis and EACS 
scenarios are slightly lower than in the CSE scenarios. The differences in the number of possible paths or 
CBSs between the Lewis/EACS and CSE web domains can explain this outcome. Namely, Lewis and 
EACS web sites have 8419 and 10643 unique paths through the web site that a visitor can traverse by 
following the hyperlinks from the top main web page, respectively. However, the CSE web site has 25741 
such paths. As we have explained, in Attack 3 the attacker is browsing the web site similar to actual 
human visitors by following links from the main top web page of the web site. Under the assumption that 
all other parameters of the simulation are equal, the attacker-synthesized CBSs in Attack 3 scenarios have 
a higher chance of matching against the CBSs generated by actual human visitors in the case of the Lewis 
or EACS web domains than in the case of CSE web domain. 
 
Recall our discussion from chapter 5 that the density-based algorithms (ILOF, Denstream and D-Stream) 
are less sensitive to noise than COD, a distance-based algorithm, since they can discover clusters of 
arbitrary shape [206]. This is a possible explanation for COD's slightly worse TPR/TNR in the case of 
some test scenarios. The slightly worse performance of both COD and ILOF could also be attributed to the 
fact that these algorithms employ a sliding window where all the points in the window are given an equal 
weight (unlike Denstream and D-Stream algorithms that employ a decaying function over the previously 
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observed data points). However, as shown in Figure 6.8 a-c), on average, across all simulated scenarios, all 
four algorithms perform fairly similarly. 
 
  
 
Figure 6.8 – Average TPR/TNR across all simulated scenarios in CSE, Lewis and EACS datasets 
 
6.3.4.2 The Relationship Between the Page Viewing Time Modeling and TPR and TNR Rates 
By examining Tables 6.4-6.12, we can conclude the model of attacker behaviour with longer average page 
viewing time (i.e., the longer average inter-arrival time between attacker's web requests in synthesized 
sessions) results in slightly higher TNR rate across all of the 3 web domains. Note that TNR rates are 
lowest in Figures 6.4-6.12 when the page viewing times are sampled with exponential distribution with 
mean of 1 minute and highest when the page viewing times are sampled with exponential distribution with 
mean of 10 minutes. This is somewhat of an expected result, as previous reported in [190], on average, 
human visitors spend close to 1 minute viewing web pages. Note that our study has also confirmed these 
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results - in CSE web domain, the average per-page viewing time for human visitors is 62 seconds and 
slightly higher in EACS and Lewis web domains at 89 and 100 seconds, respectively.) 
6.3.4.3 The Relationship Between the Attack Intensity and TPR and TNR Rates 
By examining Tables 6.4-6.12, we notice that as the number of attack sessions embedded into the dataset 
increases from 20% to 99%, i.e., as the intensity of the attack increases, the TPR rates decrease by 10%-
15% while TNR rates stay nearly constant. This observation implies that, as the dominance of attack 
sessions in comparison to regular human sessions increases, we can observe some "distortion" of the 
legitimate web visitor CBS and PVT profiles. However, the distortion is not drastic since majority, i.e., 
over 90 % of attack sessions, are outliers in attack scenarios shown in Tables 6.4-6.12 and as such are not 
used to refine the profile of typical browsing behaviour (see again Figure 6.1).  
 
Note that the spike of 10-15% in CAPTCHA rates occurs temporarily for the duration of the attack. As the 
attack sessions are identified as outliers by the system with at least 90% accuracy, the bots, as part of the 
attack-generating Botnet, quickly generate an outlier sessions and are presented with a CAPTCHA puzzle. 
Since they also fail, i.e., cannot solve, the CAPTCHA puzzle, their IP addresses quickly become blocked 
by the system. After, the bots are blocked, the legitimate web visitors refine the profile back to its original 
state and the TPR rate returns back to the rate prior to the start of the attack. 
6.3.4.4 The Relationship Between the Algorithm Parameters and TPR and TNR Rates 
The same algorithms parameters (see Table 6.3) were employed in all scenarios and the results are fairly 
similar. Our decision to choose/use these exact values of the given parameters was based on the following 
observations: 
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 In the case of COD-sequence and ILOF-sequence small k values under 5 in Stage 2 and larger k values 
greater than 10 in Stage 3 result in the highest values of TPR and TNR. Also, in the case of these two 
algorithms, the radius below 0.5 in Stage 2 and radius between 25 and 100 in Stage 3 result in the 
highest values of TPR and TNR.  
 In the case of DSS, ε values below 0.5 and Cl values below 0.5 result in the highest values of TPR and 
TNR. Note that these parameters are in line with radius parameters in COD-sequence and ILOF-
sequence. 
 In the case of Denstream and D-Stream, the radius ε between 25 and 100 and density threshold Cl 
between 100 and 3000 result in most favorable TPR/TNR. 
 The size of the sliding window in COD and ILOF did not significantly affect the TPR/TNR results due 
to low concept drift - see next section 6.3.4.5. We evaluated these two algorithms with the size of the 
window between 50K and 400K in increments of 50K and we the observed that the TPR/TNR results 
varied +/- 3%. 
 Similarly, the λ parameters in DSS, Denstream and D-Stream did not show to have a significantly 
affect on the TPR/TNR rates due to low concept drift. 
These parameter settings indicate that non-outlier clusters with a larger radius or higher number of cluster 
members, i.e., generally larger k, R/ε, Cl and L parameters in Stage 3 and non-outlier clusters with a 
smaller radius or smaller number of cluster members, i.e., generally smaller k, R/ε, Cl and L parameters in 
Stage 2, result in more favorable TPR/TNR rates. 
6.3.4.5 Concept Drift in the CSE, Lewis and EACS Datasets 
In order to gain a better understanding of 1) the parameter settings that result in the highest TPR/TNR and 
2) the amount of concept drift, i.e., the amount of new/emerging instances of browsing behaviour in the 3 
datasets, we collected additional statistics from the web logs.  
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a) CBS Concept Drift  
Firstly, we collected for each day, the number of CBSs that have some or no subsequences in common 
with the set of CBSs observed during the previous days. These results, for the CSE, Lewis and EACS 
datasets, are shown in Figures 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11, respectively. Note that the line points in Figures 6.9-6.11 
indicate the number of CBSs, collected on day i, that were at least 0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 and 1.0 distant, 
in terms of the NLLCS distance metric, from the set of CBSs collected during the previous i-1 days. The 
results were collected for exclusively human-generated web sessions. (Note that the fluctuations in number 
of CBSs observed per day in Figures 6.9-6.11 are due to natural traffic variations over the course of the 
weeks - i.e., web site has more visitors on a weekday than on a Saturday or Sunday.) 
 
 
Figure 6.9 – The number of CBSs, collected on day i, that were at least 0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 and 1.0 
distant, in terms of the NLLCS distance metric, from the set of CBSs collected during the previous i-1 
days in CSE dataset 
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Figure 6.10 – The number of CBSs, collected on day i, that were at least 0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 and 1.0 
distant, in terms of the NLLCS distance metric, from the set of CBSs collected during the previous i-1 
days in Lewis dataset  
 
 
Figure 6.11 – The number of CBSs, collected on day i, that were at least 0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 and 1.0 
distant, in terms of the NLLCS distance metric, from the set of CBSs collected during the previous i-1 
days in EACS dataset 
 
In all three Figures 6.9-6.11, we can observe the following: 
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 There exists a steady rate of about 1-3% of completely new CBSs per day, i.e., these CBSs are 1.0 
distant in terms of NLLCS from all of the CBSs observed on the previous days. However, ~ 90% of 
the new per-day incoming CBSs identically match against at least one of CBSs observed in the 
previous days, i.e., these CBSs are 0.0 distant in terms of NLLCS from at least one previously 
observed CBS.  
 The trend lines in Figures 6.9-6.11 could explain why the R and ε parameters with values under 0.5 in 
COD-sequence and DSS scenarios, respectively, produce favorable TPR/TNR results. Namely, 
almost all new per-day arriving CBSs are within radius 0.5 from the CBSs observed in the previous i-
1 days. Also, based on the obtained TNR results in the simulation scenarios, it appears that a great 
majority of attacker-generated CBSs are more than 0.5 NLLCS distance from the human-generated 
web sessions. 
b) PVT Concept Drift 
Additionally, we looked into the amount of variation in per-page viewing times in the 3 datasets. The 
mean page viewing time, the median of the standard deviation of per-page viewing time and the mean of 
the standard deviation of per-page viewing times across the individual web pages in the 3 datasets are 
plotted in Figure 6.12. (Note that these results were collected exclusively for web pages that were accessed 
at least 100 times in the web logs.) Again, the results were collected from only human-generated web 
sessions. The results indicate a substantial variation in the amount of time human visitors spend viewing a 
web page over the course of the data collection time period. As can be seen from 6.12, the viewing time 
for a web page, on average, deviates 3-4 minutes from the mean viewing time for that web page.  
 
These results could explain why the non-outlier clusters with a larger radius or higher number of cluster 
members, i.e., generally larger k, R/ε, Cl and L parameters in Stage 3, produce more favorable TPR/TNR 
rates. Namely, the attacker’s modeling of page viewing times with the exponential distribution with mean 
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of 1 minute (close to actual mean page viewing time observed in our 3 datasets), would have a good 
chance of correctly guessing the page viewing times for some of the web pages. Also, because of the large 
deviation of true human per-page viewing times there will be a greater chance that some of the attacker's 
guessed page viewing time will be close to the regular human-generated page viewing time for a particular 
web page. Therefore, larger k, R/ε, Cl and L parameters for the non-outlier clusters in Stage 3 result in a 
higher chance at identifying attacker's sessions. 
 
 
Figure 6.12 – The mean per-page viewing time, median of the standard deviation of per-page viewing time 
and mean of the standard deviation of per-page viewing time in CSE, Lewis and EACS datasets 
 
c) Recommendations for Algorithm Parameter Settings in More Dynamic Web Domains 
The 3 datasets have generally very low concept drift, especially in the terms of the new emerging CBSs 
(see Figures 6.9-6.11 where most of the CBS observed on day i are identical to CBS observed on days 1,.., 
i-1 in terms of the NLLCS metric). Other web domains can have a more evolving content. In such web 
domains, the number of CBSs that are at least 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1.0 distant from previously observed 
CBSs could be higher. As such, our system could employ a larger radius parameters, i.e., R and ε 
parameters, in both Stages 2 and 3, to ensure similar TPR rates as documented in our analysis above.  
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Additionally, to deal with the challenges of more dynamic web sites, the system operation can be further 
optimized as follows. Namely, during an absence of a DDoS attack, the outlier sensitivity of the system 
can be reduced by adjusting the radius parameters in COD-sequence, COD, Denstream and DSS 
algorithms, and L parameter in ILOF to slightly larger values or slightly lower values in the case of Cl 
parameter in D-Stream than the ones reported in Table 6.3. Note that the absence of a DDoS attack can be 
defined as the absence of web visitors that have failed a CAPTCHA test for some pre-specified time 
period. Then, as soon as the system detects a web visitors that has failed a CAPTCHA test, which would 
likely be a DDoS bot initiating an attack on the target web site, the system can reset these algorithm 
parameters to the optimal values as listed in Table 6.3. This procedure would ensure that the system 
achieves very high TPR rates, i.e., the number of regular human web visitors that are bothered by 
CAPTCHA puzzle would be reduced further in the absence of an attack, while at the same time, the 
system will quickly react to the onset of an attack by dynamically changing the parameters to higher 
outlier threshold values. In our simulations, we noticed that setting the radius and k parameters in COD, 
Denstream and DSS to 0.5 and 1, respectively, Cl to100, and L parameter in ILOF-sequence to 0.1 resulted 
in TPR rates above 95% while keeping TNR rates above 40% in the case of all 3 attack scenarios. 
6.3.4.6 Processing Time Efficiency of the Four Outlier Algorithms 
The average processing time of synthesized datasets with each algorithm is shown in Figure 6.13. As 
expected, the ILOF algorithm has the worst processing time performance due to its worst time complexity 
(recall Table 6.1). Note that the ILOF algorithm computes the KNN for each new input instance added to 
the sliding time window of size n in O(logn) time using the M-tree data structure. Also, each time an input 
instance x is added or removed from the sliding window, every input instance y in the sliding window, for 
which x is added or removed from its KNN, respectively, must re-compute its LOF value (see Appendix 
D). The running time complexity of this step, in the worst case, is O(nlogn). 
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The processing time of COD, Denstream and D-Stream algorithms is shorter since they employ either an 
indexing data structure (i.e., M-tree in COD) or synopsis data structure (i.e., micro-cluster and density grid 
in Denstream and D-Stream, respectively). The worst running time complexity for labeling a new instance 
in the case of COD, Denstream and D-Stream is O(logn), O(m) and O(g), respectively (refer again to 
Table 6.1). 
 
 
Figure 6.13 – The processing time efficiency of COD, ILOF, Denstream and D-Stream 
 
6.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we presented and evaluated the most significant contribution of this thesis: a new system 
for detection of both current and next-generation (i.e., future) HTTP-based DDoS attacks. Our DDoS 
defense system is also the first of its kind to tackle the problem of real-time HTTP-based attacks detection 
in both static and dynamic web domains. The results demonstrate that, in the case of an attack generated 
by the most sophisticated, advanced HTTP-based bots, the proposed system is capable of detecting 90% of 
such malicious traffic. While at the same time, during such an attack by these advanced HTTP-based bots, 
that are yet to be observed in the real-world, our system ensures that at most 43% of human web visitors 
will be bothered with solving CAPTCHA puzzles.  
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In the next chapter, we summarize the main conclusions of our research and outline possible future work. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 
 
 
In the first part of this thesis, we reviewed the current state-of-the-art in automated benign and malicious 
web crawler’s browsing behaviour. This research has achieved the following milestones. Firstly, we have 
shown that supervised machine learning can be employed to 1) classify user sessions as belonging to either 
automated benign web crawlers or human visitors, and 2) identify which browsing features are the most 
useful in identifying various visitors groups. Secondly, we also have shown that unsupervised machine 
learning can be utilized to obtain a better insight into the types and distribution of visitors to a public web 
site based on their link-traversal behaviour, as well as to identify suspicious outlier malicious/unknown 
visitors that exhibit human browsing behaviour and suspicious outlier human visitors that mimic malicious 
browsing behaviour on a web site. Thirdly, we demonstrated that time series analysis can be applied to 
perform a further fine-tuned separation of truly malicious sessions from suspicious outlier sessions by 
exploiting the underlying time-wise browsing behaviour differences between the human and the machine-
generated session types. 
 
In the second part, we presented and evaluated a novel real-time system for detection of various current 
and possibly future sophisticated HTTP-based DDoS attacks. The system was tested on real-world traces 
against synthesized attack scenarios. The simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed 
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system to correctly detect over 90% of the synthesized attack sessions while limiting the number of actual 
human visitors presented with CAPTCHA below 43% across all attack scenarios.  
 
While the aim of this thesis was to provide some definite answers related to the detection of current and 
future application layer DDoS attacks in static and dynamic web domains, there are many possible 
extensions to the work conducted so far, including the following: 
1. The sensitivity of the system could be improved by maintaining an additional profile of malicious 
web visitors. Note that, in the worst case scenario, the sensitivity of the system can be as low as 57%, 
i.e., 43% of actual human web visitors are asked to solve CAPTCHA. In order to further minimize the 
number of regular human visitors that are presented graphical puzzles by our system, our system 
could maintain a profile (i.e., clustering results) of web visitors that fail CAPTCHA test for fine-tuned 
separation of outlier human-generated web sessions from outlier bot-generated web sessions. In the 
two-profile system, the visitors are presented CAPTCHA only if: 1) Their web sessions are identified 
as outliers in the comparison to the profile of typical browsing behaviour of regular human visitors 
(i.e. the profile employed in the original version of the system shown in Figure 6.1) and 2) Their web 
sessions are identified as non-outliers in the comparison to the profile of the browsing behaviour of 
web visitors that fail the CAPTCHA test - i.e., the browsing behaviour profile derived from malicious 
DDoS bots. The web visitors whose web sessions are outliers in comparison to the typical browsing 
behaviour of human visitors and are also outliers in comparison to the profile of the browsing 
behaviour of web visitors that fail the CAPTCHA test are granted uninterrupted access to the site. 
2. Another issue in the current version of the system is how and when to serve CAPTCHA puzzles in the 
light of the possibility that either: 1) it could take a very long time for the "outlier" user to revisit the 
site, or 2) the "outlier" user is one-time-only web visitor (i.e., he/she never revisits the web site). For 
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instance, in CSE, Lewis and EACS web logs, the percentage of one-time-only
17
 web visitors among 
all web visitors was 50%, 29% and 27%
18
, respectively. A possible solution could entail interrupting 
the incoming/incomplete web sessions with a CAPTCHA as soon as the CBS or PVT becomes 
suspicious in order to resolve the true identity of the visitor before the visitor leaves the web site. 
3. The system's performance could be evaluated by employing additional web log data from dynamic 
web domains such as news web sites and online blogging sites. Specifically, we could investigate 
how the sensitivity and specificity of the system are affected when the same algorithm parameters, 
employed in our evaluation of the system, are also applied to detect the 3 attacks in additional set of 
highly dynamic web domains. 
4. So far, we have studied the detection of unusually behaving human web visitors. A possible direction 
for the future research would be to extend our analysis to the detection of unusually behaving benign 
crawlers or other non-DDoS malicious crawlers (e.g., spam, web site scraping bots or unknown 
crawlers identified in chapter 5) by employing the proposed anti-DDoS system.  
5. Also, the system could be evaluated with additional synthesized attacks. For instance, the simulation 
of the system performance with additional variations of Attack 2 scenario could be undertaken by 
selecting the most popular pages with a help of additional search engines or Wayback machine [216]. 
Also, another page viewing time modeling can be employed where the mean Exponential page 
viewing time would be greater for the web pages with greater amount of embedded information, i.e., 
web pages with more text or image content. For instance, the size of the embedded content in web 
pages can be estimated as the total size of the web page file in bytes.   
                                                     
17
  The one-time-only web visitors are defined as human web site visitors, identified by their origin IP address in the 
web logs, that generated only a single session for the duration of the web collection time period.  
18
 In the calculation of these statistics, we only considered web visitors that generated a web session in the first n-1 
weeks of web log data, where n is the total number of weeks of web log data for that dataset. The reasoning for this 
approach was to ignore web visitors that generated the single web session for the first time during the last week of 
web log collection time period and who typically visit the web site infrequently, i.e., once-a-week. 
197 
 
Bibliography 
[1] R. Kumar and A. Tomkins, "A Characterization of Online Browsing Behavior," in World Wide 
Web, Raleigh, North Carolina, USA, 2010, pp. 561-570. 
[2] H. Obendorf, H. Weinreich, E. Herder, and M. Mayer, "Web Page Revisitation Revisited: 
Implications of a Long-term Click-stream Study of Browser Usage," in In proceedings of CHI '07, 
San Jose, California, USA, 2007, pp. 597-606. 
[3] J. Lewis. (2012, August) Forbes.com. [Online]. 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/05/08/figuring-ddos-attack-risks-into-it-security-
budgets/#5e6bf1c41cfc 
[4] (2016) Arbor Networks. [Online]. 
https://www.arbornetworks.com/images/documents/WISR2016_EN_Web.pdf 
[5] "The Growing Threat of Application-Layer DDoS Attacks," Arbor Networks, Ann Arbor, MI, 
USA, Whitepaper 2012. [Online]. Arbor Networks, “The Growing Threat of Application-Layer 
DDoS Attacks”, Whitepaper, 2012. 
[6] D. Drinfeld, N. Vlajic, and D. Stevanovic, "Bots for Flash-Crowd DDoS that Mimic Human 
Behavior: Are We There Yet?," InderScience International Journal of Internet Technology and 
Secured Transactions (IJITST)., Accepted. 
[7] D. Stevanovic, A. An, and N. Vlajic, "Detecting Web Crawlers from Web Server Access Logs with 
Data Mining Classifiers," in In the proceedings of the 19th International Symposium on 
Methodologies for Intelligent Systems, Warsaw, Poland, June, 2011. 
[8] D. Stevanovic, A. An, and N. Vlajic, "Feature Evaluation for Web Crawler Detection with Data 
Mining Techniques," Elsevier Expert Systems with Applications, vol. 39, no. 10, pp. 8707-8717, 
August 2012. 
[9] D Stevanovic, N Vlajic, and A An, "Unsupervised Clustering of Web Sessions to Detect Malicious 
and Non-malicious Website Users," in In the proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on 
Ambient Systems, Networks and Technologies, Niagara Falls, Canada, September, 2011. 
[10] D. Stevanovic, N. Vlajic, and A. An, "Detection of Malicious and Non-malicious Website Visitors 
Using Unsupervised Neural Network Learning," Applied Soft Computing, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 698-
708, January 2013. 
[11] D. Stevanovic and N. Vlajic, "An Integrated Approach to Defence Against Degrading Application-
Layer DDoS Attacks," in International Conference on Security and Management, Las Vegas, NV, 
2013, pp. 1-7. 
[12] D. Stevanovic and N. Vlajic, "Application-Layer DDoS in Dynamic Web-Domains: Building 
Defenses against Next-Generation Attack Behavior," in In proceedings of IEEE Conference on 
Communications and Network Security, San Francisco, CA, 2014, pp. 1-2. 
[13] D. Stevanovic and N. Vlajic, "Next Generation Application-Layer DDoS Defences: Applying the 
Concepts of Outlier Detection in Data Streams with Concept Drift," in In proceedings of the IEEE 
International Conference on Machine Learning and Applications, Detroit, MI, USA, 2014. 
[14] J. Mirkovic, S. Dietrich, D. Dittrich, and P. Reiher, Internet Denial of Service: Attack and Defense 
Mechanisms. Upper Saddle River, NJ, United States of America: Pearson Education Inc., 2005. 
[15] C. Wilson, "Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for 
Congress," Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, United States Governemnt, CRS Report 
for Congress 2008. 
198 
 
[16] K. M. Finklea and C. A. Theohary, "Cybercrime: Conceptual Issues for Congress and U.S. Law 
Enforcement," Congressional Research Service, 2012. 
[17] D. Holden. (2014, July) SC Magazine. [Online]. http://www.scmagazineuk.com/the-science-behind-
ddos-extortion/article/362050/ 
[18] D. Goodin. (2014, June) Arstechnica. [Online]. http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/06/under-ddos-
feedly-buckles-but-defies-attackers-extortion-demands/ 
[19] J. E. Dunn. (2013, December) Techworld. [Online]. http://www.techworld.com/news/security/ddos-
blackmailers-branded-playground-bullies-for-attack-on-casino-firm-3494516/ 
[20] J. Nazario. (2008, August) The Arbor Networks Security Blog. [Online]. 
http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2008/07/georgia-on-my-mind-political-ddos/ 
[21] J. Vijayan. (2013, January) Computer World. [Online]. 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9235636/Experts_unsure_whether_Iran_is_behind_bank_
DDoS_attacks_ 
[22] E. Schurman and J. Brutlag, "The User and Business Impact of Server Delays, Additional Bytes, 
and HTTP Chunking in Web Search," in Velocity - Web Performance and Operations Conference, 
San Jose, USA, June, 2009. 
[23] Forrester Consulting. (2010, January) Banktech. [Online]. http://www.banktech.com/business-
intelligence/222500093 
[24] J. Mirkovic, G. Prier, and P. Reiher, "Attacking DDoS at the source," in In Proceedings of ICNP 
2002, Paris, France, 2002, pp. 312-321. 
[25] S. M Specht and R. B. Lee, "Distributed Denial of Service: Taxonomies of Attacks, Tools and 
Countermeasures," in Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed 
Computing Systems, Tainan, Taiwan, September, 2004, pp. 543-550. 
[26] A. Asosheh and N. Ramezani, "Comprehensive Taxonomy of DDoS Attacks and Defense 
Mechanisms Applying in a Smart Classification," WSEAS Transaction on Computers, vol. 7, no. 4, 
pp. 281-290, April 2008. 
[27] (2012, October) CloudFlare. [Online]. https://blog.cloudflare.com/deep-inside-a-dns-amplification-
ddos-attack/ 
[28] W. O. Chee. (2010, November) OWASP. [Online]. 
https://www.owasp.org/images/4/43/Layer_7_DDOS.pdf 
[29] B. Sullivan. (2009, November) MSDN Magazine. [Online]. https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/magazine/ee335713.aspx 
[30] S. A. Crosby and D. S. Wallach, "Denial of service via algorithmic complexity attacks," in In 
proceedings of the 12th Conference on USENIX Security Symposium, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2003, 
pp. 3-3. 
[31] J. Mirkovic and P. Reiher, "A Taxonomy of DDoS Attacks and DDoS Defence Mechanisms," ACM 
SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 39-54, April 2004. 
[32] C Douligeris and A Mitrokotsa, "DDoS attacks and defense mechanisms: classification and state-of-
the-art," Computer Networks, vol. 44, no. 5, pp. 643-666, April 2004. 
[33] T. Peng, C. Leckie, and K. Ramamohanarao, "Survey of network-based defense mechanisms 
countering the DoS and DDoS problems," ACM Computer Survey, vol. 39, April 2007. 
[34] (2015, April) Snort. [Online]. http://www.snort.org/ 
[35] C. Manikopoulos and S. Papavassiliou, "Network intrusion and fault detection: A statistical 
anomaly approach," IEEE Communication, vol. 40, no. 10, pp. 76-82, October 2002. 
199 
 
[36] T. M. Gil and M. Poletto, "MULTOPS: a data-structure for bandwidth attack detection," in In 
Proceedings of the 10th USENIX Security Symposium, Boston, MA, 2001. 
[37] Arbor Networks. (2011, October) The Peakflow Platform. [Online]. http://www.arbornetworks.com 
[38] Information Sciences Institute. (2011, October) DynaBone. [Online]. http://www.isi.edu/dynabone 
[39] (2011) IETF.org. [Online]. https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg07553.html 
[40] G. Ormazabal, S. Nagpal, E. Yardeni, and H. Schulzrinne, "Secure SIP: A scalable prevention 
mechanism for DoS attacks on SIP-based VoIP systems," in In Proceedings of the 2nd International 
Conference on Principles, Systems and Applications of IP Telecommunications, Heidelberg, 
Germany, 2008, pp. 107-132. 
[41] Securiteam. (2011, November) [Online]. http://www.securiteam.com/exploits/2AUQBR5Q0Q.html 
[42] D. Goodin. (2014, January) New DoS attacks taking down game sites deliver crippling 100Gbps 
floods. Web site. [Online]. http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/01/new-dos-attacks-taking-down-
game-sites-deliver-crippling-100-gbps-floods/ 
[43] IBM. (November, 2011) [Online]. http://www-
01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21105201 
[44] (2014) Prolexic. [Online]. http://www.prolexic.com/kcresources/attack-
report/attack_report_q214/Prolexic-Q22014-Global-Attack-Report-A4.pdf 
[45] Akamai Inc. (2015, September) [Online]. http://www.wsta.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Q1-
2015-SOTI-Security-Report-Low-Res.pdf 
[46] R. Barnett. (2011, August) SpiderLabs. [Online]. 
https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/%28Updated%29-Mitigation-of-Apache-
Range-Header-DoS-Attack/ 
[47] E. Cambiaso, G. Papaleo, and M. Aiello, "Taxonomy of slow dos attacks to web applications," in 
Communications in Computer and Information Science.: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012, vol. 
335, ch. Recent Trends in Computer Networks and Distributed Systems Security, pp. 195-204. 
[48] A. Karthigeyan, A. Andavar, and J. Ramya, "Adaptable practices for curbing xdos attacks.," 
International Journal of Scientific and Engineering Research, vol. 3, no. 6, pp. 1-6, June 2012. 
[49] (2014, June) Applicure Technologies. [Online]. http://www.applicure.com/solutions/prevent-denial-
of-service-attacks 
[50] A. Lane. (2013, July) Securosis. [Online]. https://securosis.com/blog/database-denial-of-service-
the-attacks 
[51] (2014, July) RioRey. [Online]. 
http://static.squarespace.com/static/53319b01e4b0ec02b601ca49/t/537ab649e4b02004337c19aa/14
00550985376/RioRey_Taxonomy_DDoS_Attacks_2.6_2014.pdf 
[52] C. Wilson. (2012, April) A DDoS Family Affair: Dirt Jumper bot family continues to evolve. Web 
blog. [Online]. http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2012/04/a-ddos-family-affair-dirt-jumper-bot-
family-continues-to-evolve/ 
[53] J. Nazario. (2007, October) BlackEnergy DDoS Bot Analysis. Document. [Online]. http://atlas-
public.ec2.arbor.net/docs/BlackEnergy+DDoS+Bot+Analysis.pdf 
[54] M. M Andrade and N. Vlajic, "Dirt Jumper: A New and Fast Evolving Botnet-for-DDoS," 
International Journal of Intelligent Computing Research, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 330-336, September 
2012. 
[55] P. Shankdhar. (2013, October) InfoSec Institute. [Online]. http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/dos-
attacks-free-dos-attacking-tools/ 
200 
 
[56] P. N. Tan and V. Kumar, "Discovery of Web Robot Sessions Based on their Navigation Patterns," 
Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 9-35, January 2002. 
[57] S. Yu, Z. Guofeng, S. Guo, X. Yang, and A. V. Vasilakos, "Browsing Behavior Mimicking Attacks 
on Popular Web Sites for Large Botnets," in proceedings of 2011 IEEE Conference on Computer 
Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS), Shanghai, China, April, 2011, pp. 947-951. 
[58] L. Breslau, P. Cao, L. Fan, G. Phillips, and S. Shenker, "Web caching and zipf-like distributions: 
Evidence and implications," in Proceedings of the INFOCOM, New York, 1999, pp. 126-134. 
[59] A. Madrigal. (2013, December) Welcome to the Internet of Thingies: 61.5% of Web Traffic Is Not 
Human. Web site. [Online]. http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/12/welcome-to-
the-internet-of-thingies-615-of-web-traffic-is-not-human/282309/ 
[60] J. Idziorek and M. Tannian, "Exploiting Cloud Utility Models for Profit and Ruin," in IEEE 4th 
International Conference on Cloud Computing, Washington, DC, 2011, pp. 33-40. 
[61] J. Idziorek, M. Tannian, and D. Jacobson, "Attribution of Fraudulent Resource Consumption in the 
Cloud," in IEEE Fifth International Conference on Cloud Computing, Honolulu, Hawaii, 2012, pp. 
99-106. 
[62] J Idziorek, M Tannian, and D Jacobson, "Detecting Fraudulent Use of Cloud Resources," in The 
ACM Cloud Computing Security Workshop, Chicago, Illinois, 2011, pp. 61-72. 
[63] M. H. Sqalli, F. Al-Haidari, and K. Salah, "EDoS-Shield - A Two-Steps Mitigation Technique 
against EDoS Attacks in Cloud Computing," in Fourth IEEE International Conference on Utility 
and Cloud Computing, Melbourne, Australia, 2011, pp. 49-56. 
[64] (2012, May) User-agent-string.info. [Online]. http://user-agent-string.info/ 
[65] J. Edwards. (2012, June) It's 2012 and Armageddon has arrived. Web article. [Online]. 
http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Crypto-Armageddon-Blog1.pdf 
[66] D. Schwarz. (2013, December) Arbor Networks. [Online]. 
http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2013/12/a-business-of-ferrets/ 
[67] C. Wilson. (2011, October) DDoS Watch: Keeping an Eye on Aldi Bot. Web article. [Online]. 
http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2011/10/ddos-aldi-bot/ 
[68] C. Barna, M. Shtern, M. Smit, V. Tzerpos, and M. Litoiu, "Model-based adaptive DoS attack 
mitigation," in In Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Software Engineering for 
Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems (SEAMS), Zurich, Switzerland, 2012, pp. 119-128. 
[69] Y. Xuan, S. Shin, M. T. Thai, and T. Znati, "Detecting Application Denial-of-Service Attacks: A 
Group-Testing-Based Approach," IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 21, 
no. 8, pp. 1203-1216, August 2010. 
[70] J. Wang, X. Yang, and K. Long, "Web DDoS Detection Schemes Based on Measuring User’s 
Access Behavior with Large Deviation," in IEEE Globecom, Houston, TX, USA, 2011, pp. 1-5. 
[71] L. Li and G. Lee, "Ddos attack detection and wavelets," Telecommunication Systems, vol. 28, no. 3, 
pp. 435-451, 2005. 
[72] L Liu, X Jin, G Min, and L Xu, "Real-Time Diagnosis of Network Anomaly based on Statistical 
Traffic Analysis," in IEEE 11th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in 
Computing and Communications, Liverpool, UK, 2012, pp. 264-270. 
[73] S. Lee, G. Kim, and S. Kim, "Sequence-order-independent network profiling for detecting 
application layer DDoS attacks," EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking, 
vol. 1, no. 50, pp. 1-9, 2011. 
[74] S. Yadav and S. Selvakumar, "Detection of Application Layer DDoS Attack by Modeling User 
201 
 
Behavior Using Logistic Regression," in 4th International Conference on Reliability, Infocom 
Technologies and Optimization (ICRITO), Noida, India, 2015, pp. 1-6. 
[75] S. Seufert and D. O’Brien, "Machine learning for automatic defence against distributed denial of 
service attacks," in In IEEE International Conference on Communications, Glasgow, Scotland, 
2007, pp. 1217-1222. 
[76] A. Chonka, J. Singh, and W. Zhou, "Chaos theory based detection against network mimicking ddos 
attacks," Communications Letters, vol. 13, no. 9, pp. 717-719, 2009. 
[77] P. Chwalinski, R. Belavkin, and X. Ch, "Detection of Application Layer DDoS Attacks with 
Clustering and Bayes Factors," in IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetic, 
2013, pp. 156-161. 
[78] C. Ye, K. Zheng, and C. She, "Application layer DDoS detection using clustering analysis," in 2nd 
International Conference on Computer Science and Network Technology, Changchun, China, 2012, 
pp. 1038-1041. 
[79] P. Hayati, V. Potdar, K. Chai, and A. Talevski, "Web spambot detection based on web navigation 
behaviour," in International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, 
Perth, Australia, 2010, pp. 797-803. 
[80] D. Das, U. Sharma, and D. K. Bhattacharyya, "Detection of HTTP Flooding Attacks in Multiple 
Scenarios," in In proceedings of the 2011 International Conference on Communication, Computing 
& Security , Odisha, India, 2011, pp. 517-522. 
[81] M. Zolotukhin, T. Hamalainen, T. Kokkonen, and J. Siltanen, "Analysis of HTTP requests for 
anomaly detection of web attacks," in IEEE 12th International Conference on Dependable, 
Autonomic and Secure Computin, Dalian, China, 2014, pp. 406-411. 
[82] Y. S. Choi, J. T. Oh, J. S. Jang, and I. K. Kim, "Timeslot Monitoring Model for application layer 
DDoS attack detection," in IEEE International Conference on Computer Sciences and Convergence 
Information Technology (ICCIT), Seogwipo, South Korea, 2011, pp. 677-679. 
[83] Y. Xie and S- Z. Yu, "Monitoring the Application-Layer DDoS Attacks for Popular Websites," 
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 15-25, February 2009. 
[84] C. Xu, G. Zhao, G. Xie, and S. Yu, "Detection on Application Layer DDoS using Random Walk 
Model," in IEEE Communication and Information Systems Security Symposium, Melbourne, 
Australia, 2014, pp. 707-712. 
[85] C-S. Lin, C-Y. Lee, J-C. Liu, C-R. Chen, and S-Y. Huang, "A detection scheme for flooding attack 
on application layer based on semantic concept," in International Computer Symposium , Tainan, 
China, 2010, pp. 385-389. 
[86] J. Jung, B. Krishnamurthy, and M. Rabinovich, "Flash crowds and denial of service attacks: 
characterization and implications for CDNs and web sites," in Proceedings of the 11th international 
conference on World Wide Web, Honolulu, 2002, pp. 293-304. 
[87] S Yu et al., "Discriminating DDoS Attacks from Flash Crowds Using Flow Correlation 
Coefficient," IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 23, no. 6, pp. 1073 - 
1080, June 2012. 
[88] T. Thapngam, S. Yu, W. Zhou, and G. Beliakov, "Discriminating DDoS Attack Traffic from Flash 
Crowd through Packet Arrival Patterns," in The First International Workshop on Security in 
Computers, Networking and Communications, Shanghai, China, 2011, pp. 969-974. 
[89] J. Wang, X. Yang, and K. Long, "A New Relative Entropy Based App-DDoS Detection Method," 
in IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications, Riccione, Italy, 2010, pp. 966-968. 
202 
 
[90] H. Liu and M. Kim, "Real-Time Detection of Stealthy DDoS Attacks Using Time-Series 
Decomposition," in IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC) , Cape Town, South 
Africa, 2010, pp. 1-6. 
[91] L. Wang, Q. Wu, and D. D. Luong, "Engaging edge networks in preventing and mitigating 
undesirable network traffic," in In proceedings of the 2007 3rd IEEE Workshop on Secure Network 
Protocols, Washington, DC, 2007, pp. 1-6. 
[92] V. S. Huang, R. Huang, and M. Chiang, "DDoS Mitigation System with Multi-Stage Detection and 
Text-Based Turing Testing in Cloud Computing," in 27th International Conference on Advanced 
Information Networking and Applications Workshops, Barcelona, Spain, 2013, pp. 655-662. 
[93] G. Oikonomou and J. Mirkovic, "Modeling Human Behavior for Defense against Flash-Crowd 
Attacks," in In Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Communications, Dresden, 
Germany, 2009, pp. 1-6. 
[94] J. Wang, M. Zhang, X. Yang, K. Long, and C. Zhou, "HTTP-sCAN: detecting HTTP-flooding 
attack by modeling multi-features of web browsing behavior from Noisy dataset," in In proceedings 
of the 9th Asia-Pacific Conference on Communications, Bali, Indonesia, 2013, pp. 677-682. 
[95] T. Ni, X. Gu, H. Wang, and Y. Li, "Real-Time Detection of Application-Layer DDoS Attack Using 
Time Series Analysis," Journal of Control Science and Engineering, vol. 2013, pp. 1-6, August 
2013. 
[96] K. Pandiyarajan, S. Haridas, and K. Varghese, "Transparent FPGA based Device for SQL DDoS 
Mitigation," in 2013 International Conference on Field-Programmable Technology (FPT), Kyoto, 
Japan, 2013, pp. 82-89. 
[97] H. Beitollahi and G. Deconinck, "ConnectionScore: a statistical technique to resist application-layer 
DDoS attacks," Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 425-
442, June 2014. 
[98] L. Jie, S. Jianwei, and H. Changzhen, "A Novel Framework for Active Detection of HTTP Based 
Attacks," in International Conference on Electric and Electronics, Nanchang, China, 2011, pp. 411-
418. 
[99] I. Yatagai, T. Isohara, and I. Sasase, "Detection of http-get flood attack based on analysis of page 
access behavior," in In proceedings IEEE Pacific RIM Conference on Communications, Computers, 
and Signal Processing, 2007, pp. 232-235. 
[100] S. Kandula, D. Katabi, M. Jacob, and A. Berger, "Surviving Organized DDos Attacks That Mimic 
Flash Crowds," in USENIX Symposium on Network Systems Design and Implementation, Boston, 
MA, May, 2005. 
[101] R. Gossweilier, M. Kamvar, and S. Baluja, "What’s up CAPTCHA?: a CAPTCHA based on image 
orientation," in Proceedings of 18th international conference on World wide web, Madrid, Spain, 
2009, pp. 841-850. 
[102] A Basso, "Protecting Web resources from massive automated access," University of Torino, 
Technical RT114/08, 2008. 
[103] K. Park, V. Pai, K. Lee, and S. Calo, "Securing Web Service by Automatic Robot Detection," in 
Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX '06 Annual Technical Conference, Berkeley, CA, 
2006, pp. 23-29. 
[104] D. Gavrilis, I. Chatzis, and E. Dermatas, "Flash crowd detection using decoy hyperlinks," in 2007 
IEEE International Conference on Networking Sensing and Control, London, UK, April, 2007, pp. 
466-470. 
203 
 
[105] D. Brewer, K. Li, L. Ramaswamy, and C. Pu, "A Link Obfuscation Service to Detect Webbots," in 
2010 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing, Miami, FL, 2010, pp. 433 - 440. 
[106] D. Pogue. (2012, February) Scientific American. [Online]. 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=time-to-kill-off-captchas 
[107] (2011) VouchSafe. [Online]. http://www.vouchsafe.com/all-about-vouchsafe/stopping-captcha-
farmers 
[108] (2016, March) Palo Alto Networks. [Online]. https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Documentation-
Articles/Application-DDoS-Mitigation/ta-p/54531?attachment-id=230 
[109] Barracuda Networks. (2014, August) [Online]. 
https://www.barracuda.com/products/webapplicationfirewall/features 
[110] McAfee. (2016, March) [Online]. http://www.mcafee.com/ca/resources/demos/nsp-demo-dos-
ddos.html 
[111] Sophos. (2014, August) [Online]. http://www.sophos.com/en-
us/medialibrary/PDFs/factsheets/sophosutmnetworkprotectiondsna.pdf 
[112] (2016, March) Juniper Networks. [Online]. 
http://www.juniper.net/techpubs/en_US/junos12.1x44/topics/concept/idp-application-level-ddos-
protection-overview.html 
[113] (2016, March) Arbor Networks. [Online]. http://www.arbornetworks.com/arbor-
partner/alliances/technology-alliances/clean-pipes-2-0 
[114] O. Katz. (2015, February) F5 Networks. [Online]. https://f5.com/resources/white-papers/protecting-
against-application-ddos-attacks-with-big-ip-asm-a-three-step-solution 
[115] (2016, January) Juniper Networks. [Online]. 
http://jncie.files.wordpress.com/2008/09/801003_protecting-the-network-from-denial-of-service-
floods.pdf 
[116] HP. (2016, March) [Online]. http://www8.hp.com/h20195/V2/getpdf.aspx/4AA5-
3394ENW.pdf?ver=1.0 
[117] (2016, March) Checkpoint Software Technologies. [Online]. 
https://www.checkpoint.com/downloads/product-related/datasheets/ds-ddos-protector-
appliances.pdf 
[118] (2016, March) RioRey. [Online]. http://www.riorey.com/ 
[119] Huawei. (2014, August) [Online]. 
http://enterprise.huawei.com/topic/AntiDDoS_2013_en/index.html 
[120] (2016, March) Prolexic. [Online]. 
http://www.prolexic.com/pdf/Prolexic_PLXabm_Service_Overview_082312.pdf 
[121] (2016, March) SonicWall. [Online]. http://us-
downloads.quest.com/Repository/support.quest.com/SonicWALL%20TZ%20Series/200/Document
ation/SonicOS_5.8_Administrators_Guide.pdf 
[122] WatchGuard. (2016, March) [Online]. 
http://www.watchguard.com/training/vbasics5/Admin/vclasss8.htm 
[123] (2016, March) Fortinet's DDoS Defense Technology. [Online]. 
http://www.fortinet.com/sites/default/files/productdatasheets/FortiDDos-1000B.pdf 
[124] (2016, March) Prolexic. [Online]. http://www.prolexic.com/why-prolexic-best-global-ddos-
mitigation-network.html 
204 
 
[125] (2016, March) Akamai Technologies Inc. [Online]. 
http://www.akamai.com/dl/product_briefs/product-brief-site-shield.pdf 
[126] W. Guo, S. Ju, and Y. Gu, "Web robot detection techniques based on statistics of their requested 
URL resources," in Proceedings of ninth international conference on computer supported 
cooperative work in design, Coventry, UK, 2005, pp. 302-306. 
[127] N. Geens, J. Juysmans, and J. Vanthienen, "Evaluation of Web robot discovery techniques: a 
benchmarking," Lecture notes in computer science, vol. 4065, pp. 121-130, July 2006. 
[128] P. Huntington, D. Nicholas, and H. R. Jamali, "Web robot detection in the scholarly information 
environment," Journal of Information Science, vol. 34, no. 5, pp. 726–741, May 2008. 
[129] T. Kabe and M. Miyazaki, "Determining WWW user-agents from server access log," in 
Proceedings of seventh international conference on parallel and distributed systems, Washington 
D.C., 2000, pp. 173-178. 
[130] D. Doran and S. S. Gokhale, "Discovering New Trends in Web Robot Traffic Through Functional 
Classification," in Seventh IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and 
Applications, Cambridge, MA, 2008, pp. 275-278. 
[131] J. Lee, S. Cha, D. Lee, and H. Lee, "Classification of web robots: An empirical study based on over 
one billion requests," Computers & Security, vol. 28, no. 8, pp. 795-802, November 2009. 
[132] X. Lin, L. Quan, and H. Wu, "An automatic scheme to categorize user sessions in modern HTTP 
traffic," in In Proceedings of IEEE global telecommunications conference, New Orleans, Louisiana, 
2008, pp. 1-6. 
[133] D. Doran and S. S. Gokhale, "Long Range Dependence (LRD) in the Arrival Process of Web 
Robots," in In proceedings of International Conference on Computer Technology and Science 
(ICCTS 2012), Singapore, 2012, pp. 176-180. 
[134] D. Doran, K. Morillo, and S. S. Gokhale, "A Comparison of Web Robot and Human Requests," in 
IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining, 
Niagara, Ontario, 2013, pp. 1374-1380. 
[135] D. Doran and S. S. Gokhale, "Detecting Web Robots Using Resource Request Patterns," in 11th 
International Conference on Machine Learning and Applications, Boca Raton, FL, 2012, pp. 7-12. 
[136] A. Stassopoulou and M. D. Dikaiakos, "Web robot detection: A probabilistic reasoning approach," 
Computer Networks: The In-ternational Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking, 
vol. 53, no. 3, pp. 265-278, February 2009. 
[137] T. Kohonen, Self-Organizing Maps, 3rd ed. New York: Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg, 2001. 
[138] Y. Hiltunen and M. Lappalainen, "Automated Personalization of Internet Users Using Self-
Organizing Maps," in IDEAL, Manchester, UK, 2002, pp. 31-34. 
[139] P. Lichodzijewski, A. N. Zincir-Heywood, and M. I. Heywood, "Dynamic Intrusion Detection 
Using Self-Organizing Maps," in Proceedings of the 14th Annual Canadian Information 
Technology Security Symposium, Ottawa, Canada, 2002. 
[140] H. G. Kayacik, A. N. Zincir-Heywood, and M. I. Heywood, "A hierarchical SOM-based intrusion 
detection system," Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 439-451, 
June 2007. 
[141] T. Horeis, "Intrusion detection with neural networks-combination of self-organizing maps and 
radial basis function networks for human expert integration," Computational Intelligence Society, 
Research Report 2003. 
[142] Z. Banković, D. Fraga, J. C. Vallejo, and J. M. Moya, "Self-Organizing Maps versus Growing 
205 
 
Neural Gas in Detecting Data Outliers for Security Applications," Springer - Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science , vol. 7209, pp. 89-96, 2012. 
[143] G. A. Carpenter and S. Grossberg, "Adaptive Resonance Theory," in The handbook of brain theory 
and neural networks, Michael A Arbib, Ed. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, 1998, pp. 79-82. 
[144] J. Martín-Guerrero, E. Soria-Olivas, P.J.G. Lisboa, A. Palomares, and E. Balaguer-Ballester, "User 
Profiling from Citizen Web Portal Accesses using the Adaptive Resonance Theory Neural 
Network," in IADIS, San Sabastian, Spain, 2006, pp. 334-337. 
[145] M. Amini and R. Jalili, "Network-Based Intrusion Detection Using Unsupervised Adaptive 
Resonance Theory (ART)," in In Proceedings of the 4th Conference on Engineering of Intelligent 
Systems, Madeira, Portugal, 2004. 
[146] H. Liu and V. Keselj, "Combined mining of Web server logs and web contents for classifying user 
navigation patterns and predicting users’ future requests," Data & Knowledge Engineering, vol. 61, 
no. 2, May 2007. 
[147] C. Bomhardt, W. Gaul, and L. Schmidt-Thieme, "Web Robot Detection - Preprocessing Web 
Logfiles for Robot Detection," in In Proc. SISCLADAG, Bologna, Italy, 2005. 
[148] A. Lourenco and O. Belo, "Catching Web Crawlers in the Act," in International Conference on 
Web Engineering, Palo Alto, CA, 2006, pp. 265-272. 
[149] (November, 2011) Robots.org. [Online]. http://www.robotstxt.org/ 
[150] (2011, August) User-Agents.org. [Online]. http://www.user-agents.org 
[151] (2011, August) Bots vs. Browsers. [Online]. http://www.botsvsbrowsers.com/ 
[152] D Doran and S S Gokhale, "Web robot detection techniques: overview and limitations," Data 
Mining and Knowledge Discovery, pp. 1-28, June 2010. 
[153] J. R. Quinlan, C4.5: Programs for Machine Learning.: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 1993. 
[154] J X Yu, O Yuming, C Zhang, and S Zhang, "Identifying interesting visitors through Web log 
classification," Intelligent Systems, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 55-59, June 2005. 
[155] J. Han and M. Kamber, Data Mining: Concepts and Techniques, Diane Cerra, Ed. San Francisco: 
Elsevier, 2006. 
[156] B. Fritzke, "Growing Neural Gas Network Learns Topologies," Advances in Neural Information 
Processing Systems, vol. 7, no. MIT Press, pp. 625-632, 1995. 
[157] J. Lee, S. Cha, D. Lee, and H. Lee, "Classification of web robots: An empirical study based on over 
one billion requests," Computers & Security, vol. 28, no. 8, pp. 795-802, November 2009. 
[158] (1999, October) KDD Cup 1999 Data. [Online]. 
http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html 
[159] GureKddcup database. [Online]. http://www.aldapa.eus/res/gureKddcup/README.pdf 
[160] (2010) CSIC 2010 HTTP Dataset. [Online]. 
http://users.aber.ac.uk/pds7/csic_dataset/csic2010http.html 
[161] (2015, April) Sharpschool. [Online]. http://www.sharpschool.com/ 
[162] W W Cohen, "Fast effective rule induction," in ICML 1995, 1995, pp. 115-123. 
[163] G. John and P. Langley, "Estimating Continuous Distributions in Bayesian Classifiers," in Eleventh 
Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, San Mateo, 1995, pp. 338-345. 
[164] D. Aha and D. Kibler, "Instance-based learning algorithms," Machine Learning, vol. 6, pp. 37-66, 
1991. 
[165] C. Chang and C. Lin. (2015, December) A Library for Support Vector Machines. [Online]. 
206 
 
http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/~cjlin/libsvm/ 
[166] (2010, December) WEKA. [Online]. http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/ 
[167] D. J. Sheskin, Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical Procedures, 5th ed. USA: 
CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group, A Chapman and Hall book, 2011. 
[168] R.J. Wonnacott and T.H. Wonnacott, Introductory Statistics, 4th ed. USA: John Wiley and Sons, 
1996. 
[169] N Vlajic and Howard C Card, "Vector quantization of images using modified adaptive resonance 
algorithm for hierarchical clustering," IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 
1147 - 1162, September 2001. 
[170] J. D. Carroll and J. J. Chang, "Analysis of individual differences in multidimensional scaling via an 
N-way generalization of Eckart-Young decomposition," Psychometrika, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 283-319, 
1970. 
[171] H. Yin, "On multidimensional scaling and the embedding of self organising maps," Neural 
Networks, vol. 21, no. 2-3, pp. 160-169, March 2008. 
[172] B. D. Ripley, Pattern recognition and neural networks. New York, United States of America: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
[173] D. Petrilis and C. Halatsis, "Two-level Clustering of Web Sites Using Self-Organizing Maps," 
Neural Process Letters, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 85-95, February 2008. 
[174] Y. Toshihiko, "A Zipf-Like Distribution of Popularity and Hits in the Mobile Web Pages with Short 
Life Time ," in Seventh International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Computing, 
Applications and Technologies, Taipei, Taiwan, 2006, pp. 240-243. 
[175] S Burklen, P J Marron, S Fritsch, and K Rothermel, "User centric walk: An integrated approach for 
modeling the browsing behavior of users on the web," in ANSS ’05: Proceedings of the 38th annual 
Symposium on Simulation, Washington, D.C., 2005, pp. 149-159. 
[176] V. Almeida, A. Bestavros, M. Crovella, and A. de Oliveira, "Characterizing reference locality in the 
WWW," in IEEE International Conference in Parallel and Distributed Information Systems, Miami 
Beach, Florida, 1996, pp. 92-103. 
[177] C. Cunha, A. Bestavros, and M. Crovella, "Characteristics of WWW client-based traces," Boston 
University, Boston, MA, Technical Report 95-010, 1995. 
[178] S. Glassman, "A caching relay for the world wide web," in First International Conference on the 
World-Wide Web, Geneva, Switzerland, May, 1994, pp. 69-76. 
[179] P. Barford, A. Bestavros, A. Bradley, and M. Crovella, "Changes in Web client access patterns: 
Characteristics and caching implications," World Wide Web, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 15-28, June 1999. 
[180] Z. Liu, N. Niclausse, and C. Jalpa-Villanueva, "Traffic model and performance evaluation of Web 
servers," Performance Evaluation, vol. 46, no. 2-3, pp. 77-100, October 2001. 
[181] L Cherkasova and M Gupta, "Characterizing Locality, Evolution, and Life Span of Accesses in 
Enterprise Media Server Workloads," in In proceedings of the 12th International Workshop on 
Network and Operating Systems Support for Digital Audio and Video, Miami, Florida, 2002, pp. 
33-42. 
[182] W. Tang, Y. Fu, L. Cherkasova, and A. Vahdat, "MediSyn: A Synthetic Streaming Media Service 
Workload Generator," in Proceedings of the 13th international workshop on Network and operating 
systems support for digital audio and video, Monterey, California, 2003, pp. 12-21. 
[183] L. Guo, S. Chen, Z. Xiao, and X. Zhang, "DISC: Dynamic Interleaved Segment Caching for 
Interactive Streaming," in In Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed 
207 
 
Computing Systems, Columbus, Ohio, 2005, pp. 763 - 772. 
[184] M. Chesire, A. Wolman, G. M. Voelker, and H. M. Levy, "Measurement and Analysis of a 
Streaming-Media Workload," in Proceedings of the 3rd conference on USENIX Symposium on 
Internet Technologies and Systems, San Francisco, 2001, pp. 1-12. 
[185] J. M. Almeida, J. Kruegera, D. L. Eagerb, and M. K. Vernon, "Analysis of Educational Media 
Server Workloads," in Proceedings of the 11th international workshop on Network and operating 
systems support for digital audio and video, Port Jefferson, New York, 2001, pp. 21-30. 
[186] M. D. Dikaiakosa, A. Stassopoulou, and L. Papageorgiou, "An investigation of web crawler 
behavior: characterization and metrics," Computer Communications, vol. 28, no. 8, pp. 880–897, 
May 2005. 
[187] F. Duarte, B. Mattos, A. Bestavros, V. Almeida, and J. Almeida, "Traffic Characteristics and 
Communication Patterns in Blogosphere," in In proceedings of the International Conference on 
Weblogs and Social Media, Boulder, Colorado, 2007. 
[188] F. Benevenuto et al., "Characterization and Analysis of User Profiles in Online Video Sharing 
Systems," Information and Data Management, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 261-275, June 2010. 
[189] M. E. Crovella and A. Bestavros, "Self-similarity in world wide web traffic: evidence and possible 
causes," IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 5, no. 6, pp. 835-846, December 1997. 
[190] S. Deng, "Empirical model of WWW document arrivals at access link ," in IEEE International 
Conference on Converging Technologies for Tomorrow's Applications, Dallas, Texas, 1996, pp. 
1797 - 1802. 
[191] I. C. Y. Ma and J. Irvine, "Characteristics of WAP Traffic," Wireless Networks, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 
71-81, January 2004. 
[192] D. Ersoz, M. S. Yousif, and C. R. Das, "Characterizing Network Traffic in a Cluster-based, Multi-
tier Data Center," in In the Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on Distributed 
Computing Systems, Toronto, Canada, 2007, pp. 59-69. 
[193] Y. Xie and S.- Z. Yu, "A large-scale hidden semi-markov model for anomaly detection on user 
browsing behaviors," IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 54-65, February 
2009. 
[194] V. Paxson and S. Floyd, "Wide-Area Traffic: The Failure of Poisson Modeling," IEEE/ACM 
Transactions on Networking, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 226-244, June 1995. 
[195] B. A. Huberman, P. Pirolli, J. E. Pitkow, and R. M. Lukose, "Strong regularities in world wide web 
surfing," Science, vol. 280, no. 5360, April 1998. 
[196] M. Halvey, M. T. Keane, and B. Smyth, "Mobile web surfing is the same as web surfing," 
Communications of the ACM - Self managed systems, vol. 49, no. 3, p. 49, March 2006. 
[197] J Sanchez and Y He, "Internet Data Analysis for the Undergraduate Statistics Curriculum," Journal 
of Statistics Education, vol. 13, no. 3, November 2005. 
[198] R. Baeza-Yates and C. Castillo, "Crawling the Infinite Web," Journal of Web Engineering, vol. 6, 
no. 1, pp. 49-72, March 2007. 
[199] A. Clauset, C. R. Shalizi, and M. E. J. Newman, "Power-Law Distributions in Empirical Data," 
SIAM, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 661-703, November 2009. 
[200] J. A. Silva et al., "Data Stream Clustering: A Survey," ACM Computing Surveys, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 
1-31, October 2013. 
[201] A. Bifet, "Adaptive learning and mining for data streams and frequent patterns," Universitat 
Politecnica de Catalunya, PhD Thesis 2009. 
208 
 
[202] M. Bolanos, J. Forrest, and M. Hahsler, "Introduction to stream: An extensible Framework for Data 
Stream Clustering Research with R," , 2011, pp. 1-33. 
[203] M. Kontaki, A. Gounaris, A. N. Papadopoulos, K. Tsichlas, and Y. Manolopoulos, "Continuous 
monitoring of distance-based outliers over data streams," in The IEEE International Conference on 
Data Engineering (ICDE), Hannover, Germany, 2011, pp. 135-146. 
[204] D. Pokrajac, A. Lazarevic, and L. J. Latecki, "Incremental Local Outlier Detection for Data 
Streams," in IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Data Mining (CIDM), Honolulu, 
Hawaii, USA, 2007, pp. 504-515. 
[205] F. Cao, M. Ester, W. Qian, and A. Zhou, "Density-based clustering over an evolving data stream 
with noise," in In Proceedings of the 6th SIAM International Conference on Data Mining, Bethesda, 
Maryland, USA, 2006, pp. 328-339. 
[206] Y. Chen and L. Tu, "Density-based clustering for real-ime stream data," in KDD'07, New York, 
NY, 2007, pp. 133-142. 
[207] A. Amini, T. Y. Wah, and H. Saboohi, "On Density-Based Data Streams Clustering Algorithms: A 
Survey," Computer Science and Technology, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 116-141, January 2014. 
[208] L. C. Giralte, C. Conde, I. M. De Diego, and E. Cabello, "Detecting denial of service by modelling 
web-server behaviour," ElsevierComputers and Electrical Engineering, vol. 39, no. 7, pp. 2252–
2262, October 2013. 
[209] J. Velasquez, H. Yasuda, and T. Aoki, "Combining the web content and usage mining to understand 
the visitor behavior in a web site," in The Third IEEE International Conference on Data Mining, 
Florida, USA, 2003, pp. 669 - 672. 
[210] J. Velasquez, H. Yasuda, T. Aoki, and R. Weber, "Acquiring knowledge about user's preferences in 
a web site," in International Conference on Information Technology: Research and Education, 
Newark, New Jersey, USA, 2003, pp. 375 - 379. 
[211] K. Sequeira and M. Zaki, "ADMIT: anomaly-based data mining for intrusions," in In Proceedings 
of the eighth ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining, 
New York, NY, 2002, pp. 386-395. 
[212] V. Chandola, V. Mithal, and V. Kumar, "Comparative Evaluation of Anomaly Detection 
Techniques for Sequence Data ," in In Proceedings of the 8th IEEE International Conference on 
Data Mining, Pisa, Italy, 2008, pp. 743 - 748. 
[213] S. Budalakoti, A. Srivastava, R. Akella, and E. Turkov, "Anomaly detection in large sets of high-
dimensional symbol sequences," NASA Ames Research Center, Technical Report. NASA TM-
2006-2145, 2006. 
[214] A. Bifet, G. Holmes, R. Kirkby, and B. Pfahringer, "MOA: Massive Online Analysis," Journal of 
Machine Learning Research, vol. 11, pp. 1601-1604, April 2010. 
[215] D. Drinfeld and N. Vlajic, "Smart Crawlers for Flash-Crowd DDoS: The Attacker's Perspective," in 
IEEE World Congress on Internet Security, Guelph, Canada, 2012, pp. 37 - 44. 
[216] (2016, March) Internet Archive: Wayback Machine. [Online]. https://archive.org/web/ 
[217] J B Grizzard, V Sharma, C Nunnery, B B Kang, and D Dagon, "Peer-to-Peer Botnets: Overview 
and Case Study," in First Workshop on Hot Topics in Understanding Botnets (HotBots), 
Cambridge, MA, 2007, pp. 1-8. 
[218] P. Ciaccia, M. Patella, and P. Zezula, "M-tree: An efficient access method for similarity search in 
metric spaces," in In VLDB Conference, 1997, pp. 426–435. 
[219] D. Yang, E. A. Rundensteiner, and M. O. Ward, "Neighbor-based Pattern Detection for Windows 
209 
 
over Streaming Data," in 12th Intl. Conf. on Extending Database Technology:Advances in Database 
Technology (EDBT), Saint-Petersburg, Russia, 2009, pp. 529-540. 
[220] F. Angiulli and F. Fassetti, "Detecting Distance-based Outliers in Streams of Data," in ACM Conf. 
on Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM), Lisbon, Portugal, 2007, pp. 811-820. 
[221] M. M. Breunig, H. P. Kriegel, R. T. Ng, and J. Sander, "LOF: Identifying Density Based Local 
Outliers," in In Proceedings of the ACM SIGMOD Conference, Dallas, TX, 2000. 
[222] D. K. Tasoulis, G. Ross, and N. M. Adams, "Visualising the cluster structure of data streams," , 81-
92, 2007. 
[223] C. Ruiz, E. Menasalvas, and M. Spiliopoulou, "C-Denstream:Using domain knowledge on a data 
stream," , 287-301, 2009. 
[224] L. Liu, K. Jing, and Y. Guo, "A three-step clustering algorithm over an evolving data stream," , 
160-164, 2009. 
[225] J. Ren and R. Ma, "Density-based data streams clustering over sliding windows," , 248-252, 2009. 
[226] J. Lin and H. Lin, "A density-based clustering over evolving heterogeneous data stream," , 275-277, 
2009. 
[227] I. Ntoutsi, A. Zimek, and T. Palpanas, "Density-based projected clustering over high dimensional 
data streams," , 987-998, 2012. 
[228] M. Hassani, P. Spaus, M. M. Gaber, and T. Seidl, "Density-based projected clustering of data 
streams," , 311-324, 2012. 
[229] A. Forestiero, C. Pizzuti, and G. Spezzano, "A single pass algorithm for clustering evolving data 
streams based on swarm intelligence," Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 1-
26, January 2013. 
[230] V. Bhatnagar, S. Kaur, and S. Chakravarthy, "Clustering data streams using grid-based synopsis," 
Knowledge and Information Systems, pp. 1-26, June 2013. 
[231] L. Wan, W. K. Ng, X. H. Dang, P. S. Yu, and K. Zhang, "Density-based clustering of data streams 
at multiple resolutions," ACM Trans. Knowledge Discovery from Data, vol. 3, no. 3, July 2009. 
[232] C. Jia, C. Tan, and A. Yong, "A grid and density-based clustering algorithm for processing data 
stream.," , 517-521, 2008. 
[233] J. Ren, B. Cai, and C. Hu, "Clustering over data streams based on grid density and index tree," 
Journal of Convergence Information Technology, vol. 6, no. 1, 2011. 
[234] Y. Yang, Z. Liu, and J. Zhang, "Dynamic density-based clustering algorithm over uncertain data 
streams," , 2664-2670, 2012. 
[235] A. Amini and Y. W. Teh, "DENGRIS-Stream: A density-grid-based clustering algorithm for 
evolving data streams over sliding window," , 206-210, 2012. 
[236] H. P. Kriegel, P. Kröger, E. Schubert, and A. Zimek, "LoOP: Local Outlier Probabilities," in In the 
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Information and knowledge management, 2009, pp. 
1649–1652. 
[237] D. Gusfield, Algorithms on strings, 1st ed. New York, United States of America: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. 
 
210 
 
Appendix A – DDoS Malware 
In this section, we give a systematic overview of DDoS-executing malware based on: 1) how they scan for 
new agents, 2) how they recruit new agents, and 3) how they control the agent population. The overview 
of DDoS malware is illustrated in Figure A.1.  
 
DDoS Malware 
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Managment
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Figure A.1 – DDoS malware features 
 
A.1 Scanning Strategies in DDoS-executing Malware 
 
Before any DDoS attack may be launched, an army of agents must be compromised and recruited (into a 
Botnet) for participation in an attack. There are five possible approaches to identifying (i.e., scanning) for 
new agents: 
 Random scanning – In random scanning each compromised host probes random addresses in the IP 
address space. This potentially creates a high traffic volume since many machines probe the same 
addresses.  
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 Hit-list scanning – A machine that performs hit-list scanning, probes all addresses from an externally 
supplied list. When it detects and compromises a vulnerable machine, it sends one half of its initial hit-
list to the compromised machine so that this machine can repeat the same procedure. This technique 
allows a great propagation speed and no collisions during the scanning phase. 
 Topological scanning – Topological scanning uses the information on the compromised host to select 
new targets. For instance, a scanning process may find IP addresses of new hosts on the 
compromised/infected machine. 
 Permutation scanning – During permutation scanning, all compromised machines share a common 
pseudorandom permutation of the IP address space; each IP address is mapped to an index in this 
permutation. A machine begins scanning by using the index computed from its IP address as a starting 
point. Whenever it sees an already infected machine, it chooses a new random start point. 
 Local Subnet scanning – Local subnet scanning can be added to any of the previously described 
techniques to preferentially scan for targets that reside on the same subnet as the compromised host. 
 
The actual scanning process is executed as follows. The bot scans each host individually and determines 
the type and version of the operating system running on the host and if the host has any known 
vulnerabilities that may be exploited. For instance, a host running a specific version of the operating 
system may be susceptible to well-known vulnerabilities if the system has not been patched. The bot then 
generates a list of vulnerable hosts and transmits this information to the attacker by employing either an 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channel or by employing HTTP protocol messages. 
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A.2 Recruiting Strategies in DDoS-executing Malware 
 
Once the attacker has identified and compromised a set of vulnerable machines, his next goal is to inject 
the actual attack code (i.e. malware) onto these machines. There are four common approaches to malware 
propagation: 
 Central – In this method the attack code resides on a central server or a set of servers and each 
compromised host downloads the malware from this repository.  
 Back-chaining – In this method the attack code is downloaded from the machine that was used to 
exploit the system. The infected machine then becomes the source for the next propagation point. Back-
chaining propagation is more survivable than central-source propagation since it avoids a single point 
of failure (central server). 
 Autonomous – This method avoids the file retrieval step by injecting attack instructions directly into the 
target host during the exploitation phase. The malware is carried in the payload of the worm and 
installed on every machine infected by the worm. Autonomous propagation reduces the frequency of 
network traffic needed for agent mobilization, and thus further reduces chances of attack discovery. 
 Passive – Passive methods typically involve the attacker sharing corrupt files through e-mail 
attachments or building web sites that take advantage of known vulnerabilities in a secondary victim’s 
web browser. Upon opening an e-mail attachment or accessing a web site with an embedded DDoS 
agent code, the secondary victim system is compromised. 
 
A.3 Agent Control Mechanisms in DDoS-executing Malware 
 
After successfully recruiting and infecting an agent network (i.e. network of bots), the attacker must be 
able to effectively control its Botnet. In particular, the attacker should be able to issue instructions for 
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attack execution or to be able to upgrade the disseminated malware on each individual agent. Based on the 
communication mechanisms deployed between agent and handler machines, we distinguish between three 
types of Botnets: 1) Botnets with direct communication, and 2) Botnets with indirect communication and 
3) Botnets with peer-to-peer communication. 
A.3.1 Direct Communication 
 
In Botnets with direct communication, the agent and handler machines need to know each other’s identity 
(i.e. IP and port addresses) in order to communicate. This is typically achieved by hard-coding the IP 
address of the handler machine in the attack code that is installed at the agent machine. In turn, each agent 
reports its own identity to the handler; hence, the handler ends up collecting the IP addresses of all 
involved agents. The obvious drawback of this approach is that the discovery of the network’s handler can 
expose the whole DDoS network. Also, since agents and handlers must maintain open ports to facilitate 
direct intercommunication, they are fairly easy to detect. 
A.3.2 Indirect Communication 
 
Due to drawbacks of the direct method, an alternative method utilized by attackers is indirect 
communication using Internet Relay Chat channels – see section 2.2.1.3. One key property of IRC-based 
Botnets is the use of IRC channel as a form of centralized pull-based and thus less involved type of 
communication for the attacker. This property provides the attackers with very efficient communication. 
However, this property also serves as a major disadvantage to the attacker since it represents the single-
point of failure.  
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A.3.3 Peer-to-Peer Communication 
 
Due to the inherent drawbacks of the previous two communication models, Botnet designers have started 
building distributed, the so called peer-to-peer, methods of Botnet communication [217]. In peer-to-peer 
Botnets, there is no centralized point for C&C (i.e., centralize point of failure). Instead, each compromised 
host acts as both a client and a server. Consequently, even if a significant number of bots in a P2P Botnet 
are identified and taken off-line, the overall Botnet’s operation will be only partially affected. 
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Appendix B – Recall, Precision and F1 
In this section, we describe the general meaning and relevance of the recall, precision and F1 metrics to the 
study presented in chapter 4. 
 
First an introduction to some terminology is necessary. The Table B.1 shows a confusion matrix which 
depicts how predictions on instances are tabulated. 
Table B.1 – The confusion matrix 
 
Predicted Label 
Positive Negative 
Known Label 
Positive 
True Positive 
(TP) 
False Negative 
(FN) 
Negative 
False Positive 
(FP) 
True Negative 
(TN) 
 
For simplicity, the assumption is that each instance can only be assigned one of two classes: Positive or 
Negative (e.g. a web session may be benign or malicious). Each instance (e.g. a web session) has a Known 
label, and a Predicted label. Some method is used (e.g. machine learning algorithm) to make predictions on 
each instance. Each instance then increments one cell in the confusion matrix. 
 
A confusion matrix can be summarized using various formulas. The Table B.2 shows the most commonly 
used formulas. 
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Table B.2 – Summaries of the measures 
Measure Formula Meaning 
Precision TP / (TP + FP) The percentage of positive predictions that are correct. 
Recall / Sensitivity TP / (TP + FN) 
The percentage of positive labeled instances that were 
predicted as positive. 
Accuracy 
(TP + TN)  
/  
(TP + TN + FP + FN) 
The percentage of predictions that are correct. 
F1 
2*Recall*Precision/ 
Recall + Precision 
Summary of Recall and Precision 
 
Different problem domains call for the need to use different measures for summarizing prediction quality.  
1. For example, in a data set of 10,000 samples, where 100 of these samples are labeled positive, a 
predictor that predicts "Negative" for every instance it is presented with evaluates to Precision = 100%, 
and Accuracy = 99%. This predictor would be entirely useless, and yet these measures show it 
performs very well. The same predictor would evaluate to Recall = 0%. In this case, Recall seems to be 
most in tune with how well the classifier is actually performing.  
2. If a classifier predicts positive on all instances in the data set in case 1.), then Precision = 1%, Recall = 
100% and Accuracy = 1%. In this case, Precision and Accuracy show that this classifier is problematic.  
3. F1 score summarizes the first two metrics into a single value, in a way that both metrics are given equal 
importance. Namely, the F1 score penalizes a classifier that gives high recall but sacrifices precision 
and vice versa. As stated above, a classifier that classifies all examples as positive has perfect recall but 
very poor precision. Recall and precision should therefore be close to each other, otherwise the F1 score 
yields a value closer to the smaller of the two. 
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Appendix C – Nonparametric Statistical Tests 
C.1 Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test (also known as Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney Rank Sum Test) 
 
The Mann-Whitney Rank Sum test, when applied on two independent data samples, evaluates whether 
there is a significant difference between the two sample medians. If so, we can conclude that there is a 
high likelihood that the samples represent populations with different median values. Initially, the data 
values in both samples are assigned a ranking score with the highest rank given to the best score (in our 
case that would be the most popular page in web page popularity statistic or the longest viewed web page 
in the page viewing time statistic or the longest browsing sequence length in the browsing length statistic). 
In instances where two or more subjects have the same score, the average of the ranks is assigned to all 
scores tied for a given rank. Next, once all of the subjects have been assigned a rank, the sum of the ranks 
for each of the groups is computed. Upon determining the sum of the ranks for both groups, the values Ul 
and U2 statistic are computed by employing (C.1) and (C.2) (from [167]). 
 
         
        
 
                                                    (C.1) 
         
        
 
                                                         (C.2) 
 
where     is the sum of the ranks in sample 1 and     is the sum of the ranks in sample 2. The smaller 
of the two values U1 versus U2 is designated as the obtained U statistic. If the sample sizes employed in a 
study are relatively large, the normal distribution can be employed to approximate the Mann-Whitney U 
statistic. Although sources do not agree on the value of the sample size which justifies employing the 
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normal approximation of the Mann-Whitney distribution, they generally state that the size of each sample 
should be greater than 20. Expression (C.3) (from [167]) provides the normal approximation of the Mann-
Whitney U test statistic. 
 
  
   
    
 
     
         
  
                                                                     (C.3) 
 
In order for the median between the two samples to be significantly different, the obtained absolute value 
of the z-score must be equal to or greater than the tabled critical value at the pre-specified level of 
significance. The tabled critical two-tailed significance with 95% confidence is z = 1.96.  
C.2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for 2 Independent Samples 
 
This nonparametric test compares the cumulative frequency distributions of the two independent samples. 
If, in fact, the two samples are derived from the same population, the two cumulative frequency 
distributions would be expected to be identical or reasonably similar to one another. The test protocol for 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for two independent samples is based on the principle that if there is a 
significant difference at any point along the two cumulative frequency distributions, the researcher can 
conclude there is a high likelihood the samples are derived from different populations. 
 
The first step in applying the test is to calculate the so-called Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (K-S) which is 
the supremum of the set of difference between the empirical cumulative distribution functions (empirical 
CDFs) of the two samples. It is defined as follows (from [167]): 
 
                                                                           (C.4) 
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where        is the empirical CDF of one of the samples and        is the empirical CDF of the other 
sample.  
 
The empirical CDF F(X) can be defined as follows. Let (x1, …, xn) be independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) real random variables with the common CDF F(t). Then the empirical distribution 
function is defined as (from [167]): 
 
      
                               
 
  
 
 
        
 
                                (C.5) 
 
where 1{A} is the indicator of event A. 
 
In order to determine whether the empirical CDFs of the two samples are significantly different at α=0.05 
level of significance (i.e., with 95% confidence),         must be greater than or equal to the so-called 
critical value of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test – parameter K. For samples with more than 25 values, K 
corresponds to (from [167]):  
 
         
     
    
                                                                 (C.6) 
 
where n1 and n2 are the number of values in the two samples. 
 
  
220 
 
Appendix D – Unsupervised Outlier Detection 
Algorithms for Data Streams with 
Concept Drift 
 
D.1 Continuous Outlier Detection (COD) - Distance-based Outlier 
Detection Algorithm 
 
The Continuous Outlier Detection or COD is an outlier detection algorithm based on the number of 
neighbourhood points within a spherical radius. In COD [203], given a set of instances currently in the 
sliding window, the new instance x is an outlier if there are less than k instances within (Euclidean) 
distance R from x. Otherwise x is labeled as a non-outlier. 
 
The bounded storage and concept drift constraints in COD are addressed by employing the sliding time 
window model with equal weight assignment to each instance in the window. The real-time/single-pass 
constraint of data streams is addressed by employing the M-tree [218] data structure to efficiently (in 
O(logn) time) execute the range query search for k neighbors of x that are within distance R from it. Note 
that COD is an improvement of Abstract-C [219] and STORM [220] which provide worse (O(n)) space 
complexity and worse (O(n)) running-time, respectfully. 
 
The three shortcomings of COD include:  
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1. The algorithm employs a fixed sliding time window model with equal weights and as such can only 
react to slow/gradual concept drifts. 
2. The algorithm has a high space complexity as it maintains all points in the sliding window. 
3. The algorithm assumes the existence of exclusively spherically-shaped clusters (i.e., assumes a 
specific type of input distribution). Note that spherically-shaped clusters can overlap between each 
other dependent on the selected cluster radius R. As such, this algorithm may be sensitive to noise 
(i.e., actual outlier points may be labeled as inliers). 
D.2 Density-based Outlier Detection Algorithms 
 
In density-based methods, such as ILOF [204], Denstream [205] and D-Stream [206], clusters are formed 
as dense regions of input space which are separated from sparse regions of input space (i.e., outlier 
clusters/areas). The density-based algorithms have the advantage over COD as they can discover clusters 
of arbitrary shape. As such they may be less sensitive to noise in data streams. 
D.2.1 Incremental Local Outlier Factor (ILOF) 
 
The Local Outlier Factor (LOF) is density-based algorithm for finding local high-density and low-density 
regions of the input space. The main idea of the LOF algorithm [221] is to label each input instance as an 
outlier with a confidence value called the local outlier factor (LOF). Data points with high LOF are located 
in low-density regions of the input space and typically represent stronger outliers, unlike data points 
belonging to uniform (high-density) clusters that usually tend to have lower LOF values. The algorithm for 
computing the LOFs for a data instance q includes the following steps (from [204]): 
1. Compute k-distance(q) as the distance to the kth-nearest neighbor of q. 
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2. Compute reach-ability distance of data instance q (Expression (D.1)) with respect to data instance p in 
the sliding window. 
 
reach-dist(q, p) = max(d(q, p), k-distance(p))                                               (D.1) 
 
where d(q,p) is Euclidean distance from q to p. 
3. Compute local reach-ability density (LRD) of data instance q (Expression (D.2)) as the inverse of the 
average reach-ability distance based on the k-nearest neighbors (KNN) of the data instance q. 
 
LRD(q) = 
 
 
              
      
                                                           (D.2) 
 
where KNN are neighbors of q that are k-distance or less distant from q. 
4. Compute LOF of data instance q (Expression (D.3)) as the ratio of the average local reach-ability 
density of q's KNN and local reach-ability density of the data instance q. 
 
LOF(q) = 
            
 
      
                                                                 (D.3) 
 
The incremental version of the LOF algorithm, i.e., ILOF [204], computes LOF value for each new input 
instance by employing the M-tree to perform the KNN queries. However, the drawbacks of ILOF include: 
1. It employs a fixed sliding time window for exclusively slow concept drift handling (same as COD). 
2. It has the worst time complexity, among the four algorithms, since it requires updating the KNN (and 
LRD/LOF) of all points that are within k-distance from the new input instance x (in O(nlogn)). 
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3. The algorithm does not provide any recommendations on how high the LOF value must be for the 
point to be declared an outlier. 
4. Similarly to COD, this algorithm has a high space complexity as it maintains all points in the sliding 
window. 
D.2.2 Denstream 
 
Denstream [205] is a data steam clustering algorithm that maintains two structures — p-micro-clusters 
(potential or non-outlier clusters) and o-micro-clusters (outlier clusters). Note that points associated with 
o-micro-clusters are considered as outliers in the algorithm. For each p- and o-micro-cluster, the algorithm 
stores the cluster feature vector — a popular summarization technique for data stream clustering. Instead 
of storing all points included in each cluster, only a vector of the summarization features is maintained.  
D.2.2.1 Micro-cluster Feature Vector 
The cluster feature vector of a micro-cluster includes the following entries: N, the number of data objects, 
WLS, the weighted linear sum of the data objects, and WSS, the weighted sum of squared data objects. 
Each p- and o-micro-cluster structure has an associated weight that indicates its importance based on the 
temporality (micro-clusters with no recently arrived objects tend to lose importance, i.e. their respective 
weights continuously decrease over time).  
 
The weight w of a micro-cluster Mi at time T is computed according to Expression (D.4): 
 
w =                                                                                 (D.4) 
 
where t1, ... , tj are the timestamps of when points 1, ... , j were mapped to Mi. 
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The importance of each object decreases according to the fading function in (D.5), parameterized with λ, a 
user-defined parameter [200]. 
 
f (t) =                                                                                  (D.5) 
 
The WLS and WSS for micro-cluster Mi are computed according to Expressions (D.6) and (D.7), 
respectively. Note that these summarization features can be incrementally updated as the new points are 
inserted into the cluster.  
 
WLS =              
                                                                 (D.6) 
 
WSS =              
                                                                 (D.7) 
 
From Expressions (D.6) and (D.7), it is possible to compute a micro-cluster's radius r and center c 
according to Expressions (D.8) and (D.9), respectively. 
 
r  =  
   
 
  
   
 
 
 
                                                                     (D.8) 
 
c  = 
   
 
                                                                                  (D.9) 
 
D.2.2.2 Insertion and Labeling Process of New Data Inputs 
The insertion step in the algorithm of a new object xj is as follows: 
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1. Locate the nearest p-micro-cluster Pi and update Pi's N, WLS, WSS, r and c temporarily for now. If 
the updated r of the nearest Pi is less than a predefined boundary ε (a user-defined parameter) insert xj 
into Pi. Note that a point inserted into p-micro-cluster is recognized as an inlier (i.e., non-outlier). 
2. Otherwise, the algorithm resets Pi's N, WLS, WSS, r and c to the original values before the arrival of 
xj. Instead, the algorithm tries to insert xj into its closest o-micro-cluster. The insertion process is the 
same as in step 1. If the insertion of the new point into its closest o-micro-cluster is successful (i.e., r 
of the closest o-micro-cluster is less than ε) the new point is recognized as an outlier.  
3. Lastly, if the insertion to the closest p- or o-micro-cluster was unsuccessful in both cases, a new o-
micro-cluster is created with a single point xj (implying that the point is recognized as an outlier). 
Note that algorithm has the initial training phase that constructs the initial set of p- and o-micro-clusters. 
The number of training data points processed during the training phase is a user-defined parameter. 
D.2.2.3 Micro-cluster Maintenance 
The algorithm promotes o-micro-clusters to p-micro-clusters whenever o-micro-cluster's weight, after 
insertion of a new point, exceeds β × μ (two user-defined parameters). The promotion of an o-micro-
cluster to (regular) p-micro-cluster indicates that input distribution (i.e., concept) captured with this o-
micro-cluster has now become a dominant new input distribution/concept.  
 
The outdated or sparse p- and o-micro-clusters are discarded as follows. At delimited time periods Tp (as 
defined in (D.10)), each p-micro-cluster with weight w < β × μ is removed.   
 
Tp =  
 
 
    
  
     
                                                                   (D.10) 
 
Similarly, a o-micro-cluster is  removed if its weight w is less than ξ, as defined in (D.11): 
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ξ  = 
                
        
                                                                (D.11) 
 
In (D.11) tc is the current time and to is the creation time of the o-micro-cluster. Note that o-micro-cluster 
that is never promoted to p-micro-cluster represents the noise in data stream and not the true emerging 
concept/input distribution in the data stream. 
 
 
In summary, the Denstream algorithm addresses the constraints of the data stream traffic as follows: 
 The bounded memory is handled by employing the micro-cluster synopsis structure and by periodically 
removing the clusters with older and no-longer-relevant data. Note that the space complexity of 
Denstream is orders of magnitude smaller than in COD and ILOF since only the summary of data 
inputs is maintained by the algorithm. 
 The real-time constraint is handled by employing a simple incremental update of cluster feature vectors 
of micro-clusters as new points are presented to the algorithm. 
 The concept drift is handled by employing a decaying weight function over the micro-clusters to ensure 
that clusters with old and no-longer-relevant data points (that are highly likely part of the old and 
outdated concept) are discarded from the learning process. The new emerging concepts are initially 
placed in o-micro-clusters and are subsequently placed inside to p-micro-clusters once they become 
part of the dominant input trend.  
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A number of extensions of Denstream have been proposed in literature, including [222], [223], [224], 
[225], [226], [227], [228] and [229], for different application scenarios. Note that the extensions achieve 
the same or worst time/space complexity and handle the concept drift in similar fashion as Denstream. 
D.2.3 D-Stream 
 
D-Stream is another density-based algorithm that clusters regions of input space, called grids, into dense 
(i.e., non-outlier) and sparse (i.e., outlier) grids. D-Stream and Denstream algorithms have three similar 
attributes. Firstly, both algorithms summarize input data into a synopsis data structure (micro-cluster in 
Denstream and density-grid in D-Stream). Secondly, both algorithms address the concept drift in similar 
fashion by applying the decaying weight function over the synopsis data structure and by removing sparse 
cluster/grids once their weight falls below a user-specified threshold. Thirdly, both algorithms facilitate 
incremental and efficient updates to synopsis data structure to address the real-time/single-pass constraint 
of data streams. The definition of the grid and the outlier detection process in D-Stream are described 
below. 
D.2.3.1 Multi-dimensional Density-Grid 
The definition of the multi-dimensional density grid is as follows (from [206] and [230]). Let us assume 
that input data is bounded by d dimensions and each data instance is defined within the space  S = S1 × S2 
× · · · × Sd. Also, assume that the first x dimensions are continuous and subsequent y = (d − x) dimensions 
are categorical. Let li and hi, respectively, be the lowest and the highest data values along numeric 
dimension i, as known to the domain expert
19
. The range ri = [li , hi] of each numeric dimension i is divided 
into pi number of equally-wide intervals [li
1
 , hi
1
], [li
2
 , hi
2
], ... , [li
pi
 , hi
pi
], such that li = l1 and hi
pi
 = hi. Note 
that categorical data naturally fits in this structure, where the number of intervals pi for a categorical 
                                                     
19
 For instance, each numerical feature can be normalized to have values between 0 and 1. 
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attribute is the size of its domain. Domain values of categorical attribute are arbitrarily mapped to 
continuous natural numbers starting from one, which are used as interval values. 
 
The density grid cell g is defined as a partitioning of S into S1, j1 × S2, j2 · · · × Sd, jd and is denoted by its 
coordinates ji = 1, . . . , pi. 
 
The data space S is partitioned into N density grids as defined in (D.12): 
 
N =   
 
                                                                            (D.12) 
 
 
A data instance x = (x1, x2, ... , xd) can be uniquely mapped to a density grid cell g as shown in (D.13): 
 
g(x) = (j1, j2, ... , jd) where xi ϵ Si, ji                                                                                (D.13) 
 
Each object at time t is associated to a density coefficient that decreases over time, as shown in (D.14), 
where λ   (0, 1) is a decay factor.  
 
D(xj , t) = λ
t − t j
                                                                      (D.14) 
 
The density of a grid cell g at time t, D(g, t), is given by the sum of the adjusted densities of each object 
that is mapped to g at or before time t (D.15). 
 
D(g, t) =                                                                             (D.15) 
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Note that the algorithm updates the density of a grid D(g, t) incrementally as shown in (D.16) and only 
when a new data record xj is mapped to that grid. 
 
D(g , tj) = λ
tj − tl
 D(g, tl) + 1                                                             (D.16) 
 
where tj is the arrival time of the new point to grid g and tl is the last time grid g has received/absorbed a 
point. 
 
The grids can be labeled as either dense (non-outlier regions of the input space) or sparse (as outlier 
regions of the input space). At time t, a grid g is a dense grid if 
 
D(g, t)  
  
    λ 
                                                                     (D.17) 
 
where Cl > 1 is a user-defined threshold, N is defined in (D.12) and λ is the decaying factor of inputs. The 
expression in (D.17) is based on the proof in [206] showing that the average density of the grid can be at 
most 
 
    λ 
 while the maximum density of a grid can be at most 
 
   λ 
. This also implies that N > Cl must 
be true. 
 
At time t, a grid g is a sparse and sporadic grid if 
 
D(g, t)  
      
       
      
                                                                (D.18) 
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where Cl <= 1 is another user-defined threshold and tg (t > tg) is the last insertion of a point into grid g. 
D.2.3.2 Insertion and Labeling Process of New Data Inputs 
In the algorithm, authors propose storing grid cell density summations (as given in (D.16)) in a hash table 
for efficient updates of densities as new data instances are presented to the algorithm. The hash table (non-
uniquely) maps the key (grid coordinates j1, j2, ... , jd) to a list of grid cell density summations. The hash 
table employs a hash function to compute an index from the given key into an array of grid cell density 
summations. Considering that the number of grid cells may be large, especially in high-dimensional 
streams, only the density summations for grid cells that have data mapped to them should be stored. 
 
The insertion process for a new instance xj in D-Stream is as follows: 
1. By employing the mapping function shown in (D.13), calculate the coordinates of the grid Gi for xj. 
2. Locate Gi in the hash table by using the computed coordinates as the retrieval key. If Gi does not exist 
in the hash table, create it. 
3. Update Gi's density by employing (D.16).  
Note that if xj is assigned to a dense grid then it is recognized as an non-outlier, otherwise (if it is assigned 
to a sparse and sporadic grid) it is recognized as an outlier. 
D.2.3.3 Density-grid Maintenance 
The density grid maintenance in D-stream is similar to micro-cluster maintenance in Denstream. Namely, 
the algorithm promotes sparse grids to dense grids whenever sparse grid's density satisfies the condition in 
(D.17) and downgrades dense grids to sparse grids if condition in (D.18) is satisfied.  
 
Also, periodically, the algorithm verifies if sparse (outdated) grids should be discarded. The periodicity of 
the check Tp is defined in the following expression (D.19):   
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Tp  =           
  
  
 
     
     
                                                       (D.19) 
 
where Cl > 1 is the same parameter used in (D.17) and (D.18) and Cm > 1 is another user-defined 
threshold. The sparse and sporadic grid is removed if the condition in (D.18) is satisfied for 2 Tp intervals 
in a row. Note that sparse and sporadic grid that is never promoted to dense grid represents the noise in 
data stream and not the true emerging concept/input distribution in the data stream. 
 
In summary, the D-stream algorithm addresses the constraints of the data stream traffic as follows: 
 
 The bounded memory is handled by employing the density-grid cell synopsis structure and by 
periodically removing grids with older and irrelevant data mappings. 
 The real-time constraint is handled by employing a simple incremental update of grid cell densities and 
by employing a hash table to efficiently search for new point mappings. 
 The concept drift is handled by employing a decaying weight function over the grid cells to ensure that 
sparse grid cells with old and no-longer-relevant data point mappings (that are highly likely part of the 
old and outdated concept) are discarded from the learning process. The new emerging concepts are 
initially placed in sporadic grids and are subsequently mapped to dense grids once they become part of 
the dominant input trend. 
 
Similarly to the case of Denstream algorithm, a number of extensions of D-Stream have been proposed in 
literature, including [231], [232], [233], [234], [235] and [230] for different application scenarios. Again, 
note that these extensions also achieve the same or worst time/space complexity and handle the concept 
drift in the same fashion as D-Stream. 
 
